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ELEMENTS
OF
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE
REV R. H. RIVERS, D.D.,
AUTHOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY THOMAS O. SUMMERS, D.D.



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P R E F A C E .

FOR more than eighteen years, the author has been engaged in teaching Mental Philosophy. For many years, different text-books were used; but none of them were satisfactory, because they omitted any discussion of the will. About five years ago, the writer commenced teaching by lectures; the result of this has been the preparation of this book.

The work is designed to meet a want in the schools of the Confederacy, and the author thinks it has the following characteristics :

1. It is thoroughly analytic. An attempt is made to give a thorough analysis of all the powers of mind, including intellect, sensibilities, and will.
2. It is exhaustive. The mental phenomena are fully presented. The phenomena of idiocy and of disordered mind are presented, as well as those of mind in the normal condition.

3. It exhibits, clearly, the connection between mind and body, and shows the difference between brute and human mind.

4. It shows a marked distinction between feeling and knowledge.

5. Upon all controverted points it gives the views of different authors, and thus attempts to guide the student to the truth. An honest attempt is made to dissect and expose false theories, and thus to guard the reader against error. By comparing truth and error, the difference between them may be clearly seen.

6. The view taken of duty elevates it above all other considerations. If this philosophy is true, the culminating point of intellect is *duty*, and upon this reason and conscience, sensibility and will, repose with entire satisfaction.

7 Its view of the will is taken from an Arminian stand-point, and it honestly attempts to expose the errors of Edwards, as ending directly in the doctrine of necessity.

The author makes no claim to originality ; he has studied the subject as thoroughly as possible to one

of his powers, and with great diffidence presents the result of his labors to the world.

The book is intended for schools and colleges, and claims only to present the elements of one of the noblest of human sciences. The recitation must be accompanied by lectures from the instructor, who will enlarge upon many texts.

The writer recommends to teachers the following method of instruction :

1. Let the teacher give the outlines of some ten pages, assigned as a lesson. Let this be accompanied by such illustrations and explanations as may seem to be necessary. Let this be done on the day previous to recitation.

2. Require the student to give, in his own language, a rigid analysis of the lesson assigned—the teacher proposing such questions as may suggest themselves to him.

3. Require the student to recapitulate the lesson of the preceding day. This may be done with brevity; and in doing this, he may be greatly assisted by reference to the headings of sections.


4. Require the student to illustrate the subject

discussed, not only by repeating such examples as may be found in the work, but also by calling upon his own resources.

5. The book is designed to be suggestive; and I urge upon teachers to follow out any train of thought suggested by the text, and present this in a familiar lecture to the class. The teacher must magnify his noble calling, and be an instructor as well as a hearer of recitations. It is not designed, by any means, to supersede the lectures of the faithful teacher; but to present many themes on which the intelligent instructor may discourse with eloquence and truth.

The author may be allowed to say, in conclusion, that the work would have appeared a year ago, but for a calamity by which he came very near being deprived of his life. The latter part of the work has been prepared amid great sufferings.

Trembling under a sense of his responsibility to God and to his country, the writer sends forth this book with a prayer that it may be a blessing to those who may peruse its pages.



TO THE
REV BISHOP PAINE, D.D.,

AND TO

PROF HENRY TUTWILER, LL.D.,

FROM ASSOCIATION WITH WHOM, YEARS AGO,

THE AUTHOR IMBIBED A LOVE OF TRUTH, A DESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE,

AND

A RESPECT FOR MODEST AND EXALTED WORTH,

WHICH NO SUBSEQUENT CHANGES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EFFACE,

This work is most affectionately dedicated,

BY THEIR OBLIGED FRIEND,

R. H. RIVERS.

ELEMENTS

OF

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART I

THE INTELLECT.

CHAPTER I.

STATEMENT OF THE SUBJECT.

SECTION I

EXPLANATION OF TERMS.

Psychology—Empirical Psychology—Rational Psychology—Mental Philosophy—Subjective—Objective—Power—Function—Instinct—Consciousness—Sensation—Perception—Memory—Imagination—Comparison—Association—Reason—Sensibility—Emotion—Desire—Will.

THE term psychology is derived from two Greek words—*ψυχή*, the soul, and *λόγος*, a discourse. Psychology is the science of the soul. It is divided into empirical and rational psychology. By the former is meant the science of mind as based upon experience. The Greek word *ἐμπειρία* signifies experience; and hence it has been suggested that we use the word *experimental* instead of empirical,

especially as the latter term has been long employed as a synonym of charlatan, or quack.

Rational psychology is the science of the mind, based, not upon experience, but upon the reason. In empirical science, we interrogate consciousness, and take counsel from experience. In rational science, we interrogate reason, and, ignoring experience, we found our doctrine on the intuitions of reason. Locke is regarded as the founder of the empirical school, and Kant of the rational. Cousin seeks to unite the two, and is the founder of the eclectic school.

Mental philosophy is a systematic arrangement of all the phenomena, conditions, laws, and facts connected with mind. Sir William Hamilton prefers the term psychology, because it can be the more easily converted into an adjective, psychological, which is specific and forcible.

The term subjective has reference always to self; objective, to not-self.

Power implies the possibility of effecting or suffering changes. When applied to the mind, it embraces faculty and capacity—faculty implying the possibility of effecting changes, and capacity of suffering changes.

Function implies the specific act or character of power.

Instinct is an intelligent impulse to the employment of means for the accomplishment of an end, without any knowledge of the end to be secured. The spider weaves its web without any knowledge of the end that is to be attained. So the beaver builds its dam, and the bee makes its cell. These are all instinctive acts.

Consciousness is the power by which the mind attests its knowledge, whether internal or external, and all its acts and states. It is a witness. If the mind knows, it is conscious that it knows; so if it feels or wills, it is conscious of willing or feeling.

Sensation is external feeling. It is that subjective state of mind or body caused by any outward object coming in contact with any one of the senses.

Perception is the power by which the mind acquires knowledge through the senses. It always accompanies sensation. It takes cognizance of the object of sensation. It is taking, through the senses, a knowledge of outward objects.

Memory is the faculty by which the mind retains and recalls knowledge. It is the faculty of accumulation.

Imagination is the faculty by which known elements are combined with new creations, which have no real existence. The elements are *real*; the combinations are *ideal*.

Comparison is the faculty of judging. By it one object or thought is laid alongside another, and the relations of the two are perceived.

Association is the faculty by which one thought is made to suggest another.

Reason is the intuitive faculty. It is the power by which the mind "intuits" the existence of objects, the knowledge of which cannot be attained through the senses, as of space or time.

Sensibility is the faculty of internal feeling. It differs from sensation in this : sensation is connected with the body; sensibility is independent of the body. They differ as grief differs from physical pain, or joy—pure, internal joy—from bodily pleasure.

Emotion is that excitement of the feelings arising from the perception of an object, either agreeable or disagreeable.

Desire is the feeling seeking the object that excited the emotion. It is a blind impulse to action.

Will is the faculty by which we choose or refuse. It is the power of choice, and always implies an alternative.

SECTION II

DIFFICULTIES OF MENTAL SCIENCE.

Change in the Method of Investigation—Nature of Phenomena invisible—Intangible—Absent—Science abstract—Conflicting Theories—Ambiguity of Terms.

All sciences have their difficulties. To master these difficulties requires energetic and persevering effort. Difficulties meet the student, from the acquisition of the first elements to the attainment of the most profound and abstruse principles. This is especially true of the science of which we are about to treat.

1. The whole method of investigation is changed from outer objects to the mind itself. The mind, it is true, classifies the objects of physical science; but in mental science it is the mind examining its own phenomena, classifying its own powers, and investigating its own nature. In all other sciences, the materials on which we operate, the instruments with which the operation is performed, and the operating agent are all different. For example, the astronomer uses his telescope as the instrument for the examination of the heavenly bodies; the astronomer, the telescope, and the heavenly bodies, are distinct the one from the other. But the mental philosopher is at once all of these combined.

Mind is the subject investigating, the object investigated, and the instrument with which the investigation is made.

2. Another difficulty peculiar to this science is this: In all other sciences the phenomena are visible or tangible; in this science the phenomena are invisible and intangible. The chemist can see and touch the objects he investigates; and so can the botanist; but the psychologist has not these advantages.

3. In all other sciences the phenomena are examined while they are present; but in this science the phenomena are usually, if not always, absent. If the mental philosopher is examining memory, for example, he cannot at the same time be committing, but is compelled to examine the action of memory as it has taken place at some former period. So, to examine any emotion, he has to bring to mind some past emotion, and notice its rise, progress, and end.

4. Another difficulty arises from the abstract nature of the science. To become enlisted in abstractions, so as to acquire the energy essential to success, requires far more than ordinary effort. We know nothing which can be a symbol of the mind. We can have no brilliant experiments, as can the naturalist; no splendid representations of intellect,

by means of paintings, as the astronomer can have of comet and sun and planet. No mathematical figure; no square, or compass, or quadrant; no painting or sculpture; no composition or recombination of physical elements, can be employed to embody the varied forms of intellect. No human ingenuity has ever thought of devising an apparatus that can illustrate or analyze the faculties of the mind.

5. The numerous conflicting theories are well calculated to enhance the difficulty of psychological study. No theory is capable of mathematical demonstration; sophisms assume the appearance of sound reasoning, and fallacies take the garb of truth. These opposing theories, advocated with much learning, are apt to confuse the mind.

6. The ambiguity of language presents no inconsiderable difficulty in prosecuting the study of mental philosophy. To apply acute and obtuse to angles is common, and the terms thus applied are easily understood; but when we apply them to intellect, they are not so palpable. We can readily understand the word reflect, when applied to the mirror; but it is not so free from ambiguity, when applied to the mind. We can readily understand the process of analysis, when performed in the laboratory by the skilful chemist; but it is much

more difficult to understand and to perform the process of mental analysis. Indeed, our entire vocabulary is of material origin; and hence the difficulty of employing it in reference to immaterial objects.

SECTION III

METHOD OF OVERCOMING THESE DIFFICULTIES.

Love of Science — Perseverance — Docility — Energy — Candor —
Seriousness.

We have candidly admitted that the science of mind has its difficulties, numerous and peculiar. We desire now to show how these difficulties may be surmounted.

1. We urge upon the student to cultivate a love for the science. It is, indeed, a noble science, well worthy of your love. The world of mind is the most beautiful of the worlds in the vast universe. In comparison with the science of mind, all physical science is of minor importance. It embraces man in all the complexity of nature—man, thinking, feeling, and acting—man, as the head and the centre on earth of all that we see, or hear, or consider; the personal microcosm, in whom all else is imaged and foreshadowed; the marvellous creature by whom all else is surpassed and ruled. The

physical frame of man is indeed fearfully and wonderfully made—the yielding flesh, the delicate nerve, the resisting bone, the pulsating heart, the flowing blood, the flashing eye, the sensitive ear, all indicate the greatness of the Divine Architect, and the wonderful character of his creature man. But it is the mind that imparts to man his dignity and his glory. The conscious, self-acting mind, unlocking the past and penetrating into the future; the mind, far-reaching and mysterious; with powers lofty and varied, claims our investigation, and the investigation demands our love. A love of the science for its own sake, will enable the student to overcome the difficulties which beset his path, and to make successful, if not rapid progress.

2. Perseverance is absolutely essential to success in the cultivation of this science. The student must not be appalled by the ambiguity of language, the countless theories, absurd and conflicting, or the abstract nature of the science, from prosecuting the study until the truth is attained and the difficulties mastered.

3. Docility, so far as it is compatible with a manly independence, is also requisite to a successful prosecution of the science of mind. The student must be willing to be taught, and must look up to the great lights of science.

4. A candid spirit, unwarped by prejudice, and untainted by falsehood, must characterize psychological investigations. We must not first make a theory, and then conform the phenomena to the theory; but our theories must grow out of the phenomena, and correspond with them.

5. No difficulty can be overcome without energy. In morals, in finances, and in the prosecution of science, energy is necessary. Without patient industry, this great world of mind must ever remain unexplored, and these rich fields of thought must ever be uncultivated. To sound the depths of the human intellect, requires an energy which yields not to sloth, which shrinks from no investigation, and which wearies at no labor.

6. A deeply serious spirit is laid down by President Mahan, as absolutely necessary to the successful prosecution of this study. No trifling spirit is at all compatible with the majesty of the mind. In this great temple of truth there is no place for trifling. He that worships here, must come deeply impressed with the importance of the subject, and inspired almost with awe at its contemplation.

Let the student who now enters upon the investigation of the noblest truths, endeavor to heed the instructions here given. As we advance together,

amid these rugged walks, let him not forget that with a love of truth, a holy enthusiasm in the cause of science, an untiring perseverance and meek docility, an unfaltering candor and an all-pervading seriousness; he may not merely enter the vestibule, but may penetrate into the inmost recesses of the great temple of truth.

SECTION IV

UTILITY OF THE STUDY.

Subjective Utility—Objective Utility—Bread-and-Butter Sciences—Mistaken Views—Connection of Mental Philosophy with Theology—With Law—With Medicine—With Moral Philosophy—With Rhetoric and Eloquence.

The age is emphatically utilitarian. The tendency of the Anglo-Saxon mind is to utilitarianism. We are disposed to condemn any science whose utility is not obvious. On this ground, objections have been urged to metaphysical studies. It is, therefore, incumbent on the teacher to exhibit the utility of the science. Every man prefers the useful to the useless—the more useful to the less useful.

The utility of mental science is first subjective. The aim of education is two-fold: 1, to develop the mind, and 2, to impart knowledge. The development of mind, as it refers to the subject in which all knowledge inheres, is called subjective. The ac-

cumulation of knowledge, as it refers to the object matter, about which our cognitive faculties are exercised, is called objective. It is very clear that the attainment of truth, and the development of mind, are not always commensurate. It is a question both curious and interesting, which end of education embraces the greater utility: "Is truth, or the mental exercise in the pursuit of truth, the superior end?" Sir William Hamilton does not hesitate to decide in favor of the mental exercise. He says, "Science is a chase, and in a chase the pursuit is always of greater value than the game."

Our hopes, like towering falcons, aim
At objects in an airy height;
But all the pleasure of the game
Is afar off to view the flight.

We do not hesitate to claim for mental philosophy the greatest subjective utility. It awakens curiosity, and energizes thought. It turns the mind in upon itself, and induces self-reflection. It increases mental activity, and arouses to the most thorough investigation. It imparts a power of discrimination, both nice and accurate. It begets a patience which no toil can exhaust, and arouses all the faculties of the mind to the noblest, most vigorous, independent, and continued energy. While it gives to the searcher after truth a manly self-reliance, it

imparts to him a becoming modesty and a praiseworthy humility.

Finally, as all "pleasure is the concomitant of activity, its degree being in proportion as that activity is spontaneously intense, its prolongation in proportion as that activity is spontaneously continued," to promote the activity of our powers is thus to promote our happiness. Perfection in all man's attributes, is doubtless his destination; and as no human science contributes so much to his perfection, (including happiness,) so no human science deserves more consideration, than the philosophy of the human mind.

We notice, in the second place, the objective utility of mental science. The term useful has been appropriated to those sciences, a knowledge of which will give a man dexterity in the acquisition of wealth, or in the invention and use of machines that will save labor. They have been not inaptly styled by the Germans, "Bread-and-Butter Sciences." In view of this exclusive appropriation of the term useful, mental science has been regarded as lacking in the element of utility. We believe this to be a grave error. It can be easily shown that the study of mental philosophy is not only subjectively useful, but that it possesses objective utility. It is not only absolutely useful, but it possesses relative utility.

We argue the objective utility of this study, from its close connection with the great science of theology. Man, in his intelligence and freedom, in his sense of accountability to law, and in his consciousness of moral obligation, affords the highest, if not the only proof that can be found in nature, of the existence of God. While materialism leads to atheism and to fatalism, a correct psychology leads to theism, and to a just apprehension of a great intelligent First Cause. A correct psychology teaches us that intelligence is independent of material organization, and “a power independent of matter necessarily implies an immaterial subject—a spirit. If then, the original independence of mind on matter, in other words, if the spirituality of mind in man, be supposed a datum of observation, in this datum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God.” For if the result of our investigations should lead us to the conclusion that human intelligence is the mere result of material organization, then, so far as we know, matter preceded intelligence—intelligence was necessitated by material organism. Arguing from this, we conclude that matter is eternal, and that atheism is true. But when we come to establish the truth of God’s moral government, we find the strongest proof is that uncompromising law of duty of which we are all conscious. That

law, dependent upon our liberty, and holding us to a rigid accountability, almost demonstrates the theism of the Bible. The utterances of man's moral nature are almost as conclusive as the utterances of revelation itself. Indeed, without these utterances, revelation would be deprived of its ablest support, and its own words would lose half their force. Were there no law of duty in man, we might in vain address to him argument to establish the fact of God's moral government.

2. The objective utility of mental science is seen further in its relations to the science of medicine. So intimate is the connection of mind and body, that it is almost impossible to understand the condition of one, without knowing something of the state of the other. If medical science were deprived of the assistance of psychology, half of its dignity would be lost, and more than half of its utility annihilated.

3. The science of law and government is equally dependent on psychology. It is preposterous to think of enacting laws for man's government, without knowing something of his nature—of the desires which possess him, the passions that move him, the propensities and motives that actuate him. Jurisprudence itself is based upon psychology.

4. Moral philosophy could have no existence if the

science of mind were blotted from existence. We must know what man is before we can judge what he ought to be. Mental philosophy reaches its culmination in the philosophy of duty.

5. It is equally connected with rhetoric and eloquence. As a means of preparation for appreciating the beauties of fine writing, or for following the orator in his highest flights, or indeed for acquiring those powers of moving the minds of the multitude which belong to the orator, no study is more efficient. We might extend this section, and show how this sublime science is interlaced with all other sciences, how it mingles its mystic truths with the truths of nature and revelation, and how the severe discipline to which it subjects the intellect fits man for the stern conflicts of life; but enough has been said to show to the student the utility, both subjective and objective, of mental science.

SECTION V

SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

History—Poetry—Observation—Self-reflection—Study of the best Writers—The sacred Scriptures.

When a science is to be studied, it is always desirable to have the best sources of knowledge in reference to such science. The more numerous and reliable the sources of information within the reach

of the faithful student, the more successful will be his pursuit of truth.

1. We first point to history as a source of knowledge of mind. What is history, but a record of mind? The actions of mind, either cultivated or uncultivated, developed or undeveloped, are recorded upon the pages of history. To the pen of the historian, as he records the achievements of the great and good, or of the ignorant and depraved, as he traces the progress of society, or the rise and downfall of kingdoms, are we to look for information in regard to the human mind.

2. A second source to which we are to look is poetry. Poetry is the language of imagination and passion. The sublime epic, the sweet lyric, the solemn tragic, and the mirthful comic, all abound with portraitures of mind, at once beautiful and pleasing. With such teachers as Homer, Milton, and Shakspeare, the dullest student should become proficient in the science of mind.

3. We must rely, in the next place, upon a close observation of human nature, in all the phases which it presents. We must observe the workings of mind in childhood and in youth, in mature and in declining age. We must observe intellect—from the feeble ray emitted by the almost idiot, to the resplendent lustre which is shed by him who is a little

lower than the angels. Here is a school to which all may go, and in which all may learn lessons of wisdom.

4. One of the most reliable sources of our knowledge of mind is self-reflection. It is to experience that the psychologist must look for much of his knowledge. In psychology, we have no safer guide than experience. When we interrogate our consciousness, a true response is sure to be obtained. We have already stated that in empirical science the great, if not the only teacher is experience. Let the student learn for himself. Let him become his own teacher. It is the glory of mental philosophy that it can be self taught. All education is, to some extent, self-education; and this is especially true in reference to mental philosophy, as a branch of liberal education.

5. We are not to be unmindful of those writers who have exhibited so much research and patience in this great study. From the days of Aristotle to the present time, no field of science has been occupied or cultivated by more indefatigable laborers. The mind has been classified by those who have made its study a life-time business. Heathen and christian writers have thrown light upon this science. The wise Plato, the gifted and unfortunate Abelard, the pious Locke, the eloquent Cousin, the

far-seeing Hamilton—who for boldness, originality, vast learning, deep humility, and devout piety, has no equal in this realm of science—all these, and many others, have brought the philosophic student under the most profound obligations for the light they have thrown on metaphysical inquiries.

9. Finally, we direct the student to the word of God. Whenever we can point to the Bible as authority for any theory, we feel that our foundation is sure, and that our theory is infallible. In this sacred volume, the spirituality and immortality of mind are revealed. Other doctrines of man's intellectual and moral nature are presented by the Great Teacher, whose teachings we always regard with reverence, and receive with implicit confidence. The Bible is not only a book of facts, but it is a book of philosophy, the most profound and infallible.

SECTION VI.

CONNECTION OF MIND AND BODY.

Arguments to prove this Connection—Difference of Races—Caucasian—Mongolian—Nigritian—Malay—American Indian—Difference of Sex—Difference of Temperament—Difference in Age—Influence of Fever—Influence of the Mind on the Countenance—Influence of sudden sad Intelligence.

We do not profess to explore the “World of Mind.” An analysis of the mind of the Deity, or

even of angels, will not be attempted by us. Our psychology will be confined to the human mind—not to the mind disembodied, but to the mind in its connections with the material organism. We shall consider the mind as the man, and the body as the instrument with which the mind works. Consequently, the perfection of mental labor will depend greatly upon the material organism. The manifestations of mind will depend greatly upon the condition of the physical system. Not that mind is dependent upon matter, otherwise than as the organism through which it performs much of its work. It is however a fact which the psychologist must not overlook, that the mind is variously modified by its intimate connection with the body.

To establish this theory, we have to observe the following facts:

1. The different races of men. Blumenbach has divided the human species into five varieties.

- (1.) Caucasian. He describes the Caucasian as having a white skin, either with a fair, rosy tint, or inclining to brown; red cheeks; hair dark, or of the various lighter hues, copious, soft, with heavy beard; large cranium, with small face, the upper and anterior regions of the head well developed, with the face falling perpendicularly under it, making the facial angle ninety degrees; the moral

feelings and intellectual powers most energetic, and capable of the highest culture.

(2.) Mongolian. The second, or Mongolian variety, is characterized by a head of a square form, with a small, low forehead; broad and flattened face, with the facial angle of eighty degrees; thick lips; large ears; eyes placed very obliquely; with moral feelings of a low order, accompanied by a poor development of the intellectual powers.

(3.) Nigritian, or Ethiopian. This variety he characterizes by black skin; woolly hair; thick lips; forehead low, narrow, and slanting, and a facial angle of between sixty and seventy degrees. The moral and intellectual powers of this variety are of a low order.

(4 and 5.) The Malay and American. These varieties are similar in their physical conformation, and in their intellectual manifestations, to the Mongolian. The slight differences are not necessary to our purpose, and need not be mentioned.

Thus far we have seen that the variety characterized by the greatest activity of thought, and by the highest intellectual and moral developments, is the one whose physical organism is in the main superior; and that the lowest variety is in every sense inferior in physical organism, and especially in brain development.

2. Difference in sex. That there is a difference between the mind of the male and of the female, must be admitted; and it is equally to be admitted that this difference is attributable to difference in organization. Nature has imparted to woman a more delicate nervous system, more acute sensibility, greater capacity of endurance, and quicker powers of perception; while to man is given more physical energy, greater depth of reasoning, and higher capacity for invention and discovery. They may each become distinguished, in the public observation, for the same pursuits; and, whether of art, literature, or science, there may be the products of both male and female industry which stand prominent in excellence; but, perhaps, never will the case occur in which an experienced and philosophic critic will not at once determine, from the inherent characteristics of the productions themselves, that which the man and that which the woman has originated.

3. The connection between mind and body is proved by the difference of temperaments, and their influence upon the mental manifestations.

(1.) The sanguine temperament. This temperament is characterized by florid complexion, red hair and beard, black eyes, rapid circulation, full pulse, etc. Persons of this temperament are hopeful,

impulsive, easily excited to make great efforts, and as easily baffled by opposition; they are ardent and impetuous, lively and mirthful, but readily overwhelmed by misfortunes.

(2.) Bilious. This temperament is characterized by dark complexion, black hair and eyes, slow pulse, and of course sluggish arterial action. Those that possess it are meditative, sedate, inclined to melancholy, and often to moroseness. Much less excitable than those of the sanguine temperament, they are more tenacious of their purposes, and, though less ardent, more reliable.

(3.) Nervous. This temperament is characterized by fair complexion, light hair, blue or grey eyes, quick pulse, and rapid movement of the body. Persons of this temperament are capable of the loftiest purpose, and the highest and most vigorous mental exercise. They can form and carry out the most enlarged plans, and, under the promptings of sound principles, are prepared for deeds of heroism. Some of the greatest heroes have been characterized by a predominance of this temperament.

(4.) Phlegmatic. This is characterized by remarkably slow arterial action, and by sluggish movements of the body. The mind moves slowly and cautiously. When this temperament is slightly mingled with the sanguine or nervous, it is

capable of the coolest decision, and the most prudent yet prompt action.

These facts clearly establish the intimate connection of mind and body.

4. This connection is also proved by the different manifestations of mind, during the different ages. In the tender years of infancy, in the strength and vigor of youth, in maturity of middle life, and in the decays of old age, the mental manifestations correspond with the conditions of the body during these different periods of human life.

5. It is also proved by the effect of fever on the mind. Instances are not wanting of strange hallucinations caused by fever. The mind, under the influence of fever, originates thoughts and recalls the past as it cannot when the fever is removed. We all remember the wonderful instance of the maid-servant, who could speak in Hebrew and Greek when under the influence of fever, and who was utterly ignorant of these languages when the fever passed away. In a fever, one frequently revels in fields of light and beauty, the creations of an excited imagination.

6. This connection of mind and body is also established by the influence of the mind on the countenance. A mind, modest, pure, sound, and virtuous, speaks out in every lineament of the face,

in the beaming eye, the lofty brow, and the honest, open countenance. On the other hand, a low, vicious disposition, a depraved heart, writes its character upon the countenance of the thorough-paced and detestable villain. The fact here stated is one so well known that it is needless to enlarge upon it.

7. Finally, this connection is shown in the influence exerted upon the body by the mind. Let one, with the present appetite for food, and already at the table prepared to satisfy it, be startled by the intelligence that a dear friend is dead, and immediately the appetite is gone, and hunger is appeased, though he may have eaten nothing. Irrepressible grief is always followed by loss of health and emaciation of body.

This connection may be mysterious, and such as neither the physiologist nor the psychologist can explain; but that it exists no one can deny, and that the mind is greatly modified in all its operations by this connection, is equally obvious. How the influence passes from the material to the immaterial organism, is beyond our power to discern. The physiologist may tell us of the afferent and efferent nerves, the one communicating from the mind to the body, and the other carrying intelligence from the body to the mind, and still we are left in ignorance.

SECTION VII

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HUMAN AND BRUTE MIND.

Instinct defined—Difference between Instinct and Appetite—Difference between Instinct and Reason—Instinct cannot be taught—Not progressive—Limited—More perfect—Irrresponsible—Not scientific—Cannot be accounted for—Blind—Irrational—Slight Glimpses of Reason—Carpenter's Theory—True Theory.

The great difference between the human mind and the brute mind, is well exhibited by showing the difference between instinct and reason. By instinct is meant that intelligent impulse received without instruction, and prior to experience, as a means for the accomplishment of some end of pre-eminent utility, either for the preservation of the life of its possessor, or for the benefit of its race. The difference between instinct and appetite is this: Instinct seeks the means; appetite seeks the end. Instinct prompts the spider to weave its web; appetite, to eat the fly caught in the web. Instinct prompts the bee to make its hexagonal cell, and fill it with honey; appetite prompts him to eat the honey. Instinct blindly urges the animal to secure means; appetite urges him, with equal blindness, to procure the end. This distinction is easily understood: it may be more difficult to mark the difference between instinct and reason. We call the attention of the student to the following points in which they differ.

1. Instinct cannot be taught; reason can. The bee, without a teacher, takes its bee-line, fashions its cell, and manufactures its honey. The bird, without a teacher, passes over trackless wastes, and reaches his destination, with more certainty than rational man, who has been taught the cardinal points, and the use of instruments to guide him. The beaver builds his dam without ever having taken lessons in engineering. But you cannot teach the wasp to make wax, or the bee to make paper. Instinct cannot be taught.

2. Instinct is not progressive; reason is ever progressing. Beavers have made no advancement in engineering or in architecture. The honeycomb found by Samson was similar to that which was found by John the Baptist, and that was like the last taken from the hive. The spider still spins his web, and the bird still builds her nest, in the same manner as before the flood. There has been no advancement. But reason is constantly adding to the stock of knowledge, by inventing some new machine, or revealing some hitherto undiscovered law. In agriculture, and commerce, and manufactures, in all that pertains to science and art, there has been, and will continue to be, progress.

3. Instinct is limited to its sphere. It has no versatility. Although circumstances may change,

and may seem to require change in the action of instinct, still it knows no change, and is incapable of adapting itself to circumstances. Instinct is a strict *routinist*, while reason adapts itself to endlessly varying circumstances. This can be illustrated by the following example of a beaver which was caught when very young: when he was half-grown, he would drag along a large sweeping-brush, or a warming-pan, grasping the handle with his teeth; and would endeavor to lay this, with other materials, in the mode employed by the beaver in a state of nature. Thus he went on, using baskets, boots, sticks, etc., until he constructed his dam, with a dwelling attached. Had he been governed by reason, he might have built a nest, but certainly not a useless dam in his room. The squirrel, when domesticated, manifests the same instinct as in its wild state, and seeks to hide its food in its narrow cage. The hen sits on chalk, instead of eggs. The carrion fly deposits its eggs on the carrion flower, being deceived by its odor. A moth will fly against the window panes, time after time, when it might escape by flying a foot below.

4. Instinct is more perfect in its sphere than reason. A thousand trials would not enable reason to pursue a bee-line. No perseverance would enable reason to make the hexagonal cell as perfectly as it is made

by the bee. It is an interesting fact, that it was at one time thought that the angle formed between the two sets of cells, was not such as to secure the greatest strength with the least amount of material. But more recent and accurate calculations have proved the bees to be right, and the mathematicians to have been wrong. The perfection of instinct is seen in the coöperation which it effects in communities. No human society is so perfectly organized as are the societies of bees, wasps, beavers, etc. It is also seen in the direct route taken by birds of passage.

5. Instinct is unaccountable. We can readily account for the action of reason. If man finds his way through a trackless forest, he is guided by the stars, or by the compass, or the vegetation—or by all. But migrating animals find their way with less difficulty, move straight forward to their destination, and we are utterly unable to account for the accuracy of their movements. We cannot account for the fact that, at the time of Pythagoras, the bees were the best mathematicians. So unerring is the certainty with which instinct acts, that many have supposed it to be some extraneous and Divine impulse that guides the lower animals.

6. Instinct is irresponsible. Reason is responsi-

ble. No ideas of right and wrong can be conveyed to the brute mind. The brute is not held responsible to either human or Divine law. His action is as mechanical and invariable as that of the machine. The action of man is that of a rational free agent, who is the master of his own movements, and responsible for them.

7. Instinct is blind. It seeks means which are wisely designed to accomplish great ends; but it knows nothing of the ends to be accomplished. In illustration of this remark, we quote from Carpenter's *Physiology*: "It is scarcely possible to point to any actions better fitted to give an idea of the nature of instinct, than those which are performed by various insects when they deposit their eggs. These animals will never behold their progeny; and cannot acquire any notion, from experience, of that which their eggs will produce; nevertheless they have the remarkable habit of placing, in the neighborhood of each of these bodies, a supply of aliment fitted for the nourishment of the larva that is to proceed from it; and this they do, even when they themselves are feeding upon food of an entirely different nature, such as would not be adapted to the larva. They cannot be guided by anything like reason, for the data on which they alone could reason correctly, are wanting to them :

so that they would be led to conclusions altogether erroneous, if they were not led by an unerring instinct to adopt the means best adapted for the attainment of the required end."

8. The brute mind does seem to exhibit some glimpses of reason. Though instinct cannot be taught, the brute mind is, to some small extent, capable of receiving instruction. Hence, there must be something in the brute mind besides instinct. We believe that all the phenomena of the brute mind, which cannot be attributed to instinct, may be accounted for on the principle of imitation or association. Carpenter is clearly mistaken in saying that, "the mind of man differs from that of the lower animals, rather as to the degree in which the reasoning faculties are developed in him, than by any thing peculiar in their kind." On the contrary, we maintain that these faculties differ in kind. The power of induction, of deduction, of analysis, of abstract reasoning, does not belong to the brute mind at all—neither in kind nor degree. In addition to this the mind of the brute is destitute of conscience, while this faculty is the crowning dignity and glory of the mind of man.

SECTION VIII.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

The Mind a Unit, with multiplied Powers—To Think—To Feel—To Act—Thompson's Division: The Sensibility—The Emotional Faculty—The Will—The Intelligence—Hamilton's Division: Powers of Cognition—Feelings—Conative Powers—Author's Division: Cognitive Faculties—Feelings Internal and External—Will—Phenomena of disordered Mind—Human Destiny.

It now remains for us, before entering fully upon the investigation of mental science, to give the plan which we shall pursue. We premise that we regard the mind as a unit. It is a unit, however, with multiplied powers. These powers are, for convenience, called faculties. Hence, when we speak of the mental faculties, we mean that the mind has the power of performing certain actions, or of suffering certain changes.

To think, to feel, to act, are words in common use, and easily understood. They embrace all of which the mind is capable. No mental phenomenon can be conceived of, which does not come under one or the other of the conditions implied by these words. They indicate differences of which every intelligent human being is conscious. These are differences not in degree, but in kind.

The usual division of this subject is into intellect, sensibilities, and will, corresponding with the terms used above—to think, to feel, to act.

Robert Anchor Thompson, in his noble work on Christian Theism, makes the following division: "The sensibility, the emotional faculty, the will, and the intelligence, or reason." He says: "The sensibility is sometimes included with the affections, and the mind is then said to possess the three powers of reason; or, understanding, will, and affections. But the sensibility to the impressions of the material world, appears to have as good claim to be considered a distinct faculty from the spontaneous affections, or moral emotions of the mind, as the intelligence to be distinguished from the will."

Sir William Hamilton makes the following classification: 1. Cognitive powers, or powers of cognition. 2. Feelings; including emotions, propensities, affections, and also feelings of external origin. 3. Conative powers; including desires and will.

In the present work, we shall

1. Consider the cognitive faculties.
2. The feelings—internal and external.
3. The will.

4. We shall present the phenomena of mind in a diseased state.

We shall then consider the great destination of man; whose mental nature will then be understood to be immaterial and immortal.

CHAPTER II.

FACULTIES OF COGNITION



SECTION I

CONSCIOUSNESS.

Reid's Theory of Consciousness: Special Faculty—Peculiar Function—Limited to Mental Phenomena—Brown's Objection—Hamilton's Objection—Brown's Theory: Consciousness generic—Upham's Theory: Self—State—Connection—Author's Objection to Upham's Theory—Hickok's Theory: Not a Faculty—A Light—Modification of Hamilton's.

In entering upon a classification and discussion of the faculties of cognition, it will be our aim, first, to give as clear a view as possible of consciousness. We shall first state the theory of Dr. Reid, with the objections which have been urged against it. He says: "It is an operation of the understanding of its own kind; cannot be logically defined. The objects of it are present—our pains, our pleasures, our hopes, our fears, our desires, our doubts, our thoughts of every kind; in a word, all the passions and all the actions and operations of our own minds, while they are present."

1. According to Reid, the consciousness is a special faculty of the mind, as much so as memory. 2. Its peculiar function is to make known to the mind its operations, doubts, hopes, fears, etc. 3. Its objects are limited to the mental acts or states now present. It can have no reference to past states of the mind, nor to external objects. Thus, I may say, I am conscious that I remember having written yesterday; but not that I wrote yesterday. I am conscious of the idea of the table on which I write, but not of the table itself.

To this theory, Dr. Thomas Brown urges the objection, that it goes upon the supposition, that the mind can exist in two states at one and the same moment, which he thinks absurd. He says: "To suppose the mind to exist in two different states at the same moment, is a manifest absurdity."

Sir William Hamilton objects to the theory on the following grounds: That we cannot be conscious of a mental act, without, at the same time being conscious of the object of the act; that as our intellectual operations exist only in relation, it must be impossible that consciousness can take cognizance of one term of the relation without also being conscious of the other. He says: Knowledge in general is the relation between a subject knowing and an object known, and such operation

of our cognitive faculties only exists by relation to a particular object—this object at once calling it into existence, and specifying the quality of its existence. It is, therefore, palpably impossible that we can be conscious of an act, without being conscious of the object to which that act is relative. This, however, is what Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart maintain. They maintain that I can know that I know without knowing what I know ; or that I can know the knowledge without knowing what the knowledge is about; for example, that I am conscious of perceiving a book without being conscious of the book perceived ; that I am conscious of remembering its contents without being conscious of the contents remembered.

He then tests Reid's theory, and shows its absurdity by taking the different faculties of the mind, and by showing, in regard to each, that it is impossible to propose the operation of that faculty to the consciousness, and to withhold from consciousness its object. He first takes imagination. We imagine a centaur: we are conscious, according to Dr. Reid, of the act of imagination, but not of its object. We are conscious of the imagination of the centaur, but not of the centaur imagined. Now, says Hamilton, nothing can be more evident than that the act of imagination, and the object of imagina-

tion, are identical. Thus, in the given example, the centaur imagined, and the act of imagining, are one and indivisible. What is the act of imagining a centaur, but a centaur imaged, or the image of the centaur? What is the image of the centaur, but the act of imagining it? We cannot, therefore, be conscious of imagining an object, without being conscious of the object imagined. The same test is made with memory, and other faculties, and with the same result. The theory of Reid appears to me to be entirely annihilated by the reasoning of this master mind. I have been the more careful in presenting this reasoning, because the theory of Reid has been so extensively adopted, and taught in all our schools. The theory is found in a little elementary work on Logic (Hedge's) which has had a wide circulation, and has been a text-book in many excellent seminaries of learning. I refer the curious reader for a still further refutation to Hamilton's *Metaphysics*.

Brown's Theory.—According to Dr. Thos. Brown, consciousness is a generic term, embracing all the special states of which the mind is capable.

1. It is a state, and not a special faculty. 2. It embraces all the states of which the mind is susceptible. As the term quadruped embraces all four-footed animals, so the term consciousness embraces all the states of mind—as sensation, perception,

memory, imagination, etc. These latter terms only express the particular state of consciousness at any particular moment. For example, "I am conscious of anger," simply expresses, I am angry, or that anger is the character of the consciousness at that particular moment. To the whole series of states of the mind, then, whatever the individual momentary successive states may be, he gives the name of our consciousness—using that term, not to any new state additional to the whole series, but merely as a short mode of expressing the wide variety, in the same manner as any other generic word is used for expressing briefly the individual varieties comprehended under it.

He says, further, "There are not sensations, thoughts, passions, and also consciousness, any more than there is quadruped or animal, as a separate being, to be added to the wolves, tigers, elephants, or other living creatures, which I include under those terms." Just as quadruped is not a class additional to four-footed animals, so consciousness is not a faculty or state additional to all the states of the mind. The word consciousness as much embraces all the states of the mind—joy, sorrow, anger, love, knowledge, doubt, memory, etc.—as the word quadruped embraces all animals having four feet. If this theory were true, it would

be incorrect to connect the adjective conscious with any other word than one expressive of some mental state. The word consciousness extends to all mental states, but to nothing beyond them. Hence, to say that I am conscious of an external world, or of any thing external, would be a misapplication of the term. If then, we shall not be able to show that consciousness has a still wider application, we shall adopt Dr. Brown's theory as correct. The student will notice the wide difference between Reid and Stewart, on the one hand, and Brown, on the other. The two former make consciousness a special faculty, whose function is to take notice of the present operations and conditions of the mind. Thus, when I say I am conscious of anger, I mean that I am angry, and that my consciousness informs me of it; and it is improper to say that consciousness gives any other information than concerns the present acts of the mind. I am conscious that I perceive this book, but I am not conscious of the book that I perceive. Consciousness is to the mind, what perception is to the outer world.

According to Brown, consciousness, so far from being a special faculty, is a term generic, embracing all the states of the mind. As, "I am conscious of anger," expresses simply the present state of the

consciousness; the phrase means no more than that I am angry.

Upham's Theory.—Mr. Upham gives the following analysis of consciousness: "Consciousness is described as embracing in itself the three following distinct notions: 1. The idea of self, or of personal existence, expressed in English by the words self, myself, and the personal pronoun I; 2, some quality, state, or operation of the mind, whatever it may be; and 3, a relative perception of possession, appropriation, or belonging to. For instance, a person says, I am conscious of love, or anger, or of penitence. Here the idea of self, or of personal existence, is expressed by the pronoun I; there is a different mental state, and expressed by its appropriate term, that of the affection of anger, etc.; the phrase conscious of, expresses the feeling of relation, which instantaneously and necessarily recognizes the passion of anger as the attribute, or property of the subject of the proposition. And in this case, as in all others, where we apply the term under consideration, consciousness does not properly extend to any thing, which has an existence, extraneous to the conscious subject, or soul itself."

Here again, consciousness is limited to the subjective states of the mind. It cannot be extended to an outward object. Let us look at this theory

for one moment. An act of knowledge has existence only in reference to an object known; hence, it is clear that the mental act can be known in no other way, than through the object to which it relates. For example, I see this book: I am conscious of the perception of a book. Now annihilate the book—you, at the same moment, annihilate the perception of the book; then it follows infallibly that, if you annihilate the consciousness of the object, (the book,) you must annihilate the consciousness of the perception. The act which affirms that the object is a book, affirms, at the same moment that it is not myself; therefore, if consciousness gives us a knowledge of one, it must extend to the other. The same act that affirms that the object of perception is a book, affirms the relation between the perceiving subject and the perceived object—affirms their difference and their independence. If Mr. Upham's theory be true, we may ask, "By what faculty are the subject and object discriminated?" Not by consciousness, for that recognizes nothing but mind—the thinking subject—and not by perception, for that recognizes nothing but matter. But as the subject and object cannot be known apart, any more than light and darkness, heat and cold, husband and wife, parent and

child, virtue and vice—this recognition of them must be derived from consciousness.

In fact, Upham's theory is only a modification of Reid's, and is liable to the same objections.

Hickok's Theory.—Dr. Hickok presents the following, as his view of consciousness. He first objects to the theories of Brown and Reid, and then says: "If, instead of attempting to conceive consciousness as a distinct mental faculty, or in any way an agent putting forth specific exercises, we will consider it under the analogy of an inner illumination, we may both avoid many difficulties, and gain some great advantages. The conception is not of a faculty, but of a light; not of an action, but of an illumination; not of a maker of phenomena, but of a revealer of them already made by the appropriate intellectual operation; and as thus constructed, in the illuminated mental sphere, they at once appear to the mind, and the fact of perception is consummated." Thus, according to Hickok, in the light of consciousness the outward object appears as the objective, and the agency, taking notice of this outward object, appears as the subjective; and thus, both the object and subject, the not-self and the self, are together given in the same revelation of consciousness.

This theory is a modification of that of Sir

William Hamilton, which we propose to present in the next section.

SECTION II.

CONSCIOUSNESS—CONTINUED.

Hamilton's Theory—Consciousness cannot be defined—Root of all Knowledge—Highest Source of Illustration—Analysis of Consciousness—Thinking Subject—Recognized Modification—A Recognition by the Subject of the Modification—Recognition of outward Object—Self-consciousness—Actual and not potential Knowledge—Immediate—Involves Judgment—Memory—Theory objected to—Does not involve Memory.

The student of mental philosophy must have a clear view of consciousness, or he cannot make any safe progress in the prosecution of this science. In this section we shall give a full, though condensed view of the only theory which has high claims to truth. It is the theory of Sir William Hamilton.

Consciousness cannot be defined: we may ourselves be fully aware what consciousness is, but we cannot, without confusion, convey to others a definition of what we ourselves clearly apprehend. The reason is plain. Consciousness lies at the root of all knowledge. Consciousness is itself the one highest source of all comprehensibility and illustration. How, then, can we find aught else by which consciousness may be illustrated or comprehended?

To accomplish this, it would be necessary to have a second consciousness, through which we might be conscious of the mode in which the first consciousness was possible. The notion of consciousness is so elementary, that it cannot possibly be resolved into others more simple. It cannot, therefore, be brought under any genus—any more general conception; and consequently it cannot be defined. But an analysis of consciousness can be made.

1. It implies a thinking subject.
2. It implies a recognized or known modification.
3. A recognition or knowledge by the subject of the modification.
4. When that modification is the result of an outward object, consciousness involves the recognition of such object. From this it is apparent that consciousness and knowledge involve each other.

1. Consciousness is, then, the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections. This is self-consciousness, and in reference to this there is no controversy.

2. Consciousness is an actual, and not a potential knowledge. Thus a man is said to know, that is, to be able to know, that $7+9=16$, although that equation be not at the moment the object of his thoughts; but we cannot say he is conscious of

this truth, unless it is actually present to his mind.

3. Consciousness is immediate, and not mediate knowledge. This is universally admitted. Consciousness implies discrimination. This is denied, except as this discrimination relates to the mind in different states; but we can be conscious only as we are conscious of something; and we are conscious of something only as we are conscious of what that something is—that is, distinguish it from what it is not. Hence we are conscious both of the ego and non-ego, of self and not-self, of subject and object.

4. It involves judgment. Every act of the mind involves judgment. This is also admitted.

5. The fifth condition of consciousness, as laid down by Sir William Hamilton, is memory. I doubt the correctness of this view; for it seems to me that consciousness is essential to memory, and that memory is conditioned upon consciousness. I have before me a sheet of paper: I perceive it; I am conscious of its existence; and yet memory is not exercised. When mind first awakes in self-consciousness, it has no memory of any thing past: it cannot have, for, upon our hypothesis, it is conscious for the first time. I am conscious of anger: the anger is now present, and is within the light of

consciousness. Here memory is not required, as all the phenomena are present to the mind. This is so obvious, that it is strange our author should have committed so palpable a mistake.

But for this solitary defect, or error, I think the theory of Hamilton would be perfect. I fully agree with him in the main feature of his theory: that our consciousness is not limited to our subjective states; that it includes both the ego and non-ego; that it fully discriminates the one from the other, and admits their independence. We are just as conscious of the self as we are of the not-self; just as conscious of the existence of the external world as of the existence of mind. Consciousness is to the special faculties, what the trunk is to the branches. It is, in the language of our author, the root of our nature.

SECTION III

CONSCIOUSNESS—CONTINUED.

Veracity of Consciousness—Laws to govern in receiving the Testimony of Consciousness—Facts primary—All Data to be received—No Discrepancy between Reason and Consciousness—Realism—Nihilism—Identity—Materialism—Idealism—Cosmothetic Idealism.

It is absolutely essential to the existence of psychology, as a science, that the veracity of consciousness be admitted. Some superficial thinkers may be disposed to doubt this position; but if the

data of consciousness be the sources of our information, those data must be admitted to be true, or the science is impossible; for we can with great propriety apply the legal maxim here, "False in one, false in all." We are required to conform to the three following laws:

1. No fact must be taken as a fact of consciousness which is not a primary fact. Whenever, in our analysis of the phenomena of mind, we arrive at an element which we cannot reduce to a generalization from experience, but which lies at the root of experience, and which we cannot therefore resolve into any higher principle, this we properly call a fact of consciousness. In reference to analysis, it is called ultimate; in reference to its being a fundamental principle of the first constituent, in one combination, it is called primary.

2. The second law that we enunciate is, that we are to receive all the data of consciousness. Some of the facts of consciousness we cannot but believe. It is absolutely impossible to doubt our existence. But we may bring ourselves to doubt of the existence of an external world. In receiving one datum, and rejecting another, we violate a very important law.

3. It must be seen that there is no want of harmony between reason and consciousness. If I

consult consciousness, I am informed unequivocally that I exist. If I consult reason, it teaches me that I think, and therefore I am. A fact established in empirical psychology cannot be annihilated or contradicted by rational psychology. A fact established by consciousness can never be contradicted by reason. As these belong to a common nature, we conclude their voices must always be harmonious. Consciousness and reason are ever witnesses, concurring and corroborating each the testimony of the other. An earnest and thorough interrogation of reason and consciousness must ever meet with the same response. That the veracity of consciousness must be admitted, may be seen from the various systems of philosophy which arise from its rejection, in whole or in part.

1. If the veracity of consciousness be admitted, both in reference to its testimony of the ego and non-ego—of the subject and the object—then issues the system of absolute realism, or dualism. This system admits there are mind and matter—a material and a spiritual world—each distinct and independent of the other. This we believe, nay, we know, to be the true system; and a man has to stultify his consciousness, in whole or in part, in order to reject this system.

2. If the veracity of consciousness be denied

entirely, both as it regards its testimony of the ego and non-ego, the system of absolute nihilism is the result. Here consciousness is wholly ignored, and the philosopher asserts there is nothing.

3. If the veracity of consciousness be admitted, as to the existence of both self and not-self, but not as to the difference between the two, then issues the system of identity. This system ends in pantheism, making all things one—all things God.

4. If the veracity of consciousness be admitted, as to the existence of the inner and outer world, but not as to the independence of the two, then there issues one of two systems, according as we make mind dependent on matter, or matter dependent on mind. 1. If we make mind dependent on matter, the result is the system of materialism. The direct tendency of materialism is to fatalism and to atheism. 2. If we make matter dependent on mind, then the result is idealism. Every thing is a modification of mind, and of course there is nothing but mind in the universe. The absurdity of all these theories, except the one resulting from an acknowledgment of the veracity of consciousness, is now admitted. But there is yet another theory arising from the admission of the veracity of consciousness in reference to self, and the rejec-

tion of its testimony in reference to not-self, and still contending for the existence of an outer world. This theory is named by Sir William Hamilton cosmothetic idealism, or hypothetic dualism. We *know* we exist; we *believe* the outer world exists. We *know* that mind exists; we *believe* that matter exists. Such is the system of Thomas Brown—of all that deny that consciousness testifies to the existence of the outer world.

SECTION IV

CONSCIOUSNESS—CONTINUED.

Consciousness a Witness — Concomitant of all Knowledge—Mind always conscious—Dreaming—Power of awaking—Nerves of the Sick—Close Study—Expected and unexpected Noises—Mind never sleeps.

The discussion of consciousness, thus far, has brought us to the conclusion that consciousness is a witness—that it is concomitant with all our knowledge. If an act of perception takes place, it is always attested by consciousness. Every act of knowledge, whether in reference to the world of mind or the world of matter, is referred to consciousness. When I say that I am conscious of anger, I mean that my consciousness attests that I am angry. So in reference to any thing else. Consciousness is the ultimate reference, and always the

reliable reference. We are always sure of the correctness of the testimony borne by consciousness. It is the ultimate principle, the highest genus, and as such cannot be logically defined. We have then to depend upon analysis and illustration.

A question of considerable interest has been raised by mental philosophers, as to whether consciousness always continues awake, even when the senses are paralyzed by sleep. In other words: "Is the mind conscious during sleep?" The following facts seem very clearly to indicate that this question should be answered in the affirmative.

1. Dreaming. Sir William Hamilton states, that after many experiments tried upon himself, he came to the conclusion that the mind is never inactive, or unconscious of its activity, during sleep. He caused himself to be awakened at different times during sleep, and always found that he was awakened in the midst of a dream. As to the argument, that we do not always remember having dreamed, it is believed to be destitute of force on this point. For dreams are often called up when they had been apparently forgotten; and sometimes dreams forgotten during the waking state, are remembered or recalled during sleep. This is especially true in reference to the peculiar condition known as somnambulism. Consciousness is thus cut in two: there is no

connection between the train of consciousness in the waking state, with the train of consciousness in the somnambulic state.

2. A second fact, still more clearly indicating the proposition, that the mind is consciously active during sleep, is that any one can awake at any set time. A man can lie down to sleep with the determination to awake at four o'clock, and at the hour, consciousness, ever vigilant and active, arouses him from his slumbers. Jouffroy says of himself, that he had this power in perfection; but he noticed that when he relied on any one to awake him, he lost this power. He accounts for the loss in this way: "In the latter case, his mind did not take the trouble to measure the time, or listen to the clock."

3. A consciousness ever-active, is proved by what occurs with those in attendance on the sick. All noises foreign from the patient, have no effect upon them; but let him turn himself in bed, let him utter a groan or sigh, or let his breathing become painful or interrupted, and forthwith the attendant awakes, however little inured to the vocation. Whence comes this discrimination between the noises that ought to attract the attention of the nurse, and those that are of no consequence to him or his patient? It is by being strongly

impressed with the necessity of attending to the respiration, motions, and complaints of the sick, that we are so easily aroused by anything connected with the patient, while other things fail to arouse us.

4. This activity of consciousness is proved by what occurs during sleep, when the mind is deeply absorbed in the investigation of a subject. During my own investigations of the subject now under consideration, I have waked up in the morning, with the consciousness that my mind had been wholly occupied during sleep, with the subject that had so occupied my waking thoughts.

5. The continuation of slumber uninterrupted, in the midst of *expected* noises; while the sleep is broken by far less violent, but unexpected noises, can only be accounted for on the principle that the mind remains consciously active during sleep. On a railroad, in the cars, amid the noise of the engine, and the rattle of the wheels, and the loud scream of the whistle, the tired passenger sleeps profoundly. But let any unexpected noise occur, and he is at once aroused. Now, if the awaking came through the senses, the more violent the noise, the more certainly the sleeper would be aroused. "Why," says Jouffroy, "am I aroused by the sweeping of the brush on my carpet, when the thundering noise of the wagon on the rocky pavement does not

molest my slumbers?" It is evident that the mind, and the mind alone, in a state of unsleeping activity, can explain why it is that the weaker sensation aroused me, when the stronger one failed to do so. From these considerations, we come to the conclusion, that the mind never sleeps; even when this material organism, including the senses, is overpowered by slumber.

SECTION V

CONSCIOUSNESS—CONTINUED.

Treasures of Knowledge of which Mind is unconscious—Normal and abnormal State—Facts stated by Dr. Rush—The Servant Girl—Lord Monboddo's Statement.

That the mind may possess treasures of knowledge of which it is itself unconscious, is a fact attested by universal experience. This, indeed, constitutes the difference between potential knowledge and present knowledge. A man knows $9 \times 9 = 81$; but unless this equation is before his mind, he does not think of the knowledge—it is unconscious knowledge. A college student may have recalled to him some passage of Latin or Greek, of the knowledge of which he may have been for years unconscious. But a strange fact in this connection is, that the mind may possess

knowledge, or systems of knowledge, or habits of thought, or powers of genius, of which it may be unconscious, while in its natural, or normal condition; but of which it may become conscious in an excited, or abnormal condition. This proposition is established by the following interesting facts. The first two are taken from the writings of Dr. Rush.

1. A man in the Philadelphia Lunatic Asylum, could speak with great eloquence, correctness, and, of course, with much power and beauty, while laboring under hallucination; but when free from hallucination, and his mind was in its sound natural condition, he was far from eloquent, or even correct, in speech.

2. A lady in the same asylum could discourse the sweetest music, when the mind was in its abnormal state; whereas, during her lucid moments, she appeared entirely destitute of musical capacity.

3. A servant girl, laboring under the effect of hallucination from fever, was heard to speak in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, of which languages she was utterly ignorant in her normal condition.

4. The following interesting incident, bearing upon this point, is copied from Lord Monboddo: "The Comtesse de Laval had been observed by servants, who sate with her on account of some

indisposition, to talk in her sleep a language that none of them understood; nor were they sure, or indeed, herself able to guess, upon the sounds being repeated to her, whether it was or was not gibberish. Being attended at one time by a nurse from the province of Brittany, she discovered that it was the language of that province. But the countess did not understand a syllable of the language when awake, although she uttered it with accuracy when asleep. She was born in that province, and had been nursed in a family where nothing but that language was spoken. And, though unable to speak any thing more than the vocabulary of a child, she exhibited her entire ignorance of even that during her waking hours." Now, the only explanation that can be given of this fact, is found in the theory here proposed. The mind must possess knowledge of which it is unconscious, and which is only brought into consciousness by some strange excitement, from fever, interrupted sleep, or by some abnormal condition of the mind.

CHAPTER III.

FACULTIES OF COGNITION—CONTINUED.



SECTION I

PERCEPTION.

Definition of Perception—Mental Process—Difficulty of the Subject—Pythagorean Theory—Cartesian Theory—Theory of Malebranche—Preëstablished Harmony—Physical Influence—Hamilton's Objection—Upham's Theory—Hamilton's Theory—Difference between Sensation and Perception—Cognition and Feeling coëxistent—Difference between Upham and Hamilton—Objection to Upham—Conclusions of the Author.

By perception is meant the power which the mind has to perceive. It is compounded of the words *per*, through, and *cipio*, to take. The term is employed to denote that power which the mind has of acquiring knowledge of outward objects through the senses. In order to perception, there must be, 1. A knowing mind; 2. An external object; 3. A connection between the knowing mind and the external object, by means of the organs of sensation.

So different are the mind and body, and so mysterious is the connection between them, that there have arisen many opposing theories in reference to

perception. These theories have been presented at length by Dr. Thomas Brown and Sir William Hamilton. We propose to present to the student a very condensed view of these theories.

1. *The Peripatetic and Pythagorean Theory.*—This theory maintains that bodies emit certain pellicles, or phantasms, which are perceived by the mind. The mind does not perceive the external objects themselves, but the films, or pellicles, which those material objects send forth. These pellicles are something intermediate between mind and body; hence they are readily perceived by the mind. It will be seen that this theory originated in the difficulty of understanding the connection between body and mind, and how it is possible for the immaterial mind to be impressed by any material object.

2. *Cartesian Theory, or Theory of Occasional Causes.* Des Cartes was the founder of this theory, and it sets out like the last—from the apparent impossibility of any actual communication between a material and a spiritual substance. It teaches that the Deity, on occasion of the affection of matter—of the motions in the bodies—excites in the mind correspondent thoughts and representations; and on occasion of thoughts, or representations, arising in the mind, he, in like manner, produces corres-

pendent movements in the body. According to the Cartesian doctrine, God governs the universe, and its constituent existences, by the laws agreeably to which he has created them ; and as the world was originally called into being by the mere fiat of the Divine will, so it owes its continuance from moment to moment, only to the unremitted perseverance of the same volition. Let the sustaining energy of the Divine will cease but for an instant, and the universe lapses into nothingness. The existence of created things is thus exclusively maintained by a creation, as it were, incessantly renewed. God is thus the necessary cause of every modification of body, and of every modification of mind ; and his efficiency is sufficient to afford an explanation of the union and intercourse of extended and unextended substances. External objects determine certain movements in our bodily organs of sense, and these movements are, by the nerves and animal spirits, propagated to the brain. The brain does not act upon the mind, or soul—this is impossible. It is God himself, who, when a modification takes place in the brain, makes it the occasion of producing analogous modifications in the conscious mind.

3. *Theory of Malebranche.*—This is, that we perceive, not objects themselves, but ideas which are in God. He maintained that God surrounds

mind as space surrounds body. Wherever the human mind is, there God is, and consequently, all the ideas which are in God. We have thus a fund of ideas ever present, and it needs but the action of the Divine will to impart them to us. This theory, it will be seen, is but a modification of the Cartesian theory, and originated in the same difficulty—the supposed impossibility of mind acting on matter, or matter on mind.

4. *Theory of Preëstablished Harmony.*—This theory maintains that there is no mutual influence of mind and body, the one upon the other; that the action of the two is entirely independent, as much so as the action of two clocks, which are set in different places, to keep time. Hence, perception does not take place because of any connection between mind and body, but because of a preëstablished harmony. If the soul and body could have been separated at birth, the very same affections would have happened to each, in its separate and independent condition, that occur in their union. According to this theory, when the body is bruised, the mind feels pain, not because of any connection between mind and body; and the mind would have experienced the same pain, had the body been lying on roses. So my hand moves along the paper on

which I write, not because of the action of my will, but because of predetermined harmony.

5. *Physical Influence*.—"On this doctrine, external objects affect our senses, and the organic motion they determine, is communicated to the brain. The brain acts upon the soul, and the soul has an idea—a perception. The mind thus possessed of an idea, is affected for good or ill. If it suffers, it seeks to be relieved of pain. The brain is the seat of the soul, and on this hypothesis, the soul has been compared to a spider seated in the centre of its web. The moment the least agitation is caused at the extremity of this web, the insect is advertised, and put upon the watch. In like manner, the mind, situated in the brain, has a point upon which all nervous filaments converge: it is informed of what passes in different parts of the body, and forthwith it takes its measures accordingly. The body exerts a physical influence upon the soul, and the soul a physical influence upon the body."

Upon this theory, Sir William Hamilton remarks, "It is simple, but does not afford a solution of the mystery. Nothing can touch and be touched, but what is extended; and if the soul be unextended, it can have no connection, by touch, with the body, and the physical is inconceivable and contradictory."

6. *Upham's Theory*.—Upham holds, in common with Reid and Stewart, that sensation is the change experienced by the mind, when an outer object comes in contact with the senses—that perception is the reference by the mind of the change to its proper object. In sensation, there is no reference to any thing beyond the mind; in perception, there is a reference to the object which caused the sensation. For example, we have the sensation of smell: it is all in the mind the change is experienced; the mind is conscious of the change, but no reference is made to any outer object as the cause of the change. The perception refers to the rose, or to any outer object, which may have been the cause of the sensation.

6. *Hamilton's Theory*.—Perception is only a special kind of knowledge, and sensation a special kind of feeling. Knowledge is objective; that is, our consciousness is the relative to something different from the present state of the mind itself: a feeling, on the contrary, is subjective; that is, our consciousness is exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experienced by the thinking subject. Cognition and feeling are always coëxistent. The purest act of knowledge is always colored by some feeling of pleasure or pain; for no energy is absolutely indifferent, and the grossest feeling exists,

only as it is known in consciousness. This being the case of cognition, in general, the same is true of sensation and perception, in particular. Perception, proper, is the consciousness, through the senses, of the qualities of an object known as different from self. Sensation, proper, is the consciousness of the subjective affection of pleasure or pain; which accompanies that act of knowledge. Perception is thus the objective element, and sensation is the subjective element—the former is the element of knowledge, the latter is the element of feeling. The difference between Upham and Hamilton is this: According to Upham, perception implies a reference by the mind to the object of sensation; according to Hamilton, the mind is conscious of no such reference—it makes no such reference; but in an act of perception, we are conscious of something as self, and of something as not-self, and we believe that the object of which we are conscious, is the object which exists. Nor could there possibly be such reference, or representation, as Mr. Upham supposes. For reference supposes a knowledge of the object referred to; but perception is the faculty by which our first knowledge is acquired; and therefore cannot suppose a previous knowledge as its condition.

I have thus presented briefly, and I hope accu-

rately and candidly, the different theories of perception, from the old Greek philosophers to Hamilton. My design in this has been not merely to satisfy the curiosity, but to awaken reflection in the mind of the student. Let him compare these theories—let him test them by his own consciousness—and he will be almost certain to arrive at the truth. I have found that such comparisons have always had a fine effect upon the mind going through its process of development. From the most patient and earnest consideration I have been able to give the subject, I am led to the following conclusions:

1. The mind has the power of feeling in accordance with the modifications of the external senses: this is called sensation.

2. The mind has also the power of knowing through these same external senses: this is called perception.

3. In sensation, the mind is conscious of the feeling resulting from the modification of sense.

4. In perception, the mind is conscious of the knowledge resulting from the modification of the sense.

5. That as the sensation is intense, the perception is less vivid; or that sensation and perception are always in an inverse ratio—the greater the feel-

ing, the less the knowledge. Hence, those senses that bring the greatest pleasure—physical I mean—are the “gateways” of the least knowledge. Compare the taste with the sight, and this proposition will be obvious.

6. The whole truth may be expressed in this: In sensation, the mind knows that it feels through the organs of sense; in perception, the mind knows that it knows through the organs of sense.

SECTION II

PERCEPTION—CONTINUED.

The Five Senses—Use of the Senses—Organs of Sensation and Perception—Afferent Nerves—Efferent Nerves—Means of Intercourse between Mind and Body—Facts in Connection with the Organs of Sense—Lower Animals—Man in a State of Nature—Each Organ has its Office—Sensation great, Perception slight—Perception great, Sensation slight—Examples—Senses can be cultivated—Examples—Prof. Sanderson—John Metcalf—Laura Bridgman—Examples from Abercrombie—Senses perfected.

The five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch—are universally admitted to be the organs of sensation and perception. I shall not discuss the propriety of adding another sense to account for the feelings connected with hunger, thirst, weariness, nausea, etc.; nor shall I seek to lessen the number agreed upon by mental philosophers and physiologists. That all the phenomena can be

best accounted for by retaining the old number so familiar to all, is a sufficient reason for seeking to make no innovation. Nor do I deem it important to enter into a minute investigation of each organ, but simply to state such facts as are common to them all, and to illustrate them by direct reference to one or more of the organs of sense. In dissecting the human body, there are found thin, white, minute filaments, penetrating every part of it, in every direction; and they are all connected with the brain, either directly, or through the spinal marrow. The use of these nerves is to convey information from the outer world to the mind, or from the mind to the body. Those that convey intelligence to the mind, are called afferent nerves, and those that carry intelligence from the mind to the body, are called efferent. If the communication between any part of the body and the brain be broken off, by any injury done to the nerves, no intelligence can reach that part of the body from the mind; nor can the mind give direction any longer to that part of the body. For example, I hold this book in my hand; the nerve of touch, located in my fingers, communicates the change upon the nerve to the brain, and my mind feels the change, so that now I feel with my hand; but if the nerves which reach from my brain, to the ends

of my fingers were divided, I could no longer feel. I could not determine whether the book were cold, or warm, or rough, or smooth. In a word, I should have no sort of feeling below the point of division. I might pierce my hand with a knife, or I might burn it, without experiencing the least sensation of pain. So if the nerve of motion should be injured, I should be unable to control my motions, as I can at this time, by an act of my will. It is thus evident that the nerves not only convey intelligence to the mind, but carry, with great alacrity, the decisions of the will to the remotest parts of the body.

We now propose to present a few facts, in connection with the organs of sense, that may be interesting to the student.

1. The first fact is, that the lower animals usually possess some one sense in a higher degree of perfection than man ; but taking them all together, man possesses them in higher perfection than any other being known to us. The greyhound has a keener scent, and the eagle a far more acute sight, than man.

2. The second fact is, that the senses are generally in greater perfection with man in a state of nature, than in a civilized state. The tendency of civilization is to weaken the powers of the body, while it strengthens those of the mind. It is said that the

wild Indian sees and hears with more acuteness than the civilized. This may be the result of his condition of constant danger, in which he is required to be ever on the alert, listening or looking for his foe.

3. The third fact is, that each organ has its own particular set of nerves, and these nerves are incapable of performing any other than their own peculiar functions. The optic nerve can communicate vision, but cannot communicate touch.* So the auditory nerve communicates sound, but cannot communicate sight or taste. It is said that efforts have been made to torture the optic nerve, but that it is entirely incapable of communicating to the mind any sensation of pain. We can feel pain in the eye, or rather a sensation of pain may be communicated from the eye to the mind, but not by means of the optic nerve. "The snuff-taker smells the snuff with one nerve, and feels the tingling sensation with another. Each nerve is fitted for its own peculiar office, and has for this its own peculiar capability, and has its own susceptibility. Thus the nerve of touch is insensible to light; and, on the other hand, the nerve of vision is insensible to touch. If, therefore, the nerve of vision be paralyzed, but the nerve of touch in the eye be unimpaired, although there is no seeing, the

eye is as sensible to irritation as ever. Or the nerve of feeling may be paralyzed in the eye, and that of vision remain unimpaired. In that case, the individual can see, but can suffer no pain in that direction."

4. A fourth fact is at once curious and interesting, and it is astonishing that it escaped the notice of all psychologists to the time of Sir William Hamilton. It is, that those senses which are the organs of the most acute and profound sensations, are the organs of the least acute and least profound perceptions. That is, when the sensation is very great, the perception is very slight; when the one is at its minimum, the other is at its maximum. The organ of taste, as compared with that of sight, is the source of much more intense sensations; while sight is the source of more numerous and much clearer perceptions. Through the sight we derive the most of our cognitions, and receive the feeblest sensations. In the eye the subjective element is at its lowest; in the taste it is at the highest.

Next to sight, we derive the most of our knowledge through the hearing, and our sensations are far less intense than in the touch or taste; but they are more intense than in connection with the sight. It is also a singular fact, that we become disgusted soonest with those sensations that are the most

intense. Objects that are pleasing to the eye never fatigue us, while those that gratify the taste soon pall upon it and become unpleasant. When the same sense is the instrument of different perceptions, those that are the most vivid are attended by the least sensations, while those that are the least vivid are accompanied by the most intense sensations. Take color and figure, as derived from sight: color is accompanied by more feeling, while it affords our faculties of knowledge a far smaller number of differences and relations than figure.

5. A fact of universal application is, that the senses are capable of cultivation. A man suffering from blindness cultivates the other senses, so that they almost become substituted for the one that is lost. "The sense of touch became so acute in Prof. Saunderson, who had been blind from one year old, that he could discover with the greatest exactness, the slightest inequality of surface; and could distinguish in the most finished works the slightest oversight in the polish. In the cabinet of medals at Cambridge, he could single out the Roman medals with the utmost exactness. When any object passed before his face, though at some distance, he discovered it, and could guess its size with considerable accuracy. When he walked, he knew when he passed by a tree, a wall, or a house.

His ear had become so accurate, that he could not only recognize those with whom he was acquainted, by the sound of their voices, but could judge with the utmost accuracy of the size of any room into which he was conducted."

The following instance of the degree of perfection to which our senses may be cultivated, is recorded in the Transactions of the Manchester Society, and is given by Sydney Smith, in his Lectures on Moral Philosophy. "John Metcalf, a native of the neighborhood of Manchester, became blind at a very early age, so as to be quite unconscious of light and its effects. This man passed the younger part of his life as a wagoner, and occasionally as a guide during the night, along intricate roads, when the tracks were covered with snow. Strange as this may appear to those who can see, the employment he has since undertaken is still more extraordinary; it is one of the last to which we should ever suppose a blind man would turn his attention. His present occupation is that of a projector and surveyor of highways in difficult and mountainous parts. With the assistance only of a long staff, I have several times met this man traversing the roads, ascending precipices, exploring valleys, and investigating their several extents, forms, and situations, so as to answer his design in

the best manner. The plans which he designs, and the estimates which he makes, are done in a manner peculiar to himself, and of which he cannot well convey the meaning to others. His abilities, nevertheless, in this way, are so great, that he finds constant employment. Most of the roads over the Peak in Derbyshire have been altered by his direction, particularly those in the vicinity of Buxton."

To these instances may be added the case of Laura Bridgman, a blind deaf mute, born in Hanover, N. H., December 21, 1829. At a very early age she was deprived of sight and hearing, and consequently of speech; while the sense of smell was also destroyed and that of taste greatly impaired. She has been the inmate of the Perkins Asylum, Boston, since she was eight years old. Although entirely deprived of three senses, and with a fourth impaired, she has been taught to read and write, and has also been instructed in the rudiments of arithmetic. She has taken lessons on the piano, and has become a skilful performer, and she has acquired a practical knowledge of needle-work and household duties. She one day addressed the superintendent this question: Man has made houses and vessels, but who has made the land and the sea? The answer

that it was God who made all things, led to an explanation of his character. She would not rest satisfied until her teachers explained to her the great truths of revelation. The fear of death passed away with the hope of a resurrection; and she looks forward with joy to that change of existence when, freed from physical infirmities, her faculties shall all be employed in praising her Creator. She is neat and orderly, and never leaves her room or drawers in disorder. (See Appleton's American Cyclopedia: Article, BRIDGMAN, LAURA.)

Two instances, says Dr. Abercrombie, have been related to me, of blind men who were much esteemed as judges of horses. One of these, in giving his opinion of a horse, declared him to be blind, though this had escaped the observation of several persons who had the use of their eyes, and who were, with some difficulty, convinced of it. Being asked to give an account of the principle on which he had decided, he said it was by the sound of the horse's step in walking, which implied a very unusual caution in putting down his feet. The other blind man, in similar circumstances, pronounced a horse to be blind of one eye, though this had escaped the observation of those concerned. When asked to explain the facts on which he founded his judgment, he said he felt one eye to be colder than

the other. It is related of Dr. Moyse, that he could distinguish a black dress by its smell. The author was acquainted with a blind man who could distinguish the age of a person by his voice. And he knew another who, in walking, could tell when he was approaching a post, and could determine the size of a building by the sound of his foot-fall on the pavement near which the building might be located.

We might go on adding to the instances which establish the fact, that the senses are universally capable of the highest cultivation; and that when one sense is destroyed, its loss may be, to some extent, remedied by the substitution and superior cultivation of the other senses. Let it, however, be understood, that the ideas which are derived solely through one sense, can never be attained from another. For example, a person born blind can never have any idea of color. A gentleman born blind, was asked what idea he had of scarlet: he answered, it resembled very much the sound of a trumpet.

6. Another fact, the moral bearing of which is of the greatest importance in practical life is that the senses are capable of perversion. This is especially true of the taste. A taste, as unnatural

as it is ruinous, may be acquired for narcotics, alcohol in its various forms, hasheesh, etc.

SECTION III

PERCEPTION—CONTINUED.

Perceptive presentative Faculty—Reid's Claim—Presentative Knowledge—Representative Knowledge—Difference between presentative and representative Knowledge—Illustration—Egoistical representative—Non-egoistical—Perceptive presentative Faculty proved—Universal Conviction of the Human Race—Ineradicable—If false, the Root of our Nature false—Actions of Philosophers.

Reid claims the honor of being the first of modern psychologists to have given the correct theory of perception, as the presentative faculty of the mind. He dared to differ from those that maintained that we do not perceive the real objects, but their images, or phantasms. He coincided with the vulgar, and came in collision with the philosophers. His theory is now almost universally admitted to be the true one. "Every one is accustomed to distinguish," says Mahan, "between that kind of knowledge which is direct and immediate, and that which is obtained mediately, that is, through something differing numerically from the object of knowledge." The former is styled presentative, and the latter, representative knowledge.

By presentative knowledge is meant an imme-

mediate cognition of the object; that is, the object is brought, as it were, face to face before the mind. Thus, perception presents to my mind, directly, the external world: I actually perceive the book I hold in my hand, the table on which I write, and the chair on which I sit. They are presented to the mind by the faculty of perception; immediately and directly, and not, as was formerly supposed, through the media of images, or phantasms.

By representative knowledge is meant a mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up, or mirrored to the mind, in a vicarious representation. If the object is represented to the mind, by some mental faculty, as the imagination, it is called egoistical representation: if the object is represented by something numerically different from the mind, it is called non-egoistical representation. The former supposes two things: the object represented, and the cognizant mind by which it is represented. The latter supposes three things: the object represented, the cognizant mind, and the object representing. To make this plain to the student, let us place him before the Falls of Niagara: he perceives them, and his knowledge of them is presentative. No intermediate object is necessary to his perception, and he beholds the Falls immediately. Let us remove him from the

Falls, and by means of his imagination he brings the scenery before him. His knowledge is now representative and egoistical. Now let us suppose the Falls represented to him by means of pictures, and the stereoscope: his knowledge again is representative, and the representation is non-egoistical, inasmuch as the representation is made by something foreign from the mind itself.

In presentative knowledge, there must be a cognizant mind, and an actual object; in representative knowledge, there *must* be a cognizant mind, and there *may* be an actual object. That perception is a presentative faculty, and not representative, may be proved from these considerations:

1. The universal conviction of the human race accords with this theory. All persons, save a few philosophers, believe that we perceive, immediately and intuitively, the external objects around us. All persons are natural realists. No man but a philosopher was ever an idealist. This impression of the actual and real perception of external objects, and not of the representations of those objects, is very strong evidence of the truth of our theory.

2. Not only is this the universal conviction of the race, but it is a conviction so strong, as to be almost ineradicable. So deeply are men generally,

may, universally, impressed with this idea, that no amount of learned sophistry can remove it.

3. If, then, this universal conviction be false, the root of our nature is false; and we may give up the pursuit after truth as so much useless labor. For if we are deceived as to the reality of our perceptions, we may well conclude there is no truth in the universe. There must be a real object, before there can be the representation of such object. This must be universally admitted, and this very admission shows, that our nature, in its very constitution, must be defective, or the real object could be perceived, and not that which merely represents it. Why should the Divine Being so organize us, as to render us incapable of perceiving real external objects, and yet make the impression indelible that such objects are perceived in *themselves, face to face*, and not in any vicarious representation? I leave this question to be answered by those who can maintain the opposite theory to the one presented in this work.

4. Philosophers themselves, when not committed to their theories, and when not seeking to bolster up those theories, show, by all their words and actions, that they themselves concur with the universal voice of mankind, and regard perception as

a presentative faculty, and the knowledge of the external as immediate and certain.

SECTION IV

PERCEPTION—CONTINUED.

Knowledge is gained by Perception—First Objects of Perception—Case supposed by Buffon—Primary Qualities of Matter: Extension—Divisibility—Size—Density or Rarity—Figure—Incompressibility—Mobility—Situation—Secundo-primary: Heavy—Light—Hard—Soft—Firm—Fluid—Elastic—Inelastic—Rough—Smooth—Secondary: Sound—Savor—Smell—Distinctions.

Knowledge implies two things: a knowing mind, as the subject or faculty of knowledge, and a known object. Now, when an external object is brought into correlation with the active intelligence, the knowledge of its phenomena is a necessary result. The mind knows these phenomena, because it has the power of perception. Matter is a substance to be known by its phenomena, and intellect is a substance to perceive these phenomena, and hence gain a knowledge of matter. The first objects of perception to the infant mind are the loving countenance of the mother, the sterner face of the father, the happy group of prattling children, the familiar scenes of the nursery, the different apartments of the house, the various objects in yard and garden, and then whatever presents itself in the lanes and streets of the village, or in the crowded thorough-

fares of the city, or in the more sequestered haunts of a country life.

Buffon thus beautifully describes a being awaking to consciousness, and gaining a knowledge of the external world by means of perception: "Let us suppose a man newly brought into existence, whose body and organs are already perfectly formed, but who, awaking amidst the productions of nature, is an utter stranger to every thing he perceives. Of a man thus circumstanced, what would be the first emotions, the first opinions? Were he to give us a detail of his sensations and perceptions, might it not be in the following language?—

"Well do I recollect that joyful, anxious moment when I first became conscious of my own existence. I knew not what I was, where I was, or whence I came. On opening my eyes, what addition to my surprise! The light of day, the azure vault of heaven, the verdure of the earth, the crystal of the waters, all employed, all animated, all filled me with inexpressible delight. At first, I imagined all objects were within me, and formed a part of myself. Impressed with this idea, I turned my eyes toward the sun, whose splendor instantly dazzled and overpowered me. Involuntarily, I closed my eyelids, and during this short interval of dark-

ness, I imagined that I was about to sink into nothing. Full of affliction and astonishment, I had begun to ponder on this great change, when, listening, I heard a variety of sounds. The whistling of the winds and the melody of the grove formed a concert, of which the soft impressions pervaded the inmost recesses of my soul. So much was I engrossed with this new kind of existence, that I entirely forgot the light which I had known the first, till I again opened my eyes, and found myself still in possession of so many brilliant objects.

“Then a light breeze, of which the freshness communicated a new sensation of pleasure, wafted its perfumes to me. I instantly arose, and attempted to move. I carried my hand to my head; I touched my forehead; I felt my whole frame. Every part of my body which I touched with my hand seemed to touch my hand in turn, and give back sensation for sensation. I renewed my motions, and happening to strike against a palm tree, I was dismayed, and laid my hand upon this extraneous body, for extraneous I perceived it to be, as it did not return sensation for sensation. Now was it that the idea of externality was for the time acquired, and I perceived something which was not actually a part of myself.

“I then seated myself beneath a tree loaded with delicious fruit, whose perfume invited my sense of tasting. What savor, what novelty of sensation, did I now experience !”

Thus, one by one, were the senses of this imaginary being awakened, and he became gradually acquainted with the different qualities of matter.

These different qualities of matter are divided into three classes—primary, secundo-primary, and secondary.

1. The primary includes all those qualities which inhere in matter, and are essential to it, and which, even in thought, cannot be separated from it. Sir William Hamilton gives the following as the primary qualities of matter: 1. Extension; 2. Divisibility; 3. Size; 4. Density or rarity; 5. Figure; 6. Incompressibility absolute; 7. Mobility; 8. Situation. The primary qualities of matter are all evolved with rigid necessity out of the original datum of *substance occupying space*, or being contained in space.

2. The secundo-primary qualities are those which do not pertain to matter as such, but are dependent for their existence upon the different relations of matter. They are not essential to matter, as are the primary. They suppose the primary, but the

primary do not suppose them. They could not exist without the primary, but the primary could exist without them. If there were but one piece of matter in all space, it would possess the primary qualities, but would not have the secundo-primary, inasmuch as they are dependent upon the relations which exist between different pieces of matter. The secundo-primary qualities are such as heavy and light, hard and soft, firm and fluid, elastic and inelastic, rough and smooth, etc., etc. No exhaustive analysis has been attempted of these qualities, but the student is at once able to perceive their general characteristics.

3. The secondary qualities depend upon the existence of sentient beings. They are, properly speaking, subjective affections in the sentient being, and not qualities of body at all. They are such as sound, savor, smell, etc. The following are regarded as the principal marks of distinction between these different qualities of body. They are presented, condensed and simplified, from the Works of Hamilton :

1. The primary distinguish corporeal from incorporeal, body from spirit. The secundo-primary and secondary distinguish one body from another.

2. Under the primary, we recognize modes of the non-ego ; under the secundo-primary, modes

both of the ego and non-ego; and under the secondary, modes alone of the ego.

3. The primary are apprehended as they exist in bodies, the secundo-primary as they exist in bodies and in us, and the secondary only as they exist in us.

4. The primary are apprehended objects; the secondary, inferred powers; and the secundo-primary are both apprehended objects and inferred powers.

5. The primary are objective alone; the secundo-primary are both subjective and objective; and the secondary are purely subjective.

6. The primary are mathematical, the secundo-primary are mechanical, and the secondary are physiological.

7. The primary qualities of matter have reference to bodies, as they exist *per se*; the secundo-primary, as bodies exist in reference to other bodies; and the secondary, as they exist in reference to the sentient universe.

SECTION V

PERCEPTION—CONTINUED.

Complex Perception—Synthetic Theory—Upham's Illustration—Stewart's Illustration—Hamilton's Theory—Analytic.

A question which has perplexed mental philosophers, in reference to perception, is this: In any

complex perception, do we first perceive the object as entire—in its totality—and then by analysis separate that entire object, and view the simple component parts? or do we first view all the simple parts, and after uniting them by synthesis, perceive them entire?

Mr. Stewart, Mr. Upham, Mr. James Mill, and others, adopt what we shall denominate, the synthetic theory. They hold that in any complex perception, "We first obtain a particular knowledge of the smallest parts, and then by synthesis collect them into greater wholes." On this subject, Mr. Stewart remarks: "It is commonly understood, I believe, that in a concert of music, a good ear can attend to the different parts of the music separately, or can attend to them all at once, and feel the full effect of the harmony. If, however, the doctrine which I have endeavored to establish be admitted, it will follow that in the latter case the mind is constantly varying its attention from the one part of the music to the other, and that its operations are so rapid as to give us no perception of an interval of time."

Mr. Stewart illustrates the same doctrine by reference to vision. He says, "Suppose the eye to be fixed in a particular position, and the picture of an object to be painted on the retina. Does the

mind perceive the complete figure of the object at once, or is this perception the result of the various perceptions we have of the different points in the outline? With respect to this question, the principles already stated lead me to conclude that the mind does, at one and the same time, perceive every point in the outline of the object; (provided the whole of it be painted on the retina at the same instant;) for perception, like consciousness, is an involuntary operation. As no two points, however, of the outline are in the same direction, every point by itself constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind as if it were separated by an interval of empty space from all the rest. If the doctrine, therefore, formerly stated be just, it is impossible for the mind to attend to more than one of these points at once; and as the perception of the figure of the object implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the different points with respect to each other, we must conclude that the perception of figure by the eye is the result of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however, are performed with such rapidity, that the effect, with respect to us, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous."

Mr. Upham approves the above views of Stewart, and offers the following remarks in explanation of

Stewart's theory. He says, "It is incumbent on us to show how it is that we appear to see the object at once. The answer is, that the acts of perception are performed with such rapidity that the effect with respect to us is the same as if it were instantaneous. A habit has been formed; the glance of the mind, in the highest exercise of that habit, is indescribably quick; there is no remembrance; time is virtually annihilated; and separate moments are, to our apprehension of them, crowded into one."

The opposite alternative is maintained by Sir William Hamilton, and, as we think, correctly; for, as we know the whole of any complex object better than we do any of its parts, it follows, of course, that our knowledge is attained in the manner precisely the opposite of that supposed by the authors from whom we have quoted. Now the doctrine of Mill and Stewart necessarily implies that, as wholes are known through their parts, our knowledge of the parts should be more accurate than our knowledge of the wholes. Thus, suppose we know the countenance of a friend through the different features of the face, we ought to know each separate feature better than we know the whole countenance. In other words, we should more easily recognize the eyes, nose, mouth, or

chin of a friend than the whole face. We all know the exact opposite of this to be true. While the face, as a whole, is familiar to us, we can with difficulty determine the color of the eyes, or the special qualities of any particular feature. We may look upon the portrait of a friend, and readily determine that it is not accurate—that it is not a good likeness; but if asked to point out the defect, we should be unable to show in what respect, or in reference to what particular feature, the likeness is defective. So it is in the perception of a landscape; we perceive it as a whole, and proceed by analysis to its several parts. Hence, we are better acquainted with it, as a whole, than with any one of its particular features. This could not by any possibility be the case, if the theory of Stewart and Upham were true.

SECTION VI

PERCEPTION—CONTINUED.

Internal Perception—Difference between internal and external Perception—Conditions of external Perception—Of internal Perception—Self-consciousness of Hamilton—Reflection of Locke.

We have concluded what we had to say of external perception. During our discussion, we have found various conflicting theories concerning it.

These different theories are seen to have originated in the difficulty of comprehending the mysterious union between mind and body, and the still greater difficulty of explaining how mind can act beyond itself. This perception is an act of knowledge; hence, to suppose the knowledge of any thing external to the mind, would be to suppose an act of the mind going out of itself; but action supposes existence, and nothing can act when it is not; therefore an act out of self is an existence out of self, which is absurd. It is easy to see how such difficulties, and the reasoning by which philosophers attempted to remove them, would lead to the absurd theories of perception which have been presented during this discussion. In regard to internal perception, the difficulties are not so numerous, and we are therefore not embarrassed by conflicting theories.

External perception cognizes the phenomena of the external world. Internal perception cognizes the phenomena of the mind. The conditions of external perception are time and space. We can cognize—perceive—no external phenomena, but as they exist in time and space. The conditions of internal perception are time and self. Space is no longer a condition; for we cannot conceive of the phenomena of mind existing in space. But the

phenomena of mind exist in self—in mind—and hence self is substituted for space.

Internal perception is to the world of mind, what external perception is to the world of matter. The qualities of matter are known by external perception; the qualities of mind by internal perception. External perception is objective; internal perception is subjective.

This faculty is called by Locke, reflection, and by Sir William Hamilton, self-consciousness. All the phenomena of mind come within its range. By means of this faculty, we perceive that we think, and feel, and act. If I know, I perceive that I know; and so if I feel, or will. Deprived of this faculty, we would know nothing of our subjective states—nothing of intellect, sensibilities, or will. I might think, but would not perceive the internal act of thinking: so I might remember, or reason, or abstract, and not be aware of it. Deprived of external perception, I would forever remain in ignorance of external objects; so, deprived of internal perception, I must ever remain destitute of all knowledge of mind.

CHAPTER IV.

FACULTIES OF COGNITION—CONTINUED



SECTION I

MEMORY:

Definition of Memory: the retentive and reproductive Faculty—

Four Classes of Facts retained by Memory: Facts just past out of Consciousness—Those long since passed away—Those called up by Association—Those called up by the Mind diseased: Examples—Facts never recalled in this Life—Examples of remarkable Memories: Brougham—Voltaire—Cyrus—Themistocles—Andrew Jackson—Henry Clay—Hortensius—Corsican.

Memory is styled by Hamilton, the retentive and reproductive faculty of the mind. It includes both the capacity to retain and the power to reproduce, or recollect. As the retentive faculty, it is rather passive—resisting the influence of forgetfulness: as the reproductive faculty it is active—exhibiting a lively energy in bringing into consciousness facts which have long since occurred, and have been for a long time latent.

It is believed that the facts stored away in the mind, may be divided into four classes.

1. Those which have just passed out of consciousness; and which, by an ordinary act of reminiscence, can be recalled. For example, if you are asked who dined with you yesterday, without an effort you recall the person.

2. Those facts which long since passed out of consciousness, and are recalled only by considerable effort. The name of the man with whom you were acquainted several years ago, and of whom you have not heard or thought for years, is recalled by a mental effort, possibly protracted and perplexing.

3. Those facts which are recalled by some sudden and unexpected association. You see the portrait of a friend, and it brings up to the mind scenes which you thought long since forgotten. Dr. Rush mentions a visit which he made to a lady laboring under a low nervous fever. He mentioned "crow's nest," and so vividly did the unexpected association call up the days of her childhood, when, in company with the good doctor, she visited a crow's nest, that she at once began to recover.

4. Those which are never recalled when the mind is in the normal state; but which are recalled by the peculiar abnormal state of the mind.

A man mentioned by Abernathy, had been born in France, but had spent the greater part of his life

in England, and for many years had entirely lost the habit of speaking French. But when under the care of Abernathy, on account of the effects of an injury of the head, he recalled all his French and spoke it with fluency.

A similar case occurred of a man in a hospital, who spoke a language which nobody could understand, but which was afterwards understood to be Welsh. It was then discovered that he had been absent from Wales for thirty years, and before the injury to his head had entirely forgotten his native language..

A lady mentioned by Dr. Prichard, when in a state of delirium, spoke a language which nobody understood. The language was found to be Welsh; and it was discovered, that the vocabulary used by her was very small, and such as was suited to a child. None of her friends could form the least conception of the manner in which she became acquainted with the language she was using; but after much inquiry it was found that she was a native of the province of Brittany, the dialect of which is analogous to the Welsh. The lady had left her native province when she was not more than two or three years old, and had entirely forgotten her native language for many years before this attack of fever.

“A case,” says Dr. Abercrombie, “has been related to me of a boy who, at the age of four, received a fracture of the skull, for which he underwent the operation of trepan. He was at the time in a state of perfect stupor, and after his recovery retained no recollection either of the accident or the operation. At the age of fifteen, during the delirium of fever, he gave his mother a correct description of the operation, and the persons who were present at it, with their dress and other minute particulars. He had never been observed to allude to it before, and no means were known by which he could have acquired the circumstances which he mentioned.” Dr. Abercrombie also mentions the case of an eminent physician who, during the delirium of fever, could repeat long passages from Homer, none of which he was able to repeat when in health.

Other instances might be multiplied in illustration of this fourth class of facts in connection with memory, but we deem these sufficient to establish the theory.

5. A fifth class of facts may exist in the great storehouse of the mind, which are probably never to be recalled in this life, but which will be recalled in the life to come. This is not a mere philosophical speculation, but a truth of revelation,

which gives much potency to the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

Examples are given of most remarkable memories, some of which may be both interesting and instructive to the student of mental science.

It is said of Lord Brougham, that he could listen to a protracted legal argument, embracing a great variety of points, and, without notes, could state them in the exact order in which they were delivered.

Voltaire once read a poem of several hundred lines, before Frederic the Great. The monarch charged him with plagiarism, and in proof brought out the real author, and caused him to repeat the poem, word for word. Voltaire was so mortified, that he committed the poem to the flames. After it was consumed, Frederic confessed that he only wished to exhibit the astonishing memory of the man for whom he had claimed the authorship of the poem, and at the same time amuse himself at Voltaire's expense. Hence, he had secreted his man, so as to enable him to hear the poem as it was read by Voltaire; and from having heard it recited one time he had been able to repeat it with perfect accuracy. The man was recalled, and from his lips Voltaire recovered his lost manuscript.

It is said of Cyrus, that he could call every soldier in his army by name.

Themistocles knew the name of every citizen in Athens.

It is related of our great countrymen, Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay, that they never forgot either names or faces.

Hortensius could sit all day at an auction, and at evening give an account, from memory, of every thing sold, the purchaser, and the price.

Muretus saw at Padua, a young Corsican, who could repeat, without hesitation, thirty-six thousand names in the order in which he heard them, and then reverse the order and proceed back to the first. He then spoke the first, the third, the fifth, and so on, in any order that was asked, and all without the smallest error.

SECTION II.

MEMORY—CONTINUED.

Conditions of Memory: Present Existence—Past Existence—Past Perception—Present Recognition—Idea of past Time—Memory follows Perception—Perception acquisitive—Memory retentive—Susceptibility not a Function of Memory—Marks of good Memory—Faces and Events recalled more easily than Names and Dates—Reason assigned—Local Memory—Example—Philosophical Memory.

The conditions essential to memory are the following: 1. Present existence. 2. Past existence.

3. Past perception. 4. Present recognition of such past perception. 5. The knowledge by the mind that such perception is past and has recurred to the mind. That is, there must always be the idea of past time, of our existence in past time, and of our having gained knowledge in past time; which having vanished from consciousness, is now brought up by the power of recollection.

Memory immediately follows perception, and is essential to the retention of the knowledge gained by perception. Perception is the acquisitive faculty; memory is the retentive faculty. Without memory all the knowledge which might be acquired by perception would vanish, and be irrecoverably lost.

Some have made quickness, or great susceptibility, a mark of a good memory. I doubt whether this view is correct. Facility of acquisition belongs rather to perception than to memory. I regard a memory as good, which retains with tenacity, and recalls without difficulty. It is found that the memory generally retains and recalls the faces of persons more easily than it does names. The reason is obvious. Names do not make the deep impression which is made by the human countenance, and hence the countenance is recollected while the name is forgotten. It is also found that dates are recollected with much less facility than the events

with which they are connected; for the reason that the event makes a deeper impression than the date.

There are two varieties of memory which have usually been distinguished, as local or circumstantial, and as philosophical. The former is the recollection of the uneducated mind; the latter, of the educated. A local memory retains and recalls events, only in their local connections. A person with this memory, in making a narrative, will be prolix by his minute details of times, places, and circumstances. He must tell things exactly in the order in which they occurred. Out of his accustomed route, he becomes lost and confused. This is well illustrated by Mr. Upham, who quotes as follows from Shakspeare: "Mrs. Quickly, in reminding Sir John Falstaff of his promise of marriage, says: 'Thou didst swear to me on a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, upon Wednesday in Whitsun-week, when the Prince brake thy head for likening his father to a singing man of Windsor,' " etc.

A philosophical memory, on the other hand, is distinguished by the retention and recalling of facts in the order of their importance. These minute circumstances and minor details, are not treasured up in the memory of the philosopher. It

is only the facts of importance which he cares to retain. The contrast between these varieties of memory, is often observable in the evidence presented at our courts. A circumstantial memory tires the bar and the court by unnecessary details: a philosophic memory, having retained only the important points, does not fatigue with these unimportant narrations. It will be seen that these distinctions in memory depend upon the powers of reasoning and abstraction, possessed in different degrees by different orders of intellect.

SECTION III

MEMORY—CONTINUED.

Memory and Judgment compatible—Grocius—Pascal—Leibnitz—Euler—Donellus—Ben Jonson—Dugald Stewart—Dr. Gregory—Importance of Memory—Rules for its Cultivation: Attention—Thorough Knowledge—Repeating aloud—Helps—Method—Proper Objects of Inquiry.

It has been a question among mental philosophers and others, whether a very tenacious memory is compatible with a very well-developed mind. "The opinion," says Prof. Haven, "has been somewhat prevalent, that a more than usual development of this faculty, is likely to be attended with a corresponding deficiency in some other mental power, and especially that it is incompatible with a sound

judgment." To this opinion I cannot subscribe. Doubtless it is true, that many persons, deficient in the power of accurate discrimination, have possessed wonderful power of memory. The mind, in such cases, undisciplined, uncultivated, with little inventive and self-moving power, lies passive, and open to the influence of every chance suggestion from without, as the lyre is put in vibration by the stray winds that sweep across its strings. Facts and incidents of no value, without number, and without order, are thrown into relief upon the confused back-ground of the past, as sea-weed, sand, and shells are heaped, by the unmeaning waves, upon the shore. But if a weak mind may possess a good memory, it is equally true that a strong and well-disciplined mind is seldom deficient in it. Men of most active and commanding intellect, have been men, also, of tenacious and accurate memory. Napoleon was a remarkable instance of this. So was also the philosopher Leibnitz.

The following facts are presented by Sir William Hamilton, in support of the same views: "For intellectual power of a high order, none were distinguished above Groÿius and Pascal; and they forgot nothing they ever read or thought. Leibnitz and Euler were not less celebrated for their intelligence than for their memory, and both could repeat

the whole *Æneid*. Donellus knew the *Corpus Juris* by heart, and yet he was one of the profoundest and most original speculators in jurisprudence. Ben Jonson could repeat all that he had ever written, and whole books that he had read. Mr. Dugald Stewart, and the late Dr. Gregory, are likewise examples of great talent, united with great memory."

In addition to these facts, we may argue that when the memory decays, the other faculties usually diminish in the same proportion.

Of the importance of the faculty of memory, an eloquent writer remarks: What a power, then, is this, and how directly related to the gathering of knowledge! Made independent of the limitations of states by its judgment and its reason, the soul is made equally independent of years by this faculty of memory. In its highest activity, the whole of its experience becomes a *now*. It can summon back the past; can bring near the distant; can give immortality to its every acquisition. It writes its records, not as the Roman laws were written, first on wood, then on brass, and afterwards on ivory; but at once, on a tablet more impressible than wood, more vivid than brass, more precious than ivory, and more imperishable than either. Our knowledge becomes correlative and progressive

through this power. A man of retentive memory, accurate and ready, speaks without hesitation, narrates with interest and fluency, and describes with vividness and power. Whereas, one whose memory is defective, is constantly hesitating, for lack of words and loss of facts; his narratives are without interest and his descriptions fail to present to the listener any just ideas of the scenes attempted to be described.

A good memory imparts to the evening of life, a beauty and an interest, which charm and delight. It is not only a source of happiness to the possessor, but of great utility to others. It gives to the young the advantage of the experience of years. The aged live over the past—they become young, and the sweet recollections of childhood and youth give them a pleasant exit from this world. Even the remembrance of our conflicts and our sorrows, of the loved and the lost, affords a melancholy satisfaction. How grateful to the beneficent Creator should be the possessor of such an attribute as memory! An attribute, whose rich accumulations of thought and feeling, impart to life some of its sweetest pleasures, and give encouragement to all noble purposes, ought to be cultivated with unfaltering energy. Hence, we give you the following principles and rules, for the improvement of the memory:

1. Let the attention be wholly given to whatever is to be remembered. Attention is essential to the permanence of our impressions, and to the facility of recalling them. Thousands of occurrences vanish at the very time when they take place, from the fact that no attention is paid to them. Page after page of a book may be read, and at once forgotten, because only partial attention has been given. This principle accounts for the fact, that the art of printing is said to be prejudicial to memory. Before printing, instruction was given orally; and if the words were not closely attended to, they would be for ever lost. A man who could repeat from rare manuscripts, was not only a pleasant, but a most useful companion. Hence, the closest attention was given to every thing uttered. The discovery of printing has rendered this, to some extent, unnecessary. If attention is diverted for the time, it may be again directed to the printed page. But in a speaker, such diversion of the attention would be beyond remedy. We do not think it necessary to be able to remember all that is read; therefore our attention is not directed to that object. Formerly, the book was to be recited; hence the close attention, and the ready reminiscence.

2. Never be content with a partial knowledge of

any thing. If a thing is worth knowing at all, it is worth knowing thoroughly. Thorough knowledge is always followed by permanent remembrance. Whenever knowledge is partial, superficial, and acquired with but little effort, it is ephemeral. The mind, in its very constitution, is injured, and the noble faculty of memory is impaired, by habits of inattention and superficial investigation. The man that masters his subject, the student that learns thoroughly his lessons, form a habit which, for important bearings upon the intellectual character, cannot be over-estimated.

3. The memory is improved by repeating aloud, or by verbal communication from another. The ear, as well as the eye, is, by this method, made instrumental in the acquisition of knowledge, and in fixing the attention. I have often urged this method upon students who complained of defective memory, and always with success.

4. Let the student avail himself of all the helps to the accurate, thorough, and permanent acquisition of knowledge. Maps, charts, chemical and philosophical apparatus, and experiments, are all helps to memory. Let him write in his own language the thought that he wishes to make permanent, and then let him repeat it until it is indelibly fixed in the memory.

5. Let a rigid method be employed in the pursuit of knowledge. Method is essential to success in the cultivation of memory, as it is in all the practical pursuits of life. Language thrown together without method cannot be recalled, and a science studied without method confuses the mind and injures the memory.

6. The memory is improved by the selection of proper objects of inquiry. This principle is too often neglected. Man is frequently prone to give his attention to trivial objects, and thereby renders his memory unfit to retain such knowledge as is worth the acquisition. The mind is dissipated, and the memory impaired, when the attention is wholly directed to superficial accomplishments; and a still deeper injury results from the selection of unworthy objects for investigation.

CHAPTER V.

FACULTIES OF COGNITION—CONTINUED.

SECTION I

ASSOCIATION.

Definition of Association—Connection with Memory—Haven's View—Brown's View—Author's View—Arbitrary Association—Spontaneous Association—Principles governing the associative Faculty—Laws of Association—Aristotle's—Hume's—Stewart's—Primary Laws: Resemblance—Contrast—Contiguity—Cause and Effect—Secondary Laws: Vividness of Feeling—Lapse of Time—Habit—Mahan's Theory—Objection—Hamilton's Theory.

ASSOCIATION is that power by which one thought is brought into consciousness by means of another altogether different. Thoughts are frequently, if not always, found existing in the mind in certain connections, so that the recurrence of one calls up the others. That one thought is often suggested to the mind by another, and that this again introduces its successor, are facts known to the most superficial observer of the operations of the human mind.

The power of recollection is so dependent upon this faculty, that it has often been confounded

with it. The fact may lie submerged in the memory and lost to consciousness, but, when wanted, may be recalled to consciousness by some associative thought. Hence, Prof. Haven inclines to the view, that association is rather a law of the mind than a separate faculty.' He consequently treats of association as connected with memory.

Dr. Thomas Brown prefers the term suggestion, because association, he thinks, always implies former coëxistence, whereas this faculty frequently connects ideas never before associated. He makes this faculty include the memory, whereas Haven makes memory inclusive of association.

It seems to me that the powers are different, and, though intimately related, ought to be treated of as distinct faculties of the mind. I am conscious that I have the power to connect my thoughts in such way as that one shall recall the other. I may do this arbitrarily, as when I determine to associate a man with a steamboat, because I first met him on board one; or I may do this spontaneously, as when I associate a book with its author, or a house with its builder. I am also conscious of the remembrance of past events, of having heard a lecture, or listened to a sermon, at a certain time. And I am further conscious that these operations are essentially dif-

ferent. It appears to me that the universal consciousness will testify to this differencee.

The associative faculty is found to be governed by the following principles—that is, thoughts are able to excite each other: 1. If they once coëxisted. 2. If their objects were contiguous in space. 3. If their objects sustain the relation to each other of cause and effect. 4. If the objects of thought are similar or dissimilar. 5. If they sustain the relation to each other of the sign and the thing signified.

Aristotle was the first to give the laws of association. They were divided by him into, 1. Contiguity of time or place. 2. Resemblance. 3. Contrariety.

Hume was the first of modern philosophers to classify these laws. It is remarkable that he claims the honor of being the first to discover them, especially when they are so strikingly similar to those given by Aristotle. As given by Hume, the laws of association are, 1. Contiguity of time and place. 2. Resemblance. 3. Cause and effect.

Mr. Dugald Stewart and our countryman, Mr. Upham, give four laws of association. They are, 1. Resemblance and 'analogy. 2. Contrast. 3. Vicinity in time and place. 4. Cause and effect. Dr. Thomas Brown gives precisely the same classi-

fication as Aristotle, and adds to them certain secondary laws which act upon the primary. The secondary are, vivacity, lapse of time, habit, original constitutional differences, state of mind or body at the time.

The illustration of these laws may be of service to the student, and we proceed first to illustrate the law of resemblance. It is a law of association, that like reminds us of its like. On this principle, the portrait reminds us of the original. One country reminds me of another that is like it. One person reminds me of another, though the similarity exists only in reference to one feature; for it is not necessary that the points of similarity be numerous, or that the resemblance be perfect, in order that this law may act. Nor is the resemblance confined to objects of sight. Resemblance in sound or taste will as readily suggest similar sounds or tastes, as similarity in appearance. Nay, more: similarity in effect is as suggestive as resemblance in form, feature, sight, sound, taste, or touch. Upon this principle, opium may suggest alcohol, though one is a liquid and the other a solid.

2. Contrast. This is a very obvious principle of association. The palace of the king is associated with the cottage of the peasant. Riches suggest poverty; winter suggests summer; misery suggests

happiness; and thus a thousand examples might be presented. The rhetorical figure antithesis, is dependent upon this law.

3. Contiguity, or vicinity, of time and place. Thus Napoleon suggests Waterloo and Wellington. Monmouth suggests the battle fought there. The 22d of February is associated with Washington, and the 4th of July with the Declaration of Independence.

4. Cause and effect. Thus a wound reminds one of the instrument with which it is inflicted, while the instrument suggests the wound. Ardent spirits remind one of intoxication, and intoxication suggests ardent spirits.

Sometimes in the same train of thought, all of these laws may be exerting their legitimate influence. A voice resembling my mother's may bring before me my mother, the scenes of my childhood, the familiar haunts about the old homestead, my schoolboy days, my early friendships, and almost the history of my life. Such force is imparted to one word by the power of association.

The secondary laws, as imparting greater force to the primary, may be easily illustrated. For example, take the secondary law of vividness of feeling. Every one knows that if a place is connected with very deep feeling, all the circumstances con-

nected with it are more readily suggested than when no special feeling is connected with it. We pass a place where we met with a serious calamity, which greatly excited our feelings, and all the melancholy circumstances are at once suggested by the vicinity of place, and increased by the feelings formerly felt. We all know that lapse of time weakens the power of association. The more recent the coëxistent feelings or ideas, the more readily one suggests the other. It is also known that habit greatly affects the laws of association. To a physician, a country may suggest sickness or health; to an agriculturist, the vegetable and animal productions; to a lawyer, the probable amount of litigation; while to another person, of different habits, it may suggest another country, either similar or dissimilar.

Different writers on mental philosophy have endeavored to reduce the number of these principles, or laws of association, to one or two.

Mr. Mahan presents a very ingenious theory, reducing all the laws of association to one. His law is thus stated: "When present thoughts, or trains of thought, recall former ones, it is always and exclusively because the present has induced the state of feeling, or some element of the state, induced by the former. Thus the portrait of a friend

induces a state of mind similar to that which would be produced by the friend himself; and hence the sight of the portrait suggests the absent friend. So the sight of a surgical instrument produces a state of mind similar to that produced by the sight of the operation it is designed to effect, and hence brings up the operation."

So far the theory holds good; but can the learned philosopher show that winter produces a similar state to that produced by summer, and that beauty is similar in its effects upon the mind to deformity? We cannot admit that this law accounts for contrast being a law of association. Prof. Haven gives as the general law of association: "Prior existence in the mind of the suggesting and suggested idea." He says, "It seems to be a general law of thought, that whatever has been perceived or conceived in connection with some other object of perception or thought, is afterward suggestive of that other." That this is true we cannot doubt, but that it is the whole truth we deny. This limits the whole action of the associative principle to coëxisting ideas. It is well known that the face of a stranger may call up the countenance of an absent friend. These two objects have never before coëxisted in the mind. A new idea frequently brings up an old one; and they, of course never coëxisted in the mind until

the very moment when, by similarity, contrast, vicinity, or cause and effect, they became linked together. An effect may suggest its cause, although they may never have coëxisted in the mind.

Sir W Hamilton reduces the laws to two—simultaneity and affinity. By the former is meant the law of coëxistence; and the latter embraces all those ideas which, not having coëxisted, still have a tendency to suggest each other. Were I disposed to make any innovation, I should adopt the theory of Hamilton, as affinity may embrace contrast as well as similarity, and of course the theory is not liable to the objection urged against Mahan's. Nor is it liable to the objection against that of Haven's, as he adds to coëxistence another principle, which embraces those ideas not embraced in coëxistence.

SECTION II.

ASSOCIATION—CONTINUED.

Interesting Question—Illustration—Dugald Stewart's Solution—Hamilton's Solution.

It is sometimes found that one thought suggests another, between which there is perceived no bond—no connecting link. For example: "In a company in which the conversation turned on the civil war of England, a person suddenly asked what was the

value of a Roman denarius. The question is, What led his mind to such an apparently unusual association, as that between the civil war and the value of a denarius? The original subject of discourse, naturally introduced the history of the king, and the treachery of those who surrendered his person to his enemies. This again introduced the treachery of Judas, and this the value of the coin for which the betrayal of Christ was effected. Now, suppose the individual was unconscious of any idea between that of the civil war and the denarius, how are we to account for the non-appearance of the intermediate ideas?"

Dugald Stewart contends that all the intermediate ideas, from the civil war to the value of the denarius, were aroused into consciousness by the power of the associative principle, and as suddenly disappeared, and were forgotten.

On the other hand, Sir William Hamilton concludes that the intermediate ideas did not arise into consciousness, but remained in a state of latency, or unconsciousness, and that through them, thus latent, the associative principle passed, until it aroused into consciousness the idea of the value of the denarius.

Then, the question fairly stated is, Does one thought suggest another, not immediately connected

with it, by means of ideas intermediate, and so suddenly called up, and then allowed to pass out of consciousness, as to have made no impression on the memory? Or does one thought suggest another, from which it is separated by a number of intermediate ideas, by means of those ideas, and yet those ideas are not themselves awakened into consciousness, but remain all the time in a *latent state*? The question is not merely a speculative one, but it has great practical importance in the science of mind. Its importance, as also its solution, is thus presented by Sir William Hamilton:

“It sometimes happens that thoughts seem to follow each other immediately, between which it is impossible to detect any bond of association. If this anomaly be insoluble, the whole theory of association is overthrown. Philosophers have accordingly set themselves to account for this phenomenon. To deny the fact of the phenomenon is impossible; it must, therefore, be explained on the hypothesis of association. Now, in their attempts at such an explanation, all philosophers agree in regard to the first step of the solution, but differ in regard to the second. They agree in this—that, admitting the apparent, the phenomenal immediacy of the consecution of the two unassociated thoughts, they deny its reality. They all affirm there have actu-

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ally intervened one or more thoughts; through the mediation of which the suggestion in question has been effected, and on the assumption of which intermediation, the theory of association remains intact. For example, let us suppose that A and C are thoughts not on any law of association suggestive of each other, and that A and C appear to our consciousness as following each other immediately. In this case, I say, philosophers agree in supposing that a thought B, associated with A and with C, and which, consequently, could be awakened by A, and could awaken C, has intervened. So far, they are at one. But now comes their separation. It is asked, How can a thought be supposed to intervene, of which consciousness gives us no indication? In reply to this, two answers have been made. By one set of philosophers, among whom I may particularly specify Mr. Stewart, it is said, that the immediate thought B, having been awakened by A, did rise into consciousness, suggested C, and was instantly forgotten. This solution is apparently that exclusively known in Britain. Other philosophers, following the indication of Leibnitz, by whom the theory of obscure, or latent, activities was first explicitly promulgated, maintain that the intermediate thought never did rise into consciousness. They hold that A excited B, but that the

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excitement was not strong enough to rouse B from its state of latency, though strong enough to enable it, obscurely, to excite C, whose latency was less, and to afford it vivacity sufficient to rise into consciousness.

“Of these opinions, I have no hesitation in declaring for the latter. I formerly showed you an analysis of some of the most palpable and familiar phenomena of mind, which made the supposition of mental modifications latent, but not inert, one of absolute necessity. In particular, I proved this in regard to the phenomena of perception. But the fact of such latencies being established in one faculty, they afford an easy and philosophical explanation of the phenomena in all. In the present instance, if we admit, as admit we must, that activities can endure, and consequently can operate, out of consciousness, the question is at once solved. On this doctrine, the whole theory of association obtains an easy and natural completion; as no definite line can be drawn between clear and obscure activities, which melt insensibly into each; and both being of the same nature, must be supposed to operate under the same laws. In illustration of the mediatory agency of latent thoughts, in the process of suggestion, I formerly alluded to an analagous phenomenon under the laws of physi-

cal motion, which I may again call to your remembrance. If a series of elastic balls, say of ivory, are placed in a straight line, and in mutual contact, and if the first be sharply struck, what happens? The intermediate balls remain at rest; the last alone is moved.

“The other doctrine, which proceeds upon the hypothesis that we can be conscious of a thought, and that thought be instantly forgotten, has every thing against it, and nothing in its favor. In the first place, it does not, like the counter hypothesis of latent agencies, only apply a principle which is already proved to exist; it, on the contrary, lays its foundation in a fact which is not shown to be real. But, in the second place, the fact is not only not shown to be real; it is improbable—nay, impossible; for it contradicts the whole analogy of the intellectual phenomena. The memory, or retention of a thought, is in proportion to its vivacity in consciousness; but that all trace of its existence so completely perished with its presence, that reproduction became impossible, even the instant after, this assumption violates every probability, in gratuitously disallowing the established law of the proportion between consciousness and memory.”

CHAPTER VI

FACULTIES OF COGNITION—CONTINUED.

SECTION I

IMAGINATION.

Definitions of Imagination: Representative Faculty—Esemplastic Power—Brown's Definition—Upham's Definition—Reid's—Sydney Smith's—Stewart's—Illustration of the Difference between Perception, Memory, Association, and Imagination—Abercrombie's Remarks—Creative Faculty—Invests with Life—Examples: Painters—Novelists—Orators—Author's Definition of Imagination.

THE imagination is characterized by Sir William Hamilton as the representative faculty. It is styled by Coleridge, the "esemplastic, or into-one-forming power."

The definition of Dr. Thomas Brown is this: "It is the power of combining objects which are remembered, with various new assemblages—of forming at our will, with a sort of delegated omnipotence, not a single universe merely, but a new and varied universe, with every succession of our thoughts."

Prof. Upham says, "Imagination is a complex

exercise of the mind, by means of which, various conceptions are combined together."

Dr. Reid makes imagination, "A lively conception of objects of sight."

Sydney Smith defines imagination thus: "If I gather together, in my mind, various implements of war, and create out of them the picture of that armor in which I clothe the hero of my poem, this is an act of imagination."

Dugald Stewart defines it as the power by which we modify our conceptions—combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes.

Perception, as the presentative faculty of the mind, enables us to obtain an immediate knowledge of the external world. Memory, as the conservative faculty, enables us to retain the knowledge gained by perception. Association, as the suggestive faculty, acts as a spur and help to the memory, and links together our ideas by such bonds that one calls up another. Thus far, our faculties, whether presentative or representative, conform all their action to outer realities. We perceive things as they are, and we remember them as we perceive them. But imagination makes new combinations, and enables us to blend things that are dissimilar, and make them one. Thus, the ancients perceived a man riding on a horse, and, by the imagination,

blended the two into one, and the centaur was the result.

Such is, substantially, the view taken of this faculty by that distinguished practical philosopher, Dr. Abercrombie. He says, "In the exercise of imagination, we take the component parts of real scenes, events, or characters, and combine them anew. A painter, by this process, depicts a landscape, combining the beauties of various real landscapes, and excluding their defects."

Hence, the imagination is really the creative faculty. It embodies in new forms the objects, a knowledge of which has been acquired by perception, and retained in memory. '

In addition to exerting this power of recombination, the imagination often invests its conceptions with reality, with life itself. The painter has the imaginary scene before him: trees rise, clouds float, and flowers bloom, in his presence, at the bidding of his imagination. West, before painting that magnificent picture of "Christ Healing the Sick," by his imagination had brought before him, all invested with life, the great Physician, his disciples, the feeble woman, the palsied man, the rickety child; and almost as vividly as though he had witnessed the miracles of Christ. This power of investing its creations with life, is often overlooked

by philosophers. It is, however, a very important function, and one that only belongs, in the greatest degree, to an imagination of a high order. It is this function that enables the novelist to make, for the time being, his characters real, and to impart to fiction so peculiar charms. It is the same function of the imagination, that enables the orator to make his images glow with life. So vividly is the scene called up to his own mind, and with so much power is it presented to the minds of his auditors, that, charmed with the beauty, astounded by the grandeur, overwhelmed by the sublimity, and captivated by the life-like pictures, they are held for hours entranced and spell-bound.

Were I then called upon for a definition of the imagination, I would say, that it is the faculty by which we combine objects that are remembered, with various new assemblages, and then invest those combinations with reality. I would call it the creative faculty of the mind. The poet, the artist, the orator, owe to this function much of their glory. I concur with Sir William Hamilton, who makes it the productive faculty, and with Professor Haven, who makes it the power of "conceiving the ideal." The elements which enter into and compose that ideal conception, are indeed elements previously existing, not themselves the mind's creations;

but the conception itself is the mind's own creation ; and this creative activity, this power of conceiving the purely ideal, is the very essence of that which we are seeking to define.

SECTION II

IMAGINATION—CONTINUED.

Different Kinds of Imagination—Wayland's Classification: Active—Passive—Hamilton's Classification: Natural—Logical—Poetical—Imagination affected by Age.

A writer quoted with approval by Sir William Hamilton, says: "We may, indeed, affirm that there are as many different kinds of imagination, as there are different kinds of intellectual activity. There is the imagination of abstraction, the imagination of wit, the imagination of judgment, the imagination of reason," etc. In view of these different kinds of imagination, some writers have advanced the opinion, that Aristotle possessed as powerful an imagination as Homer. The difference between the two was, that Aristotle possessed a logical imagination, and Homer's was poetical. It may be suggestive to the student, if we present to him briefly, the different kinds of imagination, as they have been classified by various writers.

Dr. Wayland divides imagination into active and

passive. Active imagination is that power by which we can originate images, or pictures, for ourselves; it is the power of original combination: such was the imagination of Homer, Milton, Shakspeare, and all great poets. Passive imagination is that power by which we form pictures as they are presented to us in language. Here there is no power of original combination; but only a power to form into a scene, or picture a scene originally combined by another, and presented in language. A passive imagination would not be capable of originating the combinations of a great poet; but when those combinations are presented in language, the imagination forms a picture of them and represents them to the mind. As soon as the picture is presented in language, a passive imagination creates it before the mind. Even passive imagination, observes our author, is possessed in different degrees. Some persons create the picture at once; others after repeated trials. Just so with the active imagination. It is possessed in very different degrees by different persons.

Imagination has again been divided into: 1. Natural. 2. Logical. 3. Poetical.

1. A natural imagination presents ideas in their natural order; that is to say, the order in which we receive the impression of external objects, or the

order in which our thoughts naturally and spontaneously group themselves.

2. A logical imagination presents ideas in their logical order; that is, either in the order of induction, in which we ascend from particulars to universals; or in the order of deduction, in which we descend from universals to particulars.

3. A poetical imagination presents the thoughts in their poetical order; that is, it seizes individual circumstances, and groups them in such a manner as to represent them as they might be offered to the sense. Thus are we always impressed, when reading the grand scenes in any poem, with the thought the scene first existed in the imagination of the poet, before it was written in language. So, when we look upon the scenes of magnificence and beauty in some picturesque temple, we are again impressed with the conviction that all these scenes existed in the mind of the architect before the beautiful fabric was erected, or even before its outlines were transferred to canvas.

Sir William Hamilton, speaking of these different orders, observes: "The natural order is wholly involuntary: it is established independent of our concurrence. The logical order is a child of art, it is the result of our will; but it is conformed to the laws of intelligence, which tend always to recall

the particular to the general, or the general to the particular. The poetical order is wholly calculated on effect. Pindar would not be a lyric poet, if his thoughts and images followed each other in the common order, or in the natural order. The state of mind in which thought and feeling clothe themselves in lyric forms, is a state in which thoughts and feelings are associated in an extraordinary manner."

No faculty of the mind is more affected by age than the imagination. In youth, it is lively and poetic; in maturity, it usually becomes more logical; while in old age, its poetic power is less vigorous, it loses, to some extent, its logical character, and follows more the natural order. Age, sex, climate, religion, form of government, state of morals, degree of civilization, all give certain peculiarities to the action of the imagination.

SECTION III

IMAGINATION—CONTINUED.

Is the Imagination voluntary?—Upham's Theory—Argument to sustain it—The Imagination voluntary—Arguments to establish it.

Mr. Upham contends in his work on Mental Philosophy, that the imagination is not controlled

by the will. He says, "In accordance with the common opinion, we will suppose that a person wills, or chooses, to imagine an ocean of melted brass, or an immense body of liquid matter, which has that appearance. The statement itself evidently involves a contradiction. It is certainly impossible for a person to will to imagine any thing, since that precise thing which he wills to imagine, must already be in his mind at the time of that volition. He wills, for instance, to imagine a sea of melted brass ; but of what meaning, or what utility is this volition, when he has already imagined the very thing which this language seems to anticipate as future? Whatever a person wills, or rather professes to will to imagine, he has already imagined ; and consequently there can be no such thing as entirely voluntary imagination."

In answer to this very plausible theory, I have a few observations to make.

1. If the argument of Mr. Upham proves the imagination involuntary, it also establishes the fact, that the reason is not controlled by the will. He might, with the same propriety, say, When I have determined to make the effort to originate arguments in proof of any position, the arguments are already brought forward, and the truth is established. Every tyro in debate knows that he

has often determined to establish his point, that he has gone to work to form the arguments, and that at the command of his will, the reasoning power has produced the arguments by which his proposition is established. Every learner of logic knows that, in answer to a determination to make a syllogism, the syllogism has been made. Now, according to Mr. Upham, when I determine to make a syllogism on the mortality of animals, the syllogism "has already been made," the making actually precedes the volition.

2. The argument of Mr. Upham applies really with more force to the memory. For it might, with more propriety, be said that, when I determine to remember a thing, it is already remembered. Yet every one knows that when he determines to remember a fact, his memory retains it with much more tenacity.

Mr. Upham, himself, says that there is such a thing as intentional recollection. Every one can remember having recalled a lost name, or long-forgotten fact, by repeated efforts—voluntary efforts to recall. And it is a fact that memory is in proportion to the attention, and that attention depends upon the will. Then Mr. Upham's argument proves too much, and is, of course, worth nothing.

3. If the imagination be involuntary, no man is responsible for any act to which he has been led by the creations of his imagination. Scarcely a crime of any malignity has been committed until after the criminal has gone through it a thousand times in his imagination. His imagination combines and recombines the scenes of horror, until he actually becomes familiar with crime before he commits it. Now, nothing is more certain than that the crime would not have been committed, had not the vicious imagination corrupted the conscience and led on the perpetrator to the fell deed.

4. If the imagination be not voluntary, we should not condemn either licentious writings or obscene pictures. Why condemn the workings of a salacious imagination, if the possessor could not avoid such workings? Nothing is more certain than that man is not responsible for what he cannot avoid; and if he cannot avoid the creations of his imagination, in all justice we should cease to condemn Don Juan, and other like creations of a corrupt imagination.

5. If the imagination be involuntary, then is the world all mistaken on this subject. For wicked men always seek to corrupt the imagination first. But no involuntary principle can be corrupted. Man is only responsible for what is voluntary, and

if the imagination be involuntary, of course it can neither be pure nor corrupt, virtuous nor vicious.

6. Mr. Upham's view is not only dangerous to morals, but it is opposed to the universal consciousness. We all know that we can determine the action of imagination, we can arrest it in its flight, we can change it from one creation to another. We can chasten and refine it, or we can indulge it in scenes of lasciviousness, at once revolting and criminal.

The true theory is this: The imagination, like the other faculties, may often perform involuntary actions, may be spontaneous, but it is always under subjection to the will, and can be, and ought to be, governed by it.

SECTION IV

IMAGINATION—CONTINUED.

Mistaken View—Hume quoted—Utility of Imagination—Connection with the reasoning Power—Connection with moral Conduct—With refined Literature—With Inspiration of the Scriptures—Concluding Remarks.

The imagination is often underrated. Hume says of it, "Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. Men of bright fancies may, in this respect, be compared to those angels whom the Scriptures represent as covering their eyes with their wings." On the

contrary, I hold that the imagination is a very important faculty, and that its utility is seen in connection with the reasoning power.

1. The writer, or speaker, pursuing the reasoning process for the purpose of carrying conviction to the minds of others, must, in order to success, not only give a thorough examination to each argument, but must imagine himself an auditor or reader, and then conceive the effect which would be produced upon him.

2. He must combine and re-combine his arguments, and imagine the effects which would result from their presentation in different orders.

3. He must call upon the imagination for those illustrations which make truth clear, and which throw a brightness upon what otherwise would be obscure.

4. He must call upon the imagination for such language as will give to the argument a beauty that will fascinate, an adornment that will attract.

Its utility is also seen in connection with moral conduct. Let us take, for example, the golden rule: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." In order to obey this rule, we have to imagine others in our condition, and ourselves in theirs; and we have still further to imagine what we would have others do unto us, were our situa-

tions changed. Now, if a man could be found incapable of these acts of imagination, he would be equally incapable of obeying this command.

Its utility is seen by its intimate connection with all refined and elegant literature. Deprive literature of the creations of the imagination, and you take away its charms, you blight its beauties, and wither all its flowers. It is imagination that makes the gardens of literature bloom with all the beauties of Eden, and gives to its halls the transcendent glories of a Gothic cathedral.

The Divine Being has shown his high appreciation of this noble faculty, by causing it to glow with the fires of inspiration. The imagination was inspired; and we have the pious strains of David, the sublime utterances of Isaiah, the melancholy chants of Jeremiah, the wonderful visions of Daniel, the unequalled descriptions of Job, and those grand panoramie views which, with the vividness of dissolving scenes, are thrown upon the canvas by the beloved disciple.

In view of these, and other facts which will suggest themselves to the reader, we conclude that God has not given to man a more important—a more useful faculty. It may gild the dark clouds with the bow of promise, throw a charm around the domestic circle, brighten the links in the

chain of friendship, hallow home-scenes, and impart serenity to old age. When properly cultivated, it holds up before the youth an ideal of excellence, which is ever inviting him forward to higher attainments, to nobler deeds, and to more heroic achievements.

SECTION V

IMAGINATION—CONTINUED.

Imagination may be abused—Unrestrained—John Foster quoted—
Indulged in vicious Scenes—Gloomy Scenes—Reverie.

Useful as is the imagination, and noble as are the purposes for which it is designed, it is capable of being abused in a variety of ways.

1. When suffered to wander at random through fields of luxury, licentiousness, ambition, wealth, or pleasure, it unfits the mind for the sober realities and the stern duties of life. The imagination is abused, then, and perverted, by suffering it thus to roam at random. This abuse of the imagination is forcibly expressed by John Foster: "The influence of this habit of dwelling on the beautiful, fallacious forms of imagination, will accompany the mind in the most serious speculations, or rather musings, on the real world. Indeed, such a mind is not disposed to examine, with any careful minuteness, the real condition of things. It is content with ignorance,

because environed with something more delicious than such knowledge, in the paradise which imagination creates. In that paradise it walks delighted, till some imperious circumstance call it thence," when it is utterly disqualified for the realities which surround it.

2. The imagination is abused by suffering it to dwell on vicious or vulgar pictures, whether of its own creation, or the creation of others. The salacious poem, the lascivious scenes in a corrupting novel, are well calculated to pervert and corrupt the imagination. And surely it is a very great abuse of a noble faculty, to allow it to create such pictures as are offensive to modesty, injurious to virtue, or provocative to vice; and it is no less an abuse of the same faculty, to allow it to dwell upon similar scenes, which are the product of other minds.

3. It is an abuse of this faculty to indulge it in the creation of scenes of sadness and misfortune. By this abuse, the mind is made constantly to anticipate evil, to dwell with discontent upon the present, and it is incessantly haunted by needless fears and restless disquietude.

4. Finally, any indulgence in *reverie*, in castle-building, or in any combinations, which tend to unfit the mind for exalted virtue, or for practical duties; any indulgence which arouses prejudice, or

weakens judgment, which produces illusions, or excites unnecessary suspicions, which interferes with a calm investigation, a thorough analysis, and a careful and correct conclusion, should be regarded as an abuse of the imagination.

SECTION VI

IMAGINATION—CONTINUED.

Imagination must be controlled by Reason and Conscience—Cultivated by reading chaste Books—Studying Nature—By Use.

As our Philosophy is designed to be practical, we will lay down certain principles by which we should be governed in the culture of the imagination.

1. The imagination should be restrained from any wayward flights. It should ever be kept within the bounds of reason. Its creations should not be allowed to be of a licentious character. The command should be imperative, and be rigidly obeyed.

2. Not only should the imagination be brought under the dominion of reason and of conscience, and thus restrained and disciplined, but it should be cultivated by reading chaste and elegant works of imagination, as orations abounding with sound logic, striking metaphors, illustrative allusions, all clothed in appropriate language; or poems, whose

rich imagery and classical taste excite the most lively emotions; or fictitious narratives, in which, by the creation of imaginary scenes, by plot and character, by continuing a net-work of circumstances, either interesting or amusing, the author seeks to "point a moral or adorn a tale."

3. The imagination is to be cultivated by looking upon the beautiful, grand, and sublime in nature. As we look upon the splendors of the stellar universe, at the heavens that declare the glory of God, at the firmament that showeth his handywork, the imagination is exalted and refined. As we gaze upon the beauties of an autumnal sunset, at the golden-tinted clouds assuming a thousand picturesque shapes, at the broad disc of the sun as he gradually sinks beneath the horizon, at star after star as they appear lighting up the vault of heaven, the imagination is fired. The lofty mountain and the lowly valley, the crystal rivulet and the foaming river, the rippling cascade and the mountain torrent, the modest violet and the towering oak, the variegated butterfly and the heaven-soaring eagle, all may serve to cultivate imagination, to give it a stronger wing and a bolder flight.

4. The imagination is strengthened by use, and impaired by disuse. It follows the general law of our nature. Let then the imagination be exercised.

Let it be employed in bright and beautiful combinations, and in creations fresh and fragrant as a garden of flowers. Let no effort be made to annihilate this noble faculty. "In childhood," says an eloquent writer, "we meet this faculty always. The child has a sense of the invisible around him. God is real to him; right imperative; eternity waiting. He walks amid a glory streaming down from the Unseen."

We repeat, let not this noble faculty be annihilated. God has honored it as he has no other faculty; let it then be exercised. Amid fields of innocence and beauty, let it roam; into its native skies, let it soar; to the scenes of unsullied purity, let it rise. Let it go back to when the Infinite reigned alone, when no sun or star broke in upon those eternal solitudes, and when no voice interrupted the eternal silence. Let it hear the sons of God shout for joy at the dawn of creation. Let it see light, when God said, "Let there be light." Let it behold the father of the race, bright with intelligence and spotless in purity. Let it see the mother of all living:

"Grace was in all her steps, heaven in her eye,
In every gesture dignity and love."

Let it look upon the wondrous works of grace, the

plan of redemption, the conflicts and triumphs of the cross, and the heaven of the blessed.

SECTION VII

IMAGINATION—CONTINUED.

Dreaming—Sleep—Order in which the Senses are closed—Causes of Dreams: Condition of Body—Illustrations—Waking Thoughts—Examples—Revival of old Associations—Example—Apparent Reality of Dreams—Singular Fact—Wonderful Acuteness—Remarkable Examples—Incoherent—Miscalculation of Time—Dr. Henkle's Dream—Dreams prophetic—Examples.

We have thus far investigated the action of imagination while the mind is in the waking state; we now proceed to investigate such action taking place while the mind is in the condition commonly called sleep. It is indeed doubtful whether the mind is ever asleep. Sleep shuts up the senses, one after another, and throws a torpor over the body; but the mind is probably ever active. It is to this action, while sleep overpowers the individual, that we now call the attention of the student.

This discussion will lead us to a thorough investigation of the phenomena of dreaming. Some mental philosophers have classified these phenomena among those which occur when the mind is in what is called the abnormal state. On the contrary, we do not think such classification just; and as they

are more intimately connected with the action. of the imagination than with any other faculty, we have thought this the proper place for their consideration.

It has been said that the senses fall asleep in the following order: 1. Sight. 2. Taste and smell. 3. Touch. 4. Hearing. After the eyelids close, and the eyes are already in a sound sleep, the person hears without difficulty, and is quite sensitive to touch. Such appears to be the usual phenomena of sleep. But while this relaxation and torpor overcome the senses, and, indeed, the entire nervous system, the ever-active mind continues its operations.

In the discussion of dreaming, I call attention to the following facts:

1. Dreams are caused by the condition of the body. Once, after much fatigue, during a rainy day, followed by a hearty meal, the writer dreamed that a huge form was sitting directly across his breast. He awoke in terror, and was disappointed at not finding the hideous being on his breast. Nothing is more certain than that the dream was caused by the condition of the body.

It is related of a traveller, that when placed between table-cloths to sleep, instead of the usual bed-cloths, he dreamed continually of eating mut-

ton. The fumes of the mutton, affecting the sense of smell, caused the dream.

Mr. Stewart gives an account of a man who dreamed that he was walking on *Ætna*. The dream was caused by his having bottles of hot water at his feet. An impression on the sense commences the dream; but it is carried out and developed by the imagination, assisted probably by association. Such illustrations of this source of dreams are so numerous that it is not necessary to multiply them.

2. Dreams are caused by the waking thoughts. One in deep grief dreams of seeing a departed friend. Another, anxious about wealth, dreams of riches; while another, anxious about his studies, dreams of his lessons. A friend of mine was much perplexed with a difficult Greek lesson. He fell asleep, deeply troubled because the lesson was not mastered. While asleep, he dreamed the correct reading of the Greek, which in his waking moments he had failed to understand. The truth in this case was, that my friend did not leave the subject when, despairing of understanding it, he sought repose. It occupied him in his dreams. His mind was active, while the senses were dormant.

Many interesting examples can be given, show-

ing that one very prolific source of dreams is found in anxiety of mind. The following are given by Dr. Abercrombie, and are both interesting and illustrative.

“A gentleman who was appointed to an office in one of the principal banks in Edinburgh, found, on balancing his first day's transactions, that the money under his charge was deficient by ten pounds. After many fruitless attempts to discover the cause of the error, he went home not a little annoyed by the result of his first experiment in banking. In the night, he dreamed that he was at his place in the bank, and that a gentleman, who was personally known to him, presented a draft for ten pounds. On awaking, he recollected the dream, and also recollected that the gentleman who appeared in it, had actually received ten pounds. On going to the bank, he found that he had neglected to enter the payment, and that the gentleman's order had, by accident, fallen among some pieces of paper which had been thrown on the floor to be swept away.”

“Mr. R., of Bowland, a gentleman of landed property in the vale of Gala, was prosecuted for a very considerable sum, the accumulated arrears of teind, (or tithes,) for which he was said to be indebted to a noble family, the titulars, (lay

impropriators of the tithes.) Mr. R. was strongly impressed with the belief that his father had, by a form of process peculiar to the law of Scotland, purchased these lands from the titular, and therefore that the present prosecution was groundless. But, after an industrious search among his father's papers, an investigation of the public records, and a careful inquiry among all persons who had transacted law business for his father, no evidence could be recovered to support his defence. The period was now near at hand when he conceived the loss of his law-suit to be inevitable, and he had formed his determination to ride to Edinburgh next day, and make the best bargain he could in the way of compromise. He went to bed with this resolution, and with all the circumstances of the case floating upon his mind, had a dream to the following purpose: His father, who had been many years dead, appeared to him, he thought, and asked him why he was disturbed in his mind. In dreams, men are not surprised at such apparitions. Mr. R. thought that he informed his father of the cause of his distress, adding, that the payment of a considerable sum of money was the more unpleasant to him, because he had a strong consciousness that it was not due, though he was unable to recover any evidence in support of his belief. 'You are right,

my son,' replied the paternal shade, 'I did acquire right to these teinds, for payment of which you are now prosecuted. The papers, relating to the transaction, are in the hands of Mr. —, a writer, (or attorney,) who is now retired from professional business, and resides at Inveresk, near Edinburgh. He was a person whom I employed on that occasion, for a particular reason, but who never, on any other occasion, transacted business on my account. It is very possible,' pursued the vision, 'that Mr. — may have forgotten a matter which is now of a very old date; but you may call it to his recollection by this token, that when I came to pay his account, there was difficulty in getting change for a Portugal piece of gold, and that we were forced to drink out the balance at a tavern.'

"Mr. R. awoke in the morning, with all the words of his vision imprinted on his mind, and thought it worth while to ride across the country to Inveresk, instead of going straight to Edinburgh. When he came there, he waited on the gentleman mentioned in the dream, a very old man: without saying any thing of the vision, he inquired whether he remembered having conducted such a matter for his deceased father. The old gentleman could not, at first, bring the circumstance to his recollection; but on mention of the Portugal piece of gold, the

whole returned upon his memory. He made an immediate search for the papers, and recovered them—so that Mr. R. carried to Edinburgh, the documents necessary to gain the cause which he was on the verge of losing.”

3. Another fact in connection with the source of dreams is, that they are frequently called up by the revival of old associations. Long absence from familiar haunts, followed by a sudden return, brings up old associations, and produces dreams of a peculiar character. The following dream illustrates this principle :

“A person who worked in a brewery, quarrelled with one of his fellow-workmen, and struck him in such a manner that he died on the spot. No other person was witness to the deed. He then took the dead body, and threw it into a large fire under the boiling vat, where it was in a short time so completely consumed, that no traces of its existence remained. On the following day, when the man was missed, the murderer observed very coolly, that he had perceived his fellow-servant to have been intoxicated, and that he had probably fallen from a bridge which he had to cross in his way home, and been drowned. For the space of seven years after, no one entertained a suspicion of the real state of the fact. At the end of this period, the murderer

was again employed in the same brewery. He was then induced to reflect on the singularity of the circumstances, that his crime had remained so long concealed. Having retired one evening to rest, one of the other workmen, who slept with him, hearing him say, in his sleep, 'It is now fully seven years ago,' asked him, 'What was it you did seven years ago?' 'I put him,' he replied, still speaking in his sleep, 'under the boiling vat.' As the affair was not entirely forgotten, it immediately occurred to the man, that his bed-fellow must allude to the person who was missing about that time, and he accordingly gave information of what he had heard, to a magistrate. The murderer was apprehended; and though he at first denied that he knew any thing of the matter, a confession of his crime was at length obtained from him, for which he suffered condign punishment."

4. Dreams frequently appear to be real; and there is, in connection with the apparent reality of dreams, a singular fact, which, so far as I know, has escaped the attention of psychologists. Dreams are frequently repeated, and there is in the dream a distinct and vivid recollection of a similar dream, accompanied with the conviction that this is reality, while the former was a dream. The writer has frequently dreamed of being in company in

“*deshabille*.” Such dreams are always attended with apparent reality, a sense of unpleasant awkwardness, and a recollection of former dreams which at last are fulfilled. It has been a question for philosophers to solve, Why dreams are apparently real? The general solution has been, because the mind is wholly taken up with the dream, and the attention wholly directed to it, and therefore it appears real.

5. Another fact in connection with dreams is, that the mind frequently evinces a wonderful degree of acuteness. It is related of a lawyer, that he was seen to rise during the night, and write for an hour with great earnestness. In the morning, he was informed of what he had done; and on examination of his writing, he found that it was the first half of a powerful legal argument. His only regret was, that the argument was not brought to a conclusion. On the succeeding night, the same phenomenon occurred. He again wrote for an hour, with the same earnestness as on the preceding night. In the morning, upon examination, he found he had concluded his argument — commencing where he had left off the former night. The argument was so satisfactory, that it was used by him, with great success, in the case for which it was prepared.

A most remarkable case, illustrating this point,

was related to me years ago, by my lamented friend, Prof. Hentz. A lady was in the habit of sleep-walking, and to prevent it, she locked the door and placed the key under her pillow. This had no effect, and as the habit was becoming very annoying, the key was taken and placed in a vessel of water. The shock, from immersing her hand in cold water, awakened her, and prevented her usual walk. On the following night, she took her walk, and it was found in the morning that, in order to prevent being aroused by the water, she had, in her dream, poured out the water, and thus accomplished her object.

6. Dreams are often very incoherent. This is caused, probably, by a loss of voluntary control over our mental action, added to the fact that the mind is not influenced by surrounding objects, as it is in the waking state.

7. There is a great want of correct calculation of time, in dreaming. Usually, the dreamer supposes the time to be very much longer than it is found to be. One of the most interesting dreams of this character was given, about a year ago, by my friend, the Rev. Dr. Henkle: "On the morning of the 10th October, 1858," says Dr. H., "I dreamed that I was in the vestibule of a large, gloomy house, in which people were assembling for some public

purpose. While there, I heard a clock strike, and from the time and circumstances, I inferred that it was the town clock striking the hour of nine, though I recollected of hearing but the first stroke. Several young men, as if startled by the striking of the clock, came out of the assembly room, and spoke of going home; but one said they could not go till they had recited their lessons. I gave attention, to learn what sort of lesson it might be, and soon gathered, that they were young men engaged in mercantile pursuits, who had associated themselves for purposes of improvement in knowledge pertaining to their vocation. They, five or six, gathered around a monitor, who, from a commercial dictionary which he held in his hand, gave out a word for the class to spell and define. The word, from its sound, I took to be French, but could not understand it, and suspected the monitor had pronounced it incorrectly. Each member of the class, in order, failed to spell the word, and then the monitor spelled and defined it from the book. Just then, a bell or clock, of the same tone as the first, was heard, and one said he must go, for that was his dinner bell. I, too, determined to leave, and moved to a door, some twenty feet west of me, to get out, but on partly opening it, I found that it opened to the room where the gathering of

people was. I then turned in an opposite direction, but not finding the outlet, I turned into a sort of side passage, or closed gallery, which I followed, apparently some fifty feet, and found it to be connected with a female academy, the bell of which I now heard, but in the same tone as the two already heard. I reached the entrance of a large room, in which were a number of persons, apparently teachers and pupils, and a man inside of the door was calling the names of persons for whom he had letters, after the manner of a penny-post. I advanced into the room a few steps, when I heard behind me another letter man, who, in a peculiar nasal voice, proclaimed, 'Letters for Misses Tablan—Miss Mattie, and Miss Sallie: Who'll take them?' I paused to observe the odd proceeding, and then advanced slowly towards the opposite door. One inquired where I was going, and as I scarcely knew, I felt slightly embarrassed by the question. Without, however, waiting for my answer, he said, 'If you are going to the parlor, that is the way.' I proceeded to the door, and opened it, and as I was passing out, I woke, as a stroke of the family clock, which stood near my bed, was dying away, and in time to hear one more stroke, and the last. I instantly recognized the identity of tone with what I had been hearing at intervals during what

seemed to have been at least half an hour. The clock had struck the hour of five, and the moment I awoke I was fully convinced, by the clear impression of the fact, and by the unquestionable identity of sound of the last stroke with those that preceded, that the first stroke of the clock was, in my dreaming fancy, the town clock striking nine o'clock; then came the recitation; the second stroke was the dinner bell, and then came my tedious search for an outlet; the third stroke was the academy bell, and then followed the crying, and delivery of the letters, the inquiry as to where I was going, and the direction; the fourth stroke I heard in the act of waking; and the fifth I heard, clearly, after being fully awake. I cannot make this as clear to the mind of another, as it is to my own by a sort of certain consciousness, connecting the outside fact with the connected mental action; yet, perhaps most persons have had dreams, originating in outward circumstances, which, though they could not demonstrate to have such origin, they were yet fully conscious of the fact. A man, for example, on the morning of the fourth of July, dreams that he is in a dreadful thunder-storm, and waking, hears the booming of cannon, to welcome in the day. He cannot demonstrate to another that the cannon created the thunder-storm of his dream, probable

as the thing would appear to any one; yet he himself has a conscious assurance that the sound he hears on waking is identical with the sound he heard dreaming. This sort of consciousness, apart from the strongly corroborating, if not actually conclusive circumstances, enables me to say that I know that my full half-hour's excursion in dream-land was actually performed between the first and fourth stroke of the clock—three or four seconds!"

7. Dreams sometimes appear to have a prophetic character. The writer once dreamed of the illness of his teacher, and that he met the children returning from school. The very place at which they were to be seen was vividly impressed upon him in his dream. The dream was literally fulfilled. He has had other dreams, of a far less important character, fulfilled with perfect accuracy. This apparently prophetic character of some dreams is illustrated in the history of almost every one.

The Rev. Mr. Cooper had a most remarkable dream in reference to the celebrated watering-place in Mississippi which bears his name. The dream was made known months, if not years, before its fulfilment, so that all doubt is removed as to the prophetic character of the dream.

Dr. Abercrombie relates the case of two sisters sleeping in the same room, adjoining that of a sick

brother; one of them awoke in affright, having dreamed that the watch had stopped, and that at the same time the other exclaimed, "Brother's breath has stopped." On examination, the watch was found to be going, and the brother in a sound sleep. In a few days, however, the dream was literally fulfilled.

Prof. Haven gives an account of a Mr. Williams, residing in Cornwall, who dreamed three times in the same night that he saw the Chancellor of England killed in the vestibule of the House of Commons. The dream so deeply impressed him that he told it to several of his friends. It was subsequently ascertained that on that very day the Chancellor was killed.

Dr. Abercrombie gives the following as authentic: "A lady dreamed that an aged female relative had been murdered by a black servant, and the dream occurred more than once. She was then so impressed by it that she went to the house of the lady to whom it related, and prevailed upon a gentleman to watch, in an adjoining room, during the following night. About three o'clock in the morning, the gentleman, hearing footsteps on the stairs, left his place of concealment, and met the servant carrying a quantity of coals. Upon examination, the servant was found to be armed with a

strong knife, which he had evidently concealed for a deadly purpose.”

Other dreams, apparently of a prophetic character, might be given, but they would serve only to protract a discussion already sufficiently long.

The sources of such dreams cannot easily be determined. Whether the mind, when the senses are closed in sleep, has power to look into the future, or whether it is under supernatural influence during these peculiar dreams, is beyond our capacity to determine. Either or both of these suppositions may be true. It certainly is not inconsistent with the view of a particular providence, that dreams may be given as warnings.

SECTION VIII

IMAGINATION—CONTINUED.

Somnambulism—Peculiarity of this State—Different Views—Wonderful Phenomena—Examples—Remarks of Hamilton.

The peculiarity of this state is, that the bodily functions are made more active than in the dreaming state. It is first seen in a propensity to talk during sleep. This can hardly be called somnambulism; but talking frequently leads to walking in sleep. The somnambulist gets up and dresses himself, catches his horse, rides or walks, as suits his

purpose, goes over dangerous places, ascends precipitous heights, reads or writes, and is all the time apparently unconscious. Nor does he appear to be able to recall those scenes after he is aroused.

Some suppose the movements in somnambulism to be altogether automatic; others maintain that they are partially controlled by the will—that the mind is conscious during the whole time, and to some extent controls the action of the body.

Some of the most wonderful phenomena connected with the human mind are exhibited during somnambulism—phenomena which, but for their being well authenticated, could hardly be believed. For example, it is related of a lady that, being anxious to obtain a prize for painting, which her attainments did not justify her in expecting, she actually performed a work of art in her sleep which she could not have performed when awake. It is also related of a clergyman, that he was in the habit of writing his sermons during fits of somnambulism. And an amusing account is given of a gentleman who, during sleep, was in the habit of stealing his own poultry—who was detected robbing his own hen-roost.

In reference to this whole subject, we may well adopt the language of Sir William Hamilton: “This subject is the most perplexing in the whole

compass of philosophy." On the one hand, the facts are authenticated by witnesses so numerous, so intelligent, and so honest, that we cannot deny or doubt them; and, on the other, we are utterly unable to account for them.

CHAPTER VII.

COGNITIVE FACULTIES—CONTINUED.

SECTION I

COMPARISON, OR THE REASONING FACULTY

Definition of Comparison—Styled by Hamilton, the elaborative Faculty—By Prof. Haven, the reflective Faculty—Act of Reasoning defined—Functions of the reasoning Faculty—Judgment—Abstraction—Brown's relative Suggestion—First Act of Comparison—Second Act—Third Act—Relations of Time—Relations of Place—Relations of Substance and Attribute—Resemblance and Difference—Proportion—Relation of Part to Whole—Cause and Effect—Antecedent and Consequent—Degree—Perception of Relations essential to Reasoning.

THE most simple definition that we can give of comparison is, that it is the faculty by which "we compare facts with each other, and mental impressions with external things."

It is called by Sir William Hamilton, the elaborative faculty, and he makes the other cognitive faculties subsidiary to this. . . .

Prof. Haven calls it the reflective faculty, and attaches the same importance to it as is attached to it by Sir William Hamilton.

It is, in fact, the reasoning faculty; for all reasoning proceeds by comparison. The act of reasoning is nothing more than the comparison of two terms with each other, by means of a third. Hence, all our perceptions, all the knowledge stored away in the memory, all the acts of the associative principle, and all the creations of the imagination, are to be made subsidiary to this important faculty. Its functions are, first, to perceive relations; and, secondly, to perform the work of abstraction. It thus embraces what are usually denominated judgment and abstraction.

Owing to its function of perceiving relations, it was called by Dr. Thomas Brown, relative suggestion.

We proceed, then, to a brief analysis of this principle, from its most simple to its most complex operations.

1. The simplest act of comparison is, the discrimination of existence, as different from non-existence. This is regarded as the primary condition of thought. The first act of the judgment is, to affirm existence and to deny non-existence. When the mind first awakes up in consciousness, this act is performed.

2. The second act of comparison is, to distinguish between self and not-self. In this act, we affirm the

existence of both self and not-self—of mind and matter—of the subject and the object, and we also affirm the difference between the two; that is, we affirm that the object exists independently of the subject, and that they cannot, by any act of the mind, be considered as one.

3. The third act of comparison is, to distinguish events in their order, either of coëxistence or of succession. In comparing events we perceive their relation in reference to time. All time is regarded as present, past, or future, and so we perceive an event as now happening, or as having taken place, or as in the future to take place. For example, we learn that the Declaration of Independence was made on the fourth of July, 1776. We assume the present year, 1860, as a given period, and reckon back to the birth of Christ as another period; then the fourth of July, 1776, expresses an intermediate point between these two extremes. By the act of comparison, we perceive the relation of this point to the present period and to the beginning of our era. In other words, we perceive how long it was from the beginning of our era to the Declaration of Independence, and how much time has passed since then to the present period.

4. We next compare things in reference to place. We cannot conceive of a body as occupying place,

without comparing its position with some other locality. In determining this relation, we must consider two bodies in reference to each other, and then take into account their relation to a third locality. A sea-captain has in his cabin the portrait of Washington. You ask him how long it has occupied its present position. The answer is, "for the last five years." But during the last five years, his vessel has crossed the Atlantic a dozen times; and of course, it and all its furniture has changed localities almost every day during that time. How, then, was the answer correct? The captain was considering the portrait simply in reference to the ship. So far as the ship was concerned, the portrait had occupied the same place; so far as other localities were concerned, it had been constantly changing its place.

5. We next perceive the relations of substance and attribute. We perceive man, and at the same time compare with him, as an individual, the attributes which he possesses. We perceive phenomena, and compare them with the substance that exhibits them. Thus, on beholding an orange, we perceive its relation to yellow color, roundness, fragrance, flavor, etc., and the comparison groups these as the attributes of the orange.

6. We perceive the relations of resemblance or

difference. I see a picture resembling a friend, I immediately make the comparison, and designate the points of resemblance and difference. Two flowers or shrubs, are presented in my morning walk, and I at once perceive in what they resemble and in what they differ. So that constantly the mind is making the distinctions of similarity and dissimilarity.

7 Comparison enables us to perceive objects in proportion. The peculiarity of this relation is that it exists between at least three objects. Thus, we perceive the proportions in the different parts of the building, between the different angles of a triangle, and between the numbers 4, 16, 5, 20.

8. We perceive the relation of a part to a whole, and of the whole to each one of its parts.

9. We perceive the relation of cause and effect, of antecedent and consequent.

10. We perceive the relation of degree. This is one of the most common relations perceived, and gives rise to the degrees of comparison in our adjectives. We hear a voice, and compare it with another that is louder, or softer, or harsher. We behold a tree, and compare it with another that is taller or more beautiful.

Perhaps this analysis could be extended, but we have probably exhibited a sufficient number of

relations to enable the student to understand very thoroughly the nature and importance of the function. Let it be kept in view, that without this power to perceive relations, the reasoning process would be impossible.

SECTION II

COMPARISON, OR THE REASONING FACULTY—CONTINUED.

Abstraction defined—Particular abstract Ideas—General abstract Ideas—Illustration—Doctrine of Realists—Nominalists—Conceptualists—Arguments establishing Conceptualism—Hamilton a Nominalist—Believed to be wrong—Prejudice against Brown.

Abstraction has often been regarded as a distinct faculty of the mind. We do not so regard it. It is a mere function of comparison. The word is derived from the two Latin words *abs* and *traho*, which mean to draw off. It has been defined as that act of the mind by which we fix our attention on some one of the several parts, properties, or qualities of an object, to the exclusion of all the other parts or properties which belong to the complex whole. Thus the attention is drawn off from all the other properties, or qualities. This is the usual definition.

Sir William Hamilton objects to this definition, and proposes the following: “Abstraction is not

a positive act of the mind—as it is often erroneously described in philosophical treatises—it is merely a negative to one or more objects, in consequence of its concentration on another.”

That is, attention directed entirely to one object or quality, implies its withdrawal from every other object or quality. Abstraction, according to Hamilton, is not the act of concentration, but the act of withdrawal. Abstraction was probably originally applied to the act of the mind by which it withdraws a quality from other qualities, and considers it alone. Thus, I desire to know the length of a building, I withdraw my attention from every other quality of the building, and fix it entirely upon the quality of which I desire fully to inform myself. Thus, the sight may be said to abstract color from the rose, or the color would be mingled with the odor.

A celebrated French philosopher says, the senses cannot but abstract. Hence, he calls the human body an abstractive machine. If the taste did not abstract the sapid quality of an orange, we would perceive such quality confounded with color, odor, etc. The abstraction of the senses is thus a very natural operation ; it is even impossible for us not to perform it. Of course, our philosopher means, as he afterwards explains, that the mind, through

the senses, performs the act of abstraction. In the presence of physical objects, the intellect abstracts colors by the eyes, sounds by the ears, sapid qualities by the taste, etc. The act of abstraction is then a very simple one, and performed by the most ignorant.

Lord Kames, in his admirable work on Criticism, thus illustrates this mental act: A carpenter considers a log of wood with regard to hardness, firmness, color, and texture; a philosopher, neglecting these properties, makes the log undergo a chemical analysis, and examines its taste, its smell, and component principles; the geometrician confines his reasoning to the figure, the length, breadth, and thickness.

Prof. Haven objects to these definitions of abstraction, and gives a new one. He makes it the act of *drawing away* a quality from the substance in which it belongs. I admit that this would be abstraction, if the mind could perform it. But, so far as I have been able to observe the operations of the human mind, it is utterly incapable of performing the operation ascribed to it by Prof. Haven. Quality and substance cannot be separated, even in thought. I therefore doubt the correctness of Prof. Haven's definition.

An abstract idea may be defined as the idea

which we have of a quality without reference to any other quality. The marble slab on which I write is round, and white, and hard. Now I withdraw my attention from the roundness and whiteness, and concentrate it on the hardness. My idea of the hardness becomes clearer and more distinct, as in thought I separate it from the other qualities. This idea of hardness is, then, an abstract idea. This is also the idea of a single individual substance that is hard; and, therefore, may be called a particular, or individual abstract idea. I am thinking of the hardness of the marble, and not of any other body. Now, it will be readily perceived, that in the formation of a particular abstract idea the work of comparison is going on. The withdrawal of the attention from one quality, and fixing it upon another quality, supposes a choice, and this necessarily implies an act of comparison before the choice can be made. So that abstraction is nothing more than an act of the faculty of comparison. This will be more clearly seen as we proceed to describe *general abstract ideas*.

We first observe a number of objects, and then compare them together; we perceive their resemblances and differences, and, abstracting the attention from the latter, concentrate it upon the points of resemblance, and then we give them a name,

according to our notion of some circumstance in which they all agree. For example, I see a number of animals, of different sizes, colors, habits, etc.; but I find them all to agree in the fact of having four feet. I call them all by the general name of quadruped. My idea of quadruped is, then, a general abstract idea. While, then, a particular abstract idea refers only to the quality of an individual, a general abstract notion embraces the quality of a class. It is a notion which enables us to recognize a plurality of objects as a unity.

As to whether we can form an adequate idea of that which is designated by a general term, as *quadruped*, *man*, various opinions and bitter controversies have arisen. I allude, of course, to the different opinions entertained on this question by the Realists, Nominalists, and Conceptualists.

1. The Realists contended that there is an essence separate and apart from any class, or any individual member of a class, which essence corresponds to our general notions. This essence is called the "universal *a parte rei*." Thus, if we were to say "that between the perception of a horse and a sheep, and the feeling of their resemblance in a certain respect, there intervenes the presence of some independent substance, some universal form or species of a quadruped, distinct from our con-

ceiving mind, which, acting on the mind, produces the notion of quadruped, in the same way as the presence of the external horse or sheep produced the notion of these individually," we would then be Realists.

This theory is clearly presented by President Mahan, in the following language: "There exists in nature not only individual substances, but certain essences corresponding with the general ideas which exist in the mind. When, for example, we use the term man, it was maintained that there exists in the world around us a certain essence, which is found in no individual of the species, and which exists in connection with no individual, but which corresponds with the idea in the mind, which idea is designated by the above term."

This theory has been long since exploded.

2. The Nominalists deny the doctrine of the Realists, and maintain that, in employing general terms, we simply do so for the sake of convenience: that there are no existences in nature corresponding to general terms, and the objects of our attention in all speculations are not ideas, but words.

Sir William Hamilton, an avowed Nominalist, says, "The doctrine of Nominalism maintains that every notion considered in itself is singular, but becomes, as it were, general through the intention

of the mind to make it represent every resembling notion, or notion of the same class. According to the Nominalists, if I use the word quadruped, it brings before the mind some individual quadruped, which represents all quadrupeds—for they maintain that quadruped involves contradictory attributes, white quadrupeds and black, male quadrupeds and female, tall and short, fat and lean, tame and wild, and that, as contradictions cannot coëxist in the same idea, it is impossible to have any idea or notion adequate to *quadruped*.

Such names as those of Stewart, George Campbell, Berkeley, and Sir William* Hamilton, are arrayed in favor of the doctrine of Nominalism. The last-mentioned philosopher may, I suppose, be regarded as the ablest of his school. He says, "The class man includes individuals, male and female, white and black and copper-colored, tall and short, straight and crooked, whole and mutilate, etc., etc.; and the notion of the class must therefore at once represent all and more of these. It is therefore evident, though the absurdity was maintained by Locke, that we cannot accomplish this; and this being impossible, we cannot represent to ourselves the class man by any equivalent notion or idea."

3. Conceptualism is opposed both to Realism and

Nominalism. According to this doctrine, a general name does not stand either for a separate essence, or simply for an individual, but for an entire class. Conceptualists maintain that the Nominalist erred by not going far enough, and the Realist, by going too far. The Conceptualist holds, in opposition to them both, that a general term, taken objectively, embraces that quality in which all of the class agree; and when taken subjectively, it embraces the conception of the quality by the mind. For example, the Nominalist would say that the term quadruped always brought to the mind the idea of some individual quadruped; and the Realist would contend that it brought the idea of an essence separate and apart both from the individual and the class; while the Conceptualist would maintain that the term quadruped represented an entire class of animals, which, however they might differ in other respects, all agreed in the common quality of four-footedness.

As before remarked, the doctrine of the Realists has been long since exploded. The contest is now between the Nominalists and Conceptualists. The question may be stated thus: Do general terms, such as quadruped, man, etc., suggest in reality any thing more than some particular man or quadruped, which we take to represent others like it? or are

there any general abstract ideas? To this question Nominalists give a negative, and Conceptualists an affirmative answer. The Nominalists argue that it is impossible to form a conception of a class; for as the individual members differ, insomuch that no two are alike, this power to form general conceptions would imply the power of uniting contradictions in one general representation, and hence we can have no notion adequate to such terms as man or quadruped.

Now it appears to me the Nominalists forget that, in the act of abstraction, the mind is drawn off from all but one quality—say that of quadrupedality—in which all the members of the class do agree, and therefore the opposite doctrine does not involve the absurdity of uniting contradictions into one representation. When we think of man in general, we do not think of man as white, black, or copper-colored, as male or female, but simply of such qualities as are common to all. The mind at once abstracts its attention from all dissimilar qualities, and concentrates it upon the point or points of similarity. In proof that Nominalism is wrong and Conceptualism right, we offer the following arguments:

1. The existence of general terms proves the existence of the notions which they are designed to

suggest. If particular terms prove the existence of particular ideas, then do general terms establish the existence of general ideas.

2. The difference between the particular idea, which we have of Washington, Jackson, or Wesley, and the general idea of man, establishes beyond all doubt the truth of the theory of Conceptualism.

3. The distinction between the ideas of virtue and vice, in general, and any particular vice, such as drunkenness, or any particular virtue, as sobriety, establishes with equal clearness the existence of general notions.

4. The existence of the general notion is proved by the readiness with which children place an individual object into a class. If the general notion of class does not exist, why with so much readiness do we call one animal a horse and another a cow? Now it appears absolutely certain to me, that the general notion of class must be in the mind, or we could not know to what class any object belongs; that is, we must know that this individual object possesses the qualities common to the class, or we would never be able to give to it a general name.

5. But the strongest proof is found in the language of the Nominalists themselves. They hold that all our ideas are particular, but still con-

tradict themselves by constantly using the word "*class*."

Dr. George Campbell uses the following language: "When a geometrician makes a diagram with chalk upon the board, and from it demonstrates some property of a straight-line figure, no spectator ever imagines that he is demonstrating a property of nothing else but that individual white figure of five inches long which is before him. Every one is satisfied that he is demonstrating a property of all that order. So entirely for all the purposes of science doth a particular serve for a whole species or genus." And yet Dr. Campbell was a rigid Nominalist, denying the possibility of general notions.

Even Sir William Hamilton is guilty of like inconsistencies and contradictions. In one place he says: "Nominalism maintains that every notion is singular. Take the term *man*. Here we can call up no notion, no idea corresponding to the universality of the class or term. This is manifestly impossible." Lecture on Metaphysics, p. 477 Then, on page 488, we have the following: "We compare objects; we find them similar in certain respects; that is, in certain respects, they affect us in the same manner; we consider qualities that affect us in the same manner as the same; and to this com-

mon quality we give a name; and as we can predicate this name of all and each of the resembling objects, it *constitutes them into a class*." In one place, it is impossible to form a class; in the other, the class is most naturally and accurately formed. So inconsistent is a fallacy.

I can account for this error of Hamilton, only upon the ground that Brown took the opposite view. The student has only to inquire on what side of any question Brown arrayed himself, to know where to find Hamilton. His opposition to Brown is seen in almost every lecture, and is exhibited "*ad nauseam*."

SECTION III

COMPARISON, OR THE REASONING FACULTY—CONTINUED.

Generalization—Mental Process in Generalization—Method of arriving at the highest Class—The reverse Method—Comparison and Abstraction always active—Extension of Terms—Comprehension of Terms.

THE mental process in generalization appears to be this:

1. We first perceive a number of objects.
2. We carefully compare these objects with each other.
3. We discover points of resemblance between them.
4. In view of one or more points of re-

semblance, we place these individual objects into a class. 5. We then give to this class a name, which shall stand for the entire class, and which shall always call up the class.

Suppose we turn our attention to the ten thousand different objects around us. By the act of abstraction, we draw off the one quality in which all these objects agree. We find them to agree in but one thing—*being, or existence*. From this standpoint, we arrange them all into one great class. Now we have arrived at the highest class, and this has been done by calling off the attention from the differences, and fixing it upon this one point of resemblance. Having arrived at the highest class, we can descend to the lowest species. We now attend to the points of difference. We find some beings animate, and some inanimate; some mineral, and others vegetable; and thus we proceed, classifying objects into animals, vegetables, minerals, etc., etc.

We ascend by abstracting the one single quality of resemblance, and disregarding the various points of difference. We descend by noticing the points of difference, and disregarding this one point of resemblance. The former method is called generalization; the latter is called division, or determination, and by some authors, classification.

We go into a room, and find it filled with objects which possess a common quality, and in view of this common quality, we arrange them all into one class, and call them by a common name—*books*. Now, upon comparing these, we find some are historical, others poetical, and others scientific, and we therefore place them in different classes. In the ascending series, or in the generalizing process, the extension of the term is increased, and the comprehension diminished. As we go from man to animal, and from animal to being, we find animal to be more extensive than man, and being the most extensive in the series, while man is the most comprehensive. By the extension is meant the number of individuals embraced by the class. By the comprehension is meant the number of attributes embraced by the class. These names we owe to the Greek logicians. And it is a universal rule, that, as the extension increases, the comprehension diminishes; and as the comprehension of the notion increases, the extension diminishes. The extension of a term is likewise called its sphere, or circuit, and the comprehension is called its matter, or intension.

SECTION IV

COMPARISON, OR THE REASONING FACULTY—CONTINUED.

The reasoning Function—Reasoning by Comparison—Distinguishes Man from the lower Animals and the Supreme Intelligence—Province of Reasoning: Discover Truth—Establish Truth—Refute Error—Upham's Definition—Wayland's Description—Deductive Reasoning—Axioms—Examples—Proceeds by Analysis—The Whole of Comprehension—Of Extension—Induction—Prof. Haven's Description—This not thorough Induction—Thorough Induction defined—Bacon and Hamilton quoted—Objection—Axioms—Examples.

All reasoning proceeds by comparison. But it must be remembered, that in reasoning, we do not merely compare one object with another, and thus discriminate them: we, at least, compare one object with another, by means of a third object, and thus arrive at a truth which we would not have been able to learn by a simple act of comparison.

This power of reasoning distinguishes man, on the one hand, from the lower animals, which are incapable of arriving at the truths which are obtained by this process; and on the other, from the Supreme Intelligence, who is supposed to know all things at once. While then it is an evidence of superiority to the lower orders of intelligence, it is equally an evidence of inferiority to such intelligences as may, by intuition, be able to grasp knowledge, which we can only attain after an elaborate and tedious process.

The province of the reasoning function is,

1. To discover truth; that is, to find out a subject of which the predicate is known; or to find out what may be predicated of a known subject.

2. The second province of this function, is to establish truth.

3. And finally, its province is to refute error.

As the means by which we may investigate and establish truth, and refute error, are similar, we will not separate them in this discussion; but will proceed to describe the reasoning process, and the different methods of reasoning.

Mr. Upham says, "Reasoning may be defined to be the mental process, or operation, whereby we deduce conclusions from two or more propositions, taken as premises."

Dr. Wayland describes the reasoning process as follows: "Reasoning consists in a series of mental acts, by which we show such a relation to exist between the known and the unknown, that if the former be true, the latter must also be equally true. Thus, in geometry, the known with which we commence, is the definitions and axioms. Our first demonstration shows such relations to exist between them and the first proposition, that if those be true, this must be true also. This first proposition is thus added to the known, and becomes as firm a

ground from which to reason, as the definitions and axioms from which we at first proceeded. In our next step, we again show, by our reasoning powers, that if this increased known be true, the second proposition must be true also. We then add our second proposition to the known, and with this increased material of knowledge, proceed to the third proposition; and so on continually. In each act of reasoning, we observe first the known, reaching to a definite limit, beyond which all is uncertainty. We observe, secondly, a proposition in the unknown, which may be true or may be false, of which nothing can with certainty be affirmed, separated from the known by a chasm, so to speak, of thus far impassable ignorance. The reasoning power projects a bridge across this chasm, uniting them indissolubly together, transforming the unknown into the known, adding a new domain to science, and enlarging, by every such act, the area of human knowledge."

Reasoning has generally been divided into *deductive* and *inductive*. Deductive reasoning proceeds from the whole to its parts; inductive, from the parts to the whole.

The deductive process is based upon the axiom, that what is part of a part, is part of the whole. Now, inasmuch as a whole may be considered in

reference either to its comprehension, or to its extension, it has given rise to two varieties of deductive reasoning. The first is, that in which the subject is the whole, and the predicate is a part. The student need hardly be reminded here, that every proposition consists of two parts, the subject and predicate—the subject being that of which an attribute is predicated, and the predicate being that attribute. Let us then take an example of deductive reasoning, in which the subject is the whole and the predicate is the part; that is, the predicate belongs to the subject.

This book contains pages :

The pages contain printed matter ;

Therefore the book contains printed matter.

Here the whole is taken in its comprehension, and pages are asserted to belong to it, as one of its attributes. Now it follows inevitably that, if the printed matter is contained in the page, and the page contained in the book, the printed matter is contained in the book. *What is part of a part, must be part of the whole.*

We may take another example of a similar kind :

Washington was patriotic :

Patriotism is a virtue ;

Therefore Washington was virtuous.

In this argument, patriotism is an attribute of

Washington ; that is, an essential part of his character ; virtue is an essential part of patriotism ; and as what is part of a part, must be part of the whole, it follows, of course infallibly, that virtue must be a part—an attribute of Washington.

In both of these examples, we considered the wholes in reference to their comprehension.

We now proceed to give a second variety of deductive reasoning, in which the whole is to be taken in reference to the extension. In this variety of deductive reasoning, the predicate is the whole, and the subject is a part.

Animals are mortals :

Men are animals ;

Therefore men are mortals. .

Here the predicate—mortals—is the whole, and the subject—animals—is a part. And again, in the minor proposition, the predicate—animals—is the whole, of which the subject—men—is a part. Then, the conclusion follows, if animals are a part of mortals, and men a part of animals, that men must be a part of mortals. Take any other example, and the same principle will be illustrated.

Quadrupeds are animals :

Horses are quadrupeds ;

Therefore horses are animals.

In these syllogisms, the predicates are taken as

wholes, in their extension. The term animals extends to quadrupeds, and the term quadrupeds extends to horses, and thus animal must extend to horses.

In deductive reasoning, we proceed by analysis; that is, we separate a whole into its parts. In the last example, for instance, we analyze animals, and find them to consist partly of quadrupeds; we then analyze, or decompose quadrupeds, and find them to consist partly of horses. But while we are proceeding with analysis, in reference to the extension, we at the same time are proceeding with synthesis, in reference to the comprehension. For, as we proceed from animals to quadrupeds, we do so by adding a number of attributes; and so, as we advance from quadrupeds to horses. In defining animals, we do not give as many attributes as are necessary in defining quadrupeds; and the same is true of quadrupeds, when compared with horses. This arises from the fact, that the two wholes of extension and comprehension, are in the inverse ratio of each other; as you diminish the extension, by a process of analysis, you must, at the same time, increase the comprehension, by a process of synthesis. And, on the other hand, as you diminish the comprehension by analysis, or decomposing, you increase the extension by synthesis. Thus, in the example, Washing-

ton was patriotic, we analyze patriotism, in reference to its comprehension—to its attributes—and find one of them to be virtue; virtue is a more extensive term than patriotism, but less comprehensive. So that when I decompose a predicate, in reference to its attributes, I obtain a more general quality, and thereby increase the extension, by as much as I have diminished the comprehension.

Inductive reasoning is founded upon the principle, that what is true of every constituent part, is true of the whole constituted of all the parts. It proceeds exactly in the opposite direction to the deductive. The deductive goes from the whole to its parts, the inductive from the parts to the whole.

The inductive process is thus stated by Professor Haven: “The peculiar characteristic of inductive, in distinction from deductive reasoning is, that it begins with individual cases, and from them infers a general conclusion; whereas, the deductive method starts with a general proposition, and infers a particular one. From the proposition, ‘All men are mortal,’ the syllogism infers, ‘Socrates is mortal.’ From the fact that Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Pliny, Cæsar, Cicero, and any number of men are mortal, induction leads you to conclude, that all men are so. Induction, then, is the process of inferring, that what we know to be true

in certain observed cases, is also true, and will be found to be true, in other like cases which have not fallen under our observation."

Such is the usual description of the inductive method, found in works on Logic and Mental Philosophy. It is called an illation from some to all; that is, it is the process by which we infer that, because certain facts are true of a number of individuals of a class, they are true of the entire class.

This is not induction according to Bacon. It may seem strange that this mistaken view of induction has crept into all our text-books on Logic and Mental Philosophy—and to some extent, into our general literature. That it is a mistaken view, none who will read these pages can doubt.

I suppose that Lord Bacon will be universally regarded as authority, in reference to a method of reasoning, which is indissolubly connected with his name. On page 208 of the first volume of his works, he uses the following language: "Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, (whereby the principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the principles,) their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent: wherein

their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they, contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before Him, and failed of David, which was in the field."

Again he says, in his *Novum Organum*, vol. iii., p. 346: "There are, and can exist, but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms; and from them, as principles and their supposed indisputable truth, derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending *continually* and *gradually*, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms. Each of these two ways begins from the senses and particulars, and ends in the greatest generalities. But they are immeasurably different; for the one merely touches cursorily the limits of experiment, and particulars,

whilst the other runs *duly* and *regularly* through them."

According to Lord Bacon, then, no particular is to be omitted, no part, of either the extensive or comprehensive whole, is to be neglected. You are not to leave out one solitary particular; for if one be omitted, the process will be vitiated.

In reference to the ordinary definition, Sir Wm. Hamilton says: "The account given of induction in all works of Logic, is utterly erroneous. Sometimes we find this inference described as a precarious, not a necessary reasoning. It is called an illation from some to all. But here the some, as it neither contains nor constitutes the all, determines no necessary movement, and a conclusion drawn under these circumstances, is logically vicious. Others again describe the inductive process thus:

"What belongs to some objects of a class, belongs to the whole class:

"This property belongs to some objects of the class;

"Therefore it belongs to the whole class.

"This account of induction, which is the one you will find in all the English works on Logic, is not an inductive reasoning at all. It is, logically considered, a deductive syllogism; and, logically considered, a syllogism radically vicious. It is logically vicious to say, that because some individuals of a class have

certain common qualities, apart from that property which constitutes the class itself, therefore the whole individuals of the class should partake in those qualities. For this there is no logical reason, no necessity of thought."

According to the general method of defining inductive reasoning, the conclusion is nothing more than conjecture. If, by actual observation, I might find that six of the planets are inhabited, I might conjecture that the others are likewise inhabited; but I could arrive at no definite conclusion. On the contrary, according to the description of the inductive process, as given by Lord Bacon and Sir William Hamilton, the inference in inductive reasoning must be of an "absolute necessity." It is just as infallibly certain, as the inference from a deductive process. Now, let the student bear in mind the axiom on which the inductive process is founded, and he will at once perceive that our elementary works on logic and mental science are certainly in error, in reference to inductive reasoning. The axiom is not, what is true of a certain number of parts is true of the whole; it is not, that what belongs to some objects of a class belongs to them all; but it is, that "*what is true of every constituent part belongs or does not belong to the containing whole.*"

Induction, like deduction, depends upon whether it have to do with a whole in reference to its extension, or its comprehension; that is, whether it be used in reference to all the qualities that make a substance, or with all the individuals that constitute a class. By a number of observations and experiments, I learn that the attributes of the human mind are intellect, sensibilities, and will; these are the parts which constitute the comprehensive whole. Then, by a process of induction, wherever I see the manifestation of these attributes, I conclude the existence of the mind. Or, by a course of observation and experiment, I learn that gold is a metal, yellow, ductile, fusible in aqua regia, etc. A piece of metal is handed to me, and I find it to be constituted as I know gold to be; I then come to the conclusion that the metal handed to me is gold. I could not arrive at the conclusion that it was gold by its being yellow, nor by its being fusible; but I must minutely examine each quality, and, finding all the qualities, all conjecture, all uncertainty is removed. An example of induction, in reference to a whole taken in its extension, is as follows:

“Ox, horse, and dog are animals:

Ox, horse, and dog are quadrupeds;

Therefore quadrupeds are animals.”

Now, by observation, I learn that these beings are animals; that is, they are contained under the class animals. By the same method, I learn that they are quadrupeds; that is, they belong to the class quadrupeds. Then, my conclusion is, that it becomes inevitable that quadrupeds are animals; for what is true of every constituent part must be true of the constituted whole. It is true here of all the constituent parts of the class quadrupeds, that they are animals; it must therefore be true of the entire class.

When discussing the deductive method of reasoning, I stated that the process is an analytic one; in the inductive, the process is a synthetic one. When, however, we perform an act of synthesis in reference to a comprehensive whole, we analyze in reference to a whole taken in its extension. And so, when we perform an act of synthesis in reference to an extensive whole, we analyze in reference to the comprehension. Thus, as by uniting together sheep, oxen, dogs, etc., to form a class quadruped, I lessen the comprehension by analyzing their differences, and I increase the extension by the act of synthesis. So, when I unite all quadrupeds into a class—animals—I perform an act of synthesis in reference to the extension, and of course increase it; and at the same time I perform

an act of analysis in reference to the comprehension, and diminish it.

SECTION V

COMPARISON, OR THE REASONING FACULTY—CONTINUED.

Probable Reasoning—Reasoning from Testimony—Its Importance—Characteristics of Witnesses: Intelligence—Honesty—Disinterestedness—Self-injury—Independence—Coincidence—Facts: Possible—Probable—Discernible—Self-consistent—No contradictory Evidence.

As we have one class of truths that are regarded as contingent, and another class that are regarded as necessary, it has given rise to another division of reasoning—into probable and mathematical. Probable reasoning is not so called because of any uncertainty attached to the conclusions, but because of the nature of the truths upon which it is employed. These truths are contingent, while those on which mathematical reasoning is employed are regarded as necessary. All truths, however certain, that are not capable of mathematical demonstration, come under probable reasoning. It is just as certain that Napoleon was Emperor of France, fought at Waterloo, and was banished to the island of St. Helena, where he died, as that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right-angles. But the former is supported by probable reasoning, and

the latter by mathematical. The evidence by which this kind of truth is supported, is derived from two sources—testimony and analogy.

Testimony is the principal source of our knowledge. As our own observation and experience must necessarily be very limited, it follows that if we make any great progress in knowledge, we must avail ourselves of the observation and experience of others. And as this can only be done by means of testimony, it behooves us to present certain principles by which we may be able to determine when testimony is reliable. This becomes the more important, in view of the fact that the Christian religion is proved to be true by this method of reasoning. In the argument from testimony, much depends upon the character of the witnesses.

1. The witnesses must have capacity sufficient to discern all the facts. A sound judgment, so as that truth may be discriminated from falsehood, and reality from mere pretension, is absolutely essential to give credibility to a witness.

2. The witnesses should be known to be truthful. A reputation for truth is as necessary as a clear intellect, to impart credibility to those upon whose evidence any important fact is to be proved.

3. The witnesses should not be deeply interested

in the consequences; that is, the statement made should not greatly promote their interest. An interested witness, however honest and capable, is liable to be biased by self-interest.

4. It adds greatly to the weight of testimony, if the testimony given is absolutely adverse to the interest of the witnesses. As men are known to be governed greatly by their own interests, the fact that temptation to falsehood from this source is not only removed, but that the opposite statement to the one made would seem to promote their interests, increases greatly the strength of their testimony. We are not disposed to believe that men will be guilty of lying, when the falsehood will obviously prove their ruin. Hence, a statement that is self-injurious, is almost sure to be true, and worthy of credit.

5. There should be no evidence of collusion among the witnesses. The testimony of each must be independent. An evidence of collusion at once destroys the force of testimony. On the other hand, the certainty that there is no collusion adds to its force.

6. Coincidence in the testimony, accompanied by the evidence of independence, gives to testimony the force of absolute demonstration. The human mind can hardly conceive of evidence stronger and

more convincing, than coincident independent human testimony. For example, suppose that twelve men, with every evidence that they had made no agreement to tell a certain tale, should inform us that a man named Lazarus was raised from the dead, at a certain time and place, and that he had two sisters, one named Mary and the other Martha. Now, on the supposition that they lied, how are we to account for their determining to tell the lie about a man's being raised from the dead? But even suppose we could imagine that, independently and simultaneously, they had so determined, how are we to account for their agreeing as to the time and place? And that they should have hit upon the same man, and the names of his two sisters, could not be accounted for on any other hypothesis than that they had told the truth. The chances for the statement being true, would be a million to one against it. A falsehood in such circumstances, would almost amount to impossibility.

Now let capacity, integrity, disinterestedness, self-injury, independence, and coincidence, all unite in the testimony, and any one can perceive with what absolute certainty we may rely upon it.

We must inquire, in the next place, into the nature of the facts concerning which the testimony is given.

1. Are the facts possible? Suppose a witness should testify that an idiot went through a demonstration in mathematics, and that such demonstration involved not only a thorough knowledge of algebra, but of the calculus; and that said idiot did not make a single mistake; such testimony would be rejected, for the fact stated is not possible.

2. Are the facts probable? In determining their probability, we are governed greatly by the analogy of the facts with our experience. We hesitate to believe that it snowed in Alabama in July, because such a phenomenon is not analagous to our experience. But we readily believe that it snowed in January, for this conforms to our experience.

3. Are the facts stated discernible by the witnesses? Witnesses may state facts that occurred when they were asleep, and of course they could not testify in reference to such facts. Or they may give their testimony as to the motives of others. These are not sufficiently palpable to admit of being proved by testimony.

4. Are the facts stated consistent with themselves? Truth is always consistent with truth. If there is inconsistency in the statement of the witnesses, it always weakens their testimony. The design of what is called cross-examination, is to

cause the witness to involve his statements in inconsistencies, and thereby destroy the force of his testimony.

In addition to what we have said in regard to the witnesses and the facts, we will add, that testimony is made stronger by the absence of any contradictory testimony. When the testimony of one witness is opposed by a counter-statement from another, such colliding testimony confuses the mind, and renders an unhesitating belief almost impossible.

In conclusion, on this subject, I hold it to be a law of our nature to believe facts of the character described, even upon weak testimony. But when the testimony possesses all the characteristics claimed, I hold it to be next to impossible to withhold assent.

SECTION VI.

COMPARISON, OR THE REASONING FACULTY—CONTINUED.

Reasoning from Analogy and Experience—Uncertainty—Example—
Upon what based—Bacon's View—Cousin's Remark—Bishop
Butler.

Reasoning from experience and analogy, is also relied upon to establish probable truths. We cannot, however, rely upon this method with the same assurance as upon the inductive process, or upon

testimony, when possessed of the characteristics described in the last section.

It is said that the King of Siam, arguing from analogy and experience, rejected testimony which went to prove that water could be converted into ice, sufficiently hard and thick to bear an elephant. The reasoning, of course, led him to a false conclusion. While more evidence is required to establish a fact which has never come within the range of our experience, we are not to make our very limited experience the great test of truth. When our experience is uniform, and embraces all the individual facts, the process is induction, and the general conclusion is an absolute certainty. We know, from experience, that it is the characteristic of lead to sink into the water; we know that a certain substance which we have on our fishing line is lead, and we know that it will sink. We then go upon the certain principle, that what is true of every member of a class, is true of the entire class. But when our experience is variable, and the analogies uncertain, our conclusion is far from being certain.

Reasoning from analogy and experience, is based upon our belief in the uniformity of causation, or in the constancy of nature in all her operations. Hence, we judge the future from the past. The more uniform our experience, the more reliance is

placed upon our conclusions. The more the experience is variable, and consequently the fewer the analogies, the less reliable is this method of reasoning. The King of Siam had lived, say for half a century, and had never seen ice ; judging, therefore, from experience, his conclusion is erroneous. I have seen many a mountain, but have never seen a volcano ; I am not, therefore, to conclude that there are no volcanoes. None of us have ever witnessed the performance of a miracle ; but we are not therefore to conclude, with Hume, that no miracle was ever wrought. A want of experience is not to be regarded as any argument against a truth, established by incontestable evidence.

If, by observation and experience, I discover that sap circulates in vegetables, I cannot, therefore, conclude, with positive certainty, that blood circulates in animals. Because I have witnessed a fall of snow, during the month of December, for ten successive years, I cannot argue, from analogy, that I shall witness the same phenomenon, in the month of December, during the remainder of my life. The fact is, this method of argumentation is to be pursued with more caution than is generally supposed. Bacon calls those who rely upon it, the anticipators, and not the interpreters of nature. It

is often our only method of proof, as in cases of legal trials, where there is no exact precedent; and still more frequently, in cases of disease, the physician is forced to rely upon analogies, to determine both the nature of the disease and the remedy.

Victor Cousin has observed, that great events take place in the middle of centuries. He illustrates this observation, by referring to the middle of the fourteenth, as remarkable for discoveries and the revival of learning; of the fifteenth, for the fall of Constantinople; of the sixteenth, for the Reformation; of the seventeenth, for the English Rebellion, etc.; yet, no one regards these experiences as affording sufficient reason for concluding that the middle of every century will be remarkable for some great event.

Bishop Butler has given to the world the best digested analogical argument which can be found.

SECTION VII

COMPARISON, OR THE REASONING FACULTY—CONTINUED.

Mathematical Reasoning—Difference between mathematical and probable Reasoning: Subjects different—Differ in Connection of Arguments—Differ in their Opposites—Probable has Degrees, mathematical none—View of Haven—Stewart—Abercrombie.

Mathematical reasoning may be best described by noting in what respects it differs from probable reasoning.

1. In the first place, mathematical reasoning is employed to establish necessary truth—this is its entire field. Probable reasoning is employed upon truth that is contingent. We prove by mathematical reasoning, that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Here the truth is necessary. It always was true, and always will be true. Nothing can change it. It is necessary—eternal. We prove by probable reasoning, that Cæsar invaded Britain. This truth is a contingent one. It happened in time. It was not always true, for there was a time when Cæsar had not invaded the island. So we do not place this among necessary truths.

2. They differ in regard to the connection and dependence of the arguments. In mathematical reasoning, all the arguments are connected in one unbroken series; each argument depending on the one going before, until the conclusion is drawn. The arguments in mathematical reasoning, resemble the links in a chain. Let one link be defective or broken, and it fails of its purpose. On the contrary, in probable reasoning, each argument may be entirely independent of every other, and may be just as convincing as though connected with it. The independence of the arguments in probable reasoning, may be illustrated, not by a chain, but

by strong, independent pillars, supporting a beautiful edifice. While they all give support to the edifice, one after another might be removed, and still the building would stand, supported by the remaining pillars. Thus do probable arguments, like Corinthian columns, support the temple of truth. Each argument is independent of every other, and hence, half the arguments to establish a probable truth might be removed, and the remaining half might still be sufficient to establish it. Take the proposition, Hannibal invaded Italy. It is proved by reference to history, to tradition, to monuments, to old Carthaginian coins, medals, etc. Now, each of these arguments is independent, and one being overthrown would not weaken the remainder. •

3. The third distinction is, that in reference to probable truth, you can conceive the opposite to be true; in reference to mathematical truth, you cannot conceive the opposite to be true. Hence, all probable truths admit of debate; but mathematical truths do not admit of debate. It is impossible for all the angles of a triangle to be either more or less than two right angles. But there is at least a possibility that Hannibal never invaded Italy. Whether such a man as Pythagoras ever lived, might admit of debate; but no one can

question, that in every right-angled triangle the square of the side subtending the right-angle, is equal to the squares of the other two sides.

4. In support of probable truths, there are degrees of evidence. Some are admitted as absolutely certain. We can no more doubt them than we can doubt mathematical truths. Others are merely regarded as probable. We cannot give full credence, nor do we deny. As to the existence of John Wesley, we have no doubt; but whether such a poet as Homer ever lived, we may have our doubts. In mathematical reasoning, there are no degrees of evidence. All mathematical truths are alike certain, and all are received with the same absolute certainty.

Prof. Haven says that probable truths are just as certain as mathematical. I doubt it. He gives as an instance: "That there is such a city as Rome or London, is just as *certain* as that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right-angles." Now this is not true, for time was when no such city as Rome or London existed, and time may be again, may be now, when their existence may cease. Who knows but they may have been swallowed up by an earthquake? Their destruction is at least possible, while the destruction of the other fact is impossible. "It is a necessary and an eternal

truth, subject to no contingency, no possibility of the opposite."

Such are the leading points of difference between mathematical and probable reasoning. We continue our remarks upon mathematical reasoning by observing, that it is supposed to derive its force from the fact, that its first principles are purely hypothetical, involving no basis or admixture of facts, and that, by simply reasoning on these assumed hypotheses, our conclusions follow irresistibly. Such was Mr. Stewart's view, and in this he is sustained by other authors of reputation.

Dr. Abererombie makes the certainty depend upon the following circumstances:

1. Nothing is taken for granted, or depends upon mere authority; and consequently, there is no room for fallacy or doubt in regard to the premises on which the reasoning is founded. No examination of facts is required, in any degree analagous to that which is necessary in physical science. The mathematician, indeed, proceeds upon assumptions of such a kind, that it is in his power to clear them from all ambiguity, and from every thing not connected with the subject.

2. In the further progress of a mathematical argument, if we have any doubt of a proposition which is assumed as the result of a former process,

we have only to turn to the demonstration of it, and be immediately satisfied. Thus, if any step of a process be founded upon the principle, that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right-angles, or that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides, should we have any doubt of the truth of these conclusions, the demonstration of them is before us. But if an argument be founded on the principle, that the heavenly bodies attract one another with a force which is directly as their quantity of matter, and inversely as the square of their distance, this great principle must be received on the authority of the eminent men by whom it was ascertained, the mass of mankind having neither the power nor the means of verifying it.

3. All the terms are fully and distinctly defined, and there is no room for obscurity or ambiguity in regard to them.

4. The various steps in a process of mathematical reasoning, follow each other so closely and consecutively, as to carry a constant conviction of absolute certainty; and, provided we are in possession of the necessary premises, each single step is short, and the result obvious.

5. The proper objects of mathematical reasoning, are quantity and its relations; and these are capable

of being defined and measured, with a precision of which the objects of other kinds of reasoning are entirely unsusceptible. It is, indeed, always to be kept in mind, that mathematical reasoning is only applicable to subjects which can be defined and measured in this manner, and that all attempts to extend it to subjects of other kinds, have led to the greatest absurdities.

SECTION VIII

COMPARISON, OR THE REASONING FACULTY—CONTINUED.

Practical Directions in Reasoning—Be governed by Love of Truth—Attention—Avoid Prejudice—Study argumentative Works—Use the reasoning Faculty—Strengthened by Use—Avoid Sophisms—Importance of the reasoning Faculty.

1. In the exercise of this function, we should always be governed by a desire of truth. Men are too prone to exercise this noble function to support a favorite theory, and to gain a victory over an opponent. This is not its legitimate use. It was given to us for nobler purposes. It is believed by many sound psychologists, that great injury results to the mind from employing its powers in establishing what is known to be false. As this can only be done by the use of fallacious modes of reasoning, instead of sound argument, the mind becomes habituated to sophisms, and is thus injured.

2. Let the attention be constantly concentrated upon all the bearings of the question. Let no part be allowed to escape a scrutinizing search. The habit of forming opinions upon slight and superficial grounds, should be avoided, as it begets listlessness and inattention. So, to allow the attention to be diverted from the main object of inquiry by every light and trivial object, tends greatly to lessen the discriminating power.

3. Avoid the influence of prejudice. By prejudice is meant, the prejudging of a case. Prejudices arise from almost countless sources, and are always injurious. No clear judgment can be made, or sound, logical process of reasoning successfully attempted, when the mind is under the control of prejudice.

4. Read works which abound in solid arguments—works that are marked by the masculine energy of original thought. Let no difficulty in grasping the profound arguments of logical writers, deter you from making the effort. Good books are always suggestive. And a writer who, with cogency and truth, presents for our contemplation unanswerable arguments, will suggest other arguments that he may have failed to use. Besides, it will subject the mind to earnest and painful thought to read works of this class. Let them be read so soon as the mind

is sufficiently matured to discriminate fallacy from reasoning—falsehood from truth.

5. This power, like all others bestowed upon us by our Heavenly Father, is to be improved by use. Let the mind act in that direction. Let it find out the reasons of things. Let it classify and arrange. Let it observe method, and subject itself to the most rigid discipline. Let it trace effects to their causes, and follow causes to their legitimate effects. Let it establish propositions by a course of argumentation, just, earnest, and convincing. Let it go down into the prolific mine of truth, and with heroic devotion, labor to bring from it its richest treasures. The greater the labor, and the more severe the conflict, the greater will be the reward. This course cannot be too earnestly urged upon the young student. Let him, forgetful alike of pleasure and sloth, pursue this course, and he will find himself soon able to grapple with the minds of giants, and to expose the most subtle sophisms ever invented.

6. Avoid the use of sophisms. These are fallacies, and a candid mind should avoid their use. It is related by Mr. Upham, that a celebrated lawyer had become so habituated to the employment of sophisms, that when he was elevated to the bench, he was advised never to give the arguments by

which he arrived at his conclusions. The conclusions might be right, but his reasoning was sure to be fallacious. The different sophisms may be found described in almost all works of logic, and to them we refer the student.

This then brings our protracted discussion of the noble faculty of comparison to a close. For improvement in the arts and sciences, we are greatly indebted to this faculty. It enables us to proceed from the known to the unknown. It makes its researches throughout the illimitable fields around us. It surveys the heavens, determines the orbits of the planets, follows the comet in its eccentric light, and enriches science with wonderful discoveries, made amid the brilliant "archipelago of the skies." It classifies the plants that adorn our earth, the fish that swim in the sea, all the various tribes of animals, from the tiny insect of a day to the mighty elephant that has traversed his native forests for more than a century. It blesses man with invention after invention, and discovery after discovery. It brings the winds and waves under its control, and makes the lightnings minister to the wants of man. It forms constitutions, enacts laws, and establishes governments. Let it, then, be cultivated with untiring industry, and unfaltering purpose.

CHAPTER VIII

FACULTIES OF COGNITION—CONTINUED.

SECTION I

PURE REASON

Cousin—Upham—Wayland—Hamilton—Haven—Reason—Original Suggestion—Regulative Faculty—Intuitive Faculty—Common Sense—Locke—Almost universally admitted—Office of the Faculty—Ideas derived from it—Space—Difference between Body and Space—Time—Succession—Locke's Error—Haven's Error—Personal Identity—Infinite—Finite—Hamilton's Error.

We now come to the last of the faculties of cognition. It is called by Cousin, "the reason." Mr. Upham and Dr. Wayland call it "original suggestion." Sir William Hamilton calls it "the regulative faculty." Professor Haven calls it "the intuitive faculty." It is also called by some writers, "common sense." By whatever name called, the idea of the existence of this faculty, is very nearly universal. It is true, that Mr. Locke is thought to have ignored it, as he seems to conclude that our ideas are all derived from either external or internal perception; or, as he calls them, sensa-

tion and reflection. We quote from the twelfth chapter of his first book:

“If we trace the progress of our minds, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites, its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us farther than at first we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operation of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself by rejecting and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of sense or from its own operations about them. So that even those large and abstract ideas, are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain unto. This I shall endeavor to show in the ideas we have of space, time, and infinity, and some few others, that seem the most remote from those originals.”

This ignoring of this very important function of the intelligence, led Locke into grave errors concerning the ideas of space, time, etc., as we shall see in our analysis.

But to return, we said that the existence of this faculty is almost universally acknowledged. Sir William Hamilton quotes from various authors, and gives the names of some twenty different writers on mental science, who acknowledged the existence of the faculty. That there is a class of ideas not obtained through the senses, nor by reflection, or internal perception, no one, who will for a moment reflect, can doubt. Such are our ideas of space, time, personal identity, etc. These are not objects of sense, nor are they modifications of mind, and we must, therefore, account for their origin otherwise than by referring either to sense or to reflection.

As to the particular name by which we shall call this faculty, we are not precise. I have given preference to the term reason, though I do not object to the term original suggestion, or to its being designated, the faculty of intuition.

It is the office of this faculty, to enable us to form ideas of *realities* which cannot be made known by experience. Hence, the ideas from this source are not empirical, but rational; they are not ideas derived through the senses, but they are transcendental. It is the faculty which intuitively cognizes realities, which neither the presentative nor representative faculty would ever enable us to know.

Sir William Hamilton says, "It is the power

which the mind has of being the native source of certain necessary or *à priori* cognitions."

Professor Haven says it is a power of simple conception; and yet it differs in an important sense from all the other conceptive powers; and that it is not reflective, but intuitive in its action.

Dr. Wayland says of this faculty, "The mind of man is endowed not only with a receptive, but also with what may be called a suggestive power. For example: A child, before it can talk, throws a ball and knocks down a nine-pin. By perception, aided by memory, it derives no other ideas besides those of a rolling ball and a falling nine-pin. This is all that the senses would give it. But then there arises in his mind, by virtue of its own energy, the notion of cause and effect; of something in the ball capable of producing this effect."

I do not know that any one has attempted to give an exhaustive enumeration of the ideas derived from this faculty. In the further consideration of it, we shall give, at least, a partial analysis of this peculiar class of ideas, and show in what they differ from other ideas.

We notice first the idea of space. This idea is certainly not of external origin. It does not come within the range of the senses. We can neither see, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch space.

And yet every intelligence has an idea of space, as an objective reality. It is not matter, or it could be observed by means of the senses; it is not spirit, or it would possess intelligence. It is neither matter nor spirit, and yet it is an objective reality. Space is the place of bodies, but is not itself body.

The difference between the ideas of space and body, is thus illustrated by Cousin: "Let us take any body that you please; let us take this book, for instance, which is under our eyes: it exists, it is solid, it is more or less hard, it has figure, etc. Do you think of nothing more in regard to it? Do you not think, for example, that this body is somewhere, in some place? Yes, doubtless, all men will answer. Well, let us take a more considerable body—let us take the world. Is the world somewhere? No one doubts it. Let us take myriads of worlds; are they all somewhere? are they in space? Take a savage—take a child—take an idiot, unless he be completely one; and if any one of these human creatures has the idea of any body whatever, he will naturally believe that such body occupies space."

Then, these ideas differ in the following respects:

1. The idea of a material object—of body—is contingent; the idea of space is necessary. We can conceive of a time when body did not exist, but we

cannot, even in imagination, go back to a period when space did not exist. We may take this book, or this world, or any number of worlds, and imagine them to be annihilated, but we cannot conceive of the annihilation of space. It is beyond the power of omnipotence itself to annihilate space. This is spoken with reverence; for it is reverent to say that God cannot effect impossibilities. The idea that we have of a thing which we can conceive of as not existing, we call contingent; and the idea which we have of a reality which we cannot suppose as ceasing to exist, we call necessary. This, then, constitutes the first distinction between the idea of body and the idea of space.

2. Body is limited, space is unlimited. Enlarge the body as you may, it is still limited. You cannot conceive of all limits removed from body. Its limits cannot be destroyed; they can simply be extended. But it is not so with space. The idea of space is that of continuation, in which you can make divisions, under which subsists still the idea of unlimited space. For beyond any limited portion of space, there is space still. "You may launch out in thought beyond the solar walk, you may transcend in fancy even the universe of matter, and rise from sphere to sphere," and still beyond; until, in immeasurable and eternal solitudes, the

imagination sinks exhausted, and yet there is space beyond.

3. The idea of body is not complete without that of form, or figure; and you can always represent body under some determinate form. On the other hand, our conception of space is of a reality "without form." When we conceive of space as having form, it becomes something else—body occupying space. We cannot even think of a form in connection with that which is immaterial. According to Cousin, the idea of space is a conception of the pure reason, distinct from every sensible representation.

4. The idea of body is obtained through the senses; the idea of space is of internal origin: it comes from the pure reason, or is the product of the intuitive faculty.

5. The idea of body is conditioned and relative, while the idea of space is unconditioned and absolute. The idea of body is conditioned upon that of space. Body could not exist without space. There *must be space* for body to occupy, or, of course, it could not exist. Body, then, always exists relatively to space, but space exists absolutely and independent of all bodies.

We cannot conceive of a body existing nowhere; but we can and do conceive of unoccupied space.

6. Of two ideas—say the two ideas of body and space—we may inquire whether one does not suppose the other—whether, one being admitted, it is not necessary to admit the other. This is the logical order of ideas. And of the same two ideas, we may inquire which was acquired first, or which preceded the other in point of time. This is called the chronological order. The idea of space is the logical condition of our idea of body; that is, body presupposes space. Take any body that you please, you can admit the idea of this body only on condition that you admit the idea of space. On the other hand, body is the chronological condition of our idea of space. We first get an idea of body through the senses, by means of the presentative faculty, perception, and then we obtain the idea of space, as an intuition of the reason. This, then, constitutes the sixth difference. In the chronological order, body comes first—the idea of it is first acquired; in the logical order, space comes first—space existed anterior to body.

7. The idea of space, is of a reality that had no beginning, and can have no end. The idea of body, is of that which had a beginning, and was caused by something going before. Body is caused, created—space, uncaused, uncreated. Our idea of space, then, may be defined as our conception of

that which, itself immaterial, exists as the condition of all material objects. It is not derived from experience, for it cannot be experienced. Logically, it is prior to all experience; yet chronologically, it is posterior to our experience—cognizance of matter.

The second idea of the pure reason, is that which we have of time. Time is to succession, what space is to body. It is duration. It may be defined as the condition on which events can succeed each other. The idea of time arises in the mind whenever events are perceived to succeed each other. But time is not succession, as Locke has it. It is no more succession, than space is body. Our idea of time may be best illustrated by showing the difference between the ideas of succession and time, as we did between those of space and body.

1. The idea of succession is contingent; that of time, necessary.

2. The idea of succession is conditional and relative; the idea of time is unconditioned and absolute.

3. The idea of succession is limited; the idea of time, unlimited.

4. The idea of succession is the chronological condition of our idea of time. We acquire the idea of succession anterior to that of duration.

But the idea of time is the logical condition of our idea of succession. Time must exist, in order that succession take place. Hence, succession necessarily presupposes time. Take away the continuity of time, and you take away the possibility of succession. As one idea succeeds another, we arrive at the idea that duration, or time, must have existed, or it would have been impossible for this internal phenomenon to have taken place.

5. Every idea of succession is from experience, either interior or exterior. We either experience the successive acts of attention, or the successive states of feeling of our own minds, or the successive events as they transpire around us. The idea of time is anterior to all experience. Time was necessary, in order that experience might take place. Take, for instance, a succession of any number of events. They are a first, a second, a third, a fourth, etc. Now, this order of events could no more have occurred without time, than body could exist without space.

Mr. Locke's error, in making succession and duration the same, is forcibly exposed by Cousin. If succession and duration were one, then annihilate succession—let events cease to transpire—and duration would also cease.

“Moreover,” says Cousin, “see to what results

the theory of Locke leads. If succession is no longer simply the measure of time, but time itself; if the succession of ideas is no longer simply the condition of the conception of time, but this conception itself, time is nothing else than what the succession of our ideas makes it. The succession of our ideas is more or less rapid; therefore, time is more or less short, not in appearance, but in reality: in absolute sleep, in lethargy, all succession of ideas, all thought ceases; therefore, during that time we do not endure, and nothing has endured; for not only time, but time in itself, is the mere succession of our ideas."

This criticism I regard as just, and the argument against Locke's view, as unanswerable. Nothing is more certain, than that we can conceive that events may cease to happen, and thoughts may cease to follow each other; but we cannot conceive of the cessation of duration. Succession measures duration, as body measures space.

Dr. Brown falls into a similar error. He defines time to be the relation of one event to another, as prior or subsequent; that is, time is succession. If, then, there were no succession of events, there could be no time. The absurdity of this view has already been shown.

Prof. Haven makes our idea of time, "simply the

perception of relation: the relation of passing events to each other." This is our idea of the measure of time, but not of time itself. If events succeed each other with great rapidity, the duration appears to have been brief; in common parlance, the time appears to have been short. On the contrary, if the events are transpiring slowly, and the mind is dwelling for a length of time upon each one, time appears to us to pass more slowly; it appears to be long. A monotonous day, with scarcely an event to break upon its dreariness, appears almost interminable; whereas, a day of active business, of numerous changes, passes off rapidly. The idea of succession, then, is relative. We consider the events in relation to each other. But our idea of time, of duration, is absolute. It has neither beginning nor ending. It is independent of all events. It would exist if no event had ever occurred. According to Prof. Haven, "if passing events were to cease, if the various modes and states of being were to cease," time itself would cease. For this is our only idea of time. Hence, we might say, with Cousin, "During sleep and lethargy, there has been no time; the horologe has vainly moved on, the horologe has been wrong, and the sun, like the horologe, should have stopped." Such is the absurdity of a doctrine

that confounds time, which exists necessarily, unconditionally, and absolutely, with the measure of time, which exists relatively, and on condition that time itself exists.

But, to show still further the error of Haven's view, we can easily conceive the annihilation of all passing events; but we cannot conceive the annihilation of duration. Events may cease, but it is beyond the power of Omnipotence to annihilate time, or duration.

The third idea, is that of personal identity. This idea is one most difficult to define, and yet it is an idea universal as the race. If we apply the usual tests of identity to either mind or body, those tests fail. Whether a substance is the same, we usually determine by the manner in which it affects other substances, or is affected by them. It is recognized by us as the same, when the same substances affect it in the same manner as we have known those substances to affect it at some former period; and at the same time, its effect upon other substances is similar to what we have known it to be before. "Thus," says Dr. Brown, "if a white substance, resembling a lump of sugar exactly, in every external appearance, do not melt when exposed to the action of boiling water, we do not regard it as sugar, because the water does not act on it as we

have uniformly known it to act on that substance; or if the same white lump, in every other respect resembling sugar, affect our taste as bitter, or acrid, rather than sweet, we immediately, in like manner, cease to consider it as sugar."

Now, apply the same tests to any human being, and, to a great extent, they fail. Man is constantly changing in mind and body. He is more or less sensitive, more or less intelligent, than he formerly was.

Here is a man who once, by the power of his eloquence, enchained senates, and led the masses at will; he is now a raging maniac, or a driveling idiot—the light of intellect being extinguished forever. Is he the same?

Again, in the language of Brown, "When we compare the listless inactivity of the infant, slumbering from the moment at which he takes his milky food, to the moment at which he awakes to require it again, with the restless energies of that mighty being which he is to become, in his maturer years, pouring truth after truth in rapid and dazzling profusion, upon the world, or grasping in his single hand, the destinies of empires, how few are the circumstances of resemblance which we can trace."

These, and other facts which might be multiplied

without number, show the difficulty of the subject.

Now, nothing is more certain than that every individual being, not affected with mania, believes himself to be the same man that he ever was. Is this consciousness of identity false? Is the root of our nature a lie? No, consciousness is still true, and personal identity, a *fixed fact*.

By personal identity is meant the unity of our being, of the I, or self, as opposed to the ever changing phenomena of consciousness. By our idea of personal identity is, therefore, meant the notion we have of the me, or self, as one and indivisible, through all the changes of consciousness.

Is this idea in the human mind? Is there any one that doubts it? Let each member of this class answer for himself. If no one doubts it, then it only remains for us to inquire more closely into its origin and nature. The question may be asked, When does this idea arise in the mind? The answer is, that it is subsequent to consciousness and memory. We must be conscious, and we must remember former consciousness, before we can arrive at the idea that we are the same persons in whom this consciousness existed, and by whom the fact is remembered. We could not remember, if

we were not the same. This would be impossible. Memory presupposes identity, and identity is essential to memory. In every act of consciousness, there is the consciousness of some operation, and at the same time, of our existence; and when memory comes after consciousness, we know that the same being that was conscious of certain phenomena, now remembers those phenomena. Thus, consciousness and memory cannot be exercised without reason's suggesting to me the irresistible connection of my personal existence, one and identical.

The ideas of consciousness and memory are so intimately connected with that of personal identity, that it is necessary to point out their differences. In addition to this, by presenting the ideas in contrast, I shall be able to give the student a clearer understanding of the idea of personal identity.

1. The idea of personal identity is conditionally *necessary*. The idea of consciousness and memory is contingent and relative. The idea of personal identity is not absolutely necessary, like the ideas of time and space, but it is conditionally necessary. On the conditions that consciousness and memory exist, personal identity must exist. It is necessary that personal identity exist, or consciousness and memory cannot exist. Personal identity may exist

without consciousness or memory—as when we are in a state of lethargy—but consciousness and memory cannot exist without personal identity. For no power could remember or be conscious of anything, without remaining the same; that is, without personal identity.

2. The idea of personal identity is the logical condition of the ideas of consciousness and memory; while the ideas of consciousness and memory are the chronological condition of the idea of personal identity. Take away being; and of course no phenomena can come to consciousness, or be retained in the memory; in the order of nature, it is consciousness and memory which presuppose identity. If I remember, I must be the same person who acquired that which I remember. Hence, in the chronological order, we have consciousness and memory prior to identity.

3. The ideas of consciousness and memory are the result of experience. They are empirical ideas. The idea of personal identity is purely rational. It is an intuition of the pure reason. When I think or act, I am conscious of thinking or acting; when I think or act a second time, I remember having thought and acted before; and this is experience. My intuitive faculty, then, gives me the idea of identity. By intuition, I know that I could not

remember if it were some other, and not the same I.

Mr. Locke has fallen into the error of confounding consciousness with personal identity. He says, "Consciousness makes personal identity;" "Consciousness makes the same person;" "Self depends on consciousness;" "Consciousness makes self."

Again, he says, still more articulately, in Book II, chapter 27: "Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking beings, in this alone consists personal identity; that is, the sameness of a rational being," etc.

Now, if this theory be true, where there is a loss of consciousness, there is, of course, a loss of personal identity; and if consciousness be enfeebled, personal identity is equally enfeebled. As Cousin justly remarks: "It is evident that if consciousness and memory, not only measure our existence, but constitute it, he who has forgotten that he has done a thing, has really not done it; he who has badly measured, by memory, the time of his existence, has really had less existence. Then, there is no more moral imputation, no more juridical action. A man no longer recollects to have done such or such a thing, therefore he cannot be

tried for having done it, for he has ceased to be the same. The murderer can no longer bear the penalty of his crime, if, by a fortunate chance, he has lost the memory of it."

Dr. Reid exhibits still more palpably this error of Locke. He supposes the same individual to have been, at different periods of his life, a boy at school, a private soldier, and an officer in the army. While a boy, he robs an orchard, and is whipped for it. When a private soldier, he takes the standard from the enemy, and at the same time remembers very well his robbing the orchard, and his whipping. He becomes a captain, and remembers taking the standard, but has entirely forgotten the affair of the orchard and the whipping. According to Locke, the boy was identical with the soldier—the same; and the soldier was identical with the officer; but the boy was not the same as the officer. X is the same as Y, and Y is the same as Z; but X is not the same as Z.

The fourth idea of the pure reason, is that which we have of the infinite. This sustains the same relation to the finite that space does to body, or duration to succession.

Sir William Hamilton maintains that we can have no positive idea of the infinite; on the contrary, I think our idea of the infinite is as distinct

and positive as the idea of the finite. I think this is true of all minds. Take, for example, "Body is limited, space is unlimited;" "Man is finite, God is infinite." Does not every one at once perceive the difference in the propositions? When I conceive of a finite being, I of necessity at the same time conceive of an infinite being. If we could have no idea of the infinite, why do we use the term? That every one has some idea of the infinite, is proved by the distinction which is universally made between the finite and the infinite, the limitable and the illimitable.

The difference between the ideas of the finite and the infinite, may be exhibited in the following order:

1. The idea of the finite is contingent and relative; the idea of the infinite is necessary.

2. The idea of the finite is of that which was caused, and, of course, began to exist; the idea of the infinite is of that which is uncaused, and, of course, had no beginning.

3. The idea of the finite is conditioned; the idea of the infinite is unconditioned. The infinite could exist if there were no finite; but the finite could exist only on condition of the existence of the infinite.

4. The idea of the finite comes from experience;

the idea of the infinite is from the pure reason. The former is empirical; the latter is rational.

5. The idea of the finite is the chronological condition of the idea of the infinite; and the idea of the infinite is the logical condition of the idea of the finite. There must be the infinite in which the finite may exist.

Sir William Hamilton is, we think, chargeable with a strange inconsistency in reference to the idea of the infinite. He says, "The term infinite expresses that which cannot be terminated or concluded." This is an articulate definition of the infinite. Immediately afterwards, he says, "The infinite can only be conceived as the negation of the thinkable." "In other words, of the absolute and infinite, we can have no conception at all." If he could have no conception of the infinite, why say it is that which cannot be "terminated or concluded?" Why attempt a definition of that of which we can form no conception? Suppose I were to tell you that a quadruped is a fourfooted beast, and in the next breath were to inform you that we can form no conception whatever of quadruped, with what inconsistency would you charge me! Or, suppose that, after defining a square as a figure with four equal sides and four right-angles, I should say a square can only be

conceived as a negation of the thinkable—in other words, we can form no conception of a square at all—would you not say, “Much learning hath made thee mad?”

SECTION II

PURE REASON—CONTINUED.

Idea of Cause—Brown's Theory—Reply to Brown—Not derived from Experience—Law of Causation—Idea of Substance—Hamilton's Definition—Cousin's Definition—Difference between Substance and Phenomena—Closing Remarks on pure Reason—Natural Image of God.

“Of all questions in the history of philosophy,” says Hamilton, “that concerning the nature and genealogy of causality is the most famous.”

Before proceeding to give the true idea of cause and causality, I shall give you, in his own words, the famous theory of Dr. Brown. He says: “We see, in nature, one event followed by another. The fall of a spark on gunpowder, for example, followed by the deflagration of the gunpowder; and, by a peculiar tendency of our constitution, which we must take for granted, whatever be our theory of power, we believe, that as long as all the circumstances continue the same, the sequence of events will continue the same; that the deflagration of the gunpowder, for example, will be the invariable

consequence of the fall of a spark on it; in other words, we believe the gunpowder to be susceptible of deflagration on the application of a spark, and a spark to have the power of deflagrating the gunpowder. There is nothing more, then, understood in the trains of events, however regular, than the regular order of antecedents and consequents which compose the train; and between which, if any thing else existed, it would itself be a part of the train. All that we mean, when we ascribe to one substance a susceptibility of being affected by another substance is, that a certain change will uniformly take place in it when that other is present; all that we mean, in like manner, when we ascribe to one substance a power of affecting another substance is, that when it is present a certain change will uniformly take place in that other substance. Power, in short, is significant not of any thing different from the invariable antecedent itself, but of the mere invariableness of the order of its appearance in reference to some invariable consequent, the invariable antecedent being denominated a *cause*, the invariable consequent an *effect*. To say that water has the power of dissolving salt, and to say that salt will always melt when water is poured upon it, are to say precisely the same thing; there is nothing in the one proposition

which is not exactly, and to the same extent, enunciated in the other."

Now, that this theory is erroneous, a moment's reflection will enable us to see. According to Brown, the whole idea of cause and effect, is that of invariable antecedent and consequent. The explosion of the gunpowder, will be the invariable cause of the application of a spark. If this be true, then day is the cause of night, for it is the invariable and uniform antecedent, and night is the invariable and uniform consequent. Brown leaves out the idea of necessity, which is absolutely essential to the conception of cause. If he had said, the explosion of the gunpowder is the *necessary* consequent of the application of a spark, his theory would not have been so bad as it is. Death invariably follows life; yet no one considers life as the cause of death.

Nor is the idea of cause derived from experience. For example, I witness the application of a spark to gunpowder, and the explosion which follows, and I immediately say, there was that in the constitution of the two, and on their being brought in contact, which *necessarily* resulted in the explosion. I do not experience cause, but I experience events, and then I get the idea of cause.

The law of causation, is usually stated thus,

every event which takes place has a cause. Now, let it be understood that this law is not applicable to things which exist, but to things which begin to exist. I cannot infer from the present existence of any reality, that it had a cause; for it may, for aught I know, have existed forever. But so soon as I am made aware of the fact that its existence had a beginning, the idea of cause is immediately, universally, and necessarily suggested. I say, with unhesitating certainty, that the existence could not have commenced without a cause. It is impossible to conceive the absolute commencement of any thing; we can only conceive of commencement of existence, which has relation to some *efficient* antecedent. If all things in the universe were unchangeable, if no event broke upon the stillness of duration, then no idea of cause could ever arise in the mind. But the very instant a change occurs, as soon as an event takes place, the idea of cause, as an intuition of the pure reason, is given. I immediately say, some agency is at work producing this change. That agency may be unknown, it may be ever so occult, still I know that the cause exists, or the change could never have taken place.

This, then, is the law of causality, and it is as universal as the human race. Hereon is founded

the earnest desire to find out the perpetrators of any startling act. Let an assassination occur, and immediately every body is on the alert, inquiring for the assassin. Now, if it were not impossible, not to conceive of a cause, where an event takes place, such an inquiry would not be made. If we could conceive that a murder may take place without a murderer, then we would make no search for the murderer. I say, this principle is universal. Take any man, or child, or savage, even, without education, and let an event happen, and he immediately supposes a cause. In addition to this, the idea is necessary. You may try when a phenomenon is given, to suppose that there is no cause for it, but you cannot make such supposition.

The idea of cause may be articulately stated, as the idea of an invariable and efficient antecedent, which is *necessarily* followed by its consequent. The idea of causality may be stated, as the universal and necessary idea, that every event must have a cause. The differences between the ideas of cause and effect, are the following :

1. The idea of cause is of an efficient antecedent; the idea of effect is of a necessary consequent.
2. The idea of cause is the logical condition of our idea of effect. It must have existed before the effect; just as space is prior to the existence of

body, and as time is prior to succession, so is cause logically prior to the event. But at the same time, the idea of event is the chronological condition of the idea of cause. We first get the idea of the event, and then, by intuition, arrive at the idea of cause.

The sixth idea of the pure reason, is that of substance.

Sir William Hamilton defines substance to be the basis of attributes. Substance is a term for the substratum, we are obliged to think, to all that we variously denominate, a mode, a state, an attribute, a phenomenon, etc.

Mr. Locke contends that we can have no clear idea of substance in general. On the contrary, we maintain that our idea of substance is as clear as it is of time, or space, or personal identity. They are all apprehended by the same faculty; and the power to conceive one, implies the power to conceive them all. If we could have no ideas, such as those that have been discussed in this chapter, philosophy itself would be impossible.

It is often said that we can have no idea of substance, but only of its attributes, or phenomena. On the other hand, it is replied that substance is always as the phenomena. If the phenomena are immaterial, the substance is adjudged to be imma-

terial; if the phenomena are material, the substance is regarded as material.

Cousin's definition of substance is this: Being one and identical, opposed to variable accidents, to transitory phenomena, is substance. So, then, we can best give a clear illustration of the idea of substance, by comparing it with the idea of phenomena, or attributes. This paper is white. Here, white is affirmed to be an attribute of paper; paper is the substance of the attribute. As soon as I witness a phenomenon, the idea of substance arises; for it is impossible to conceive an attribute as belonging to no substance—to nothing.

1. The idea of phenomena is derived from the external senses. We see, or feel, or hear, or smell, or taste phenomena. The idea of substance is revealed in the pure reason.

2. The idea of phenomena is contingent. No phenomena could be exhibited, where there is no substance. Hence, phenomena are contingent, and dependent upon substance for their existence. The idea of substance is conditionally necessary; that is, phenomena being given, we cannot but conceive that a substance exists.

3. The idea of phenomena is the chronological condition of the idea of substance. We first obtain the idea of phenomena. The idea of substance is

the logical condition of the idea of phenomena. Substance is the logical antecedent of phenomena. Substance is first in the order of existence; phenomena, first in the order of acquisition.

This analysis of the ideas of the pure reason might be continued; but it has been carried sufficiently far for an elementary work. It gives fully the general nature of the ideas derived from this source. We do not deify this faculty, on the one hand, as do many of the rationalistic school; nor do we ignore its existence, as a positive faculty, as does Sir William Hamilton. We believe that it is a positive faculty, and that it occupies a very high place among the cognitive faculties. As the ideas derived from it are intuitive, and not acquired by a slow process of reasoning, nor yet through the physical organization, it may be called, with some propriety, "the natural image of God." The ideas derived from this faculty, are seen to be of a peculiar character. They are ideas of realities; but those realities are incapable of being tested by the senses. These ideas are found to be universal and necessary. They are found in minds uncultivated, as well as in minds the most polished.

PART II

THE SENSIBILITIES

CHAPTER I.

GENERIC DIVISION

SECTION I

PLEASURE AND PAIN.

Difference between Feeling and Knowledge—Relative Position of the Feelings—Example—Feelings subjective—Embrace two States of the Mind—Distinct—Subsequent to Cognitions—Feelings of Pleasure—Definition of Pleasure—Feelings of Pain—Defined—Positive Pleasure—Negative Pleasure—Positive Pain—Negative Pain—Opinion of some Philosophers—Hamilton's Error.

THE three-fold division of the human mind, into intellect, sensibilities, and will, is due to Kant. To think, to feel, to act, embrace the operations of the human mind, and are known to be entirely distinct from each other.

Although we are conscious of the difference between knowledge and feeling, it is not a distinction that can be readily expressed in language. The feelings are supposed to be generally inter-

mediate between cognition and willing. In so far as the feelings are internal, and not external, in their origin, they always occupy a place between cognition and conation. For example, I first know that human beings are suffering; my feelings are then aroused, and I determine to render them assistance. But for the knowledge, I could have no feeling, and but for the feeling, I would have formed no determination. The mere cognition, as it leaves us cold and unexcited, would be followed by no action. Without the intervention of feeling, there would be no conation. We hope to give to the student a clear idea of feeling, by offering the following considerations.

1. Feeling is altogether subjective; cognition is objective. In feeling, I am conscious of nothing beyond self—feeling is confined to self; but cognition always presupposes an object distinct from self. Even when mind itself is known, it is, for the time being, *objectified*.

2. In cognition, our consciousness embraces only one state of the mind—we are conscious that we know; in feeling, the consciousness embraces two states—we feel, and we know that we feel: that is, in cognition, I only know; but in feeling, I both know and feel.

3. Our cognitions must always correspond to

their entities. No man can perceive a house to be a tree, or a horse to be a man. All sane minds must perceive objects as they are. Hence, the same cognitions are derived from the same entities to all minds; but the feelings are as distinct, as various, as can be imagined. The sight of the same locality may excite pain in one, and pleasure in another.

4. Feelings, except those which are termed sensations, invariably follow our cognitions. A knowledge of the entity must always precede any feeling which the entity may be calculated to arouse.

All feelings are either pleasant or painful; hence, they may be generically divided into feelings of pleasure and feelings of pain. Pleasure is the result of the normal and unimpeded exercise "of some power of whose energy we are conscious." Pain is the result of the exercise of some power of whose energy we are conscious; but the exercise of this power is either impeded, improperly directed, or it is overstrained.

Both pleasure and pain result from the exercise of powers, of whose energy we are conscious; for we must be conscious, in order to experience either a pleasant or painful feeling. If the exercise of the power is neither impeded, nor improperly directed,

nor carried to excess, pleasure is the result. If, however, the power is either impeded, improperly directed, or exerted to excess, then pain is the consequence.

Pleasure is said to be positive, when there is positive enjoyment in the exercise of a power. It is said to be negative, when it is the result of the absence of pain. Let one be suffering intensely from toothache, then let the pain be removed, and the pleasure felt is denominated negative. Freedom from pain is not positively pleasant, but when succeeding intense suffering, no one will deny its pleasant nature.

So, pain is positive, when it is the result of the improper, impeded, or excessive exercise of a power; and it is negative, when it is the result of the removal of pleasure. In the midst of social enjoyment, the friends, whose society affords pleasure, suddenly depart; the pain thus inflicted, is called negative, as it is caused by the removal of the pleasure. The removal, then, of positive pleasure, is the source of negative pain; and the removal of positive pain, is the source of negative pleasure. Hence, some of the old philosophers said, "That a state of pleasure is always preceded by a state of pain."

Here I must caution the student against an error

into which Sir William Hamilton has fallen. He says that feeling is the cause of pleasure, and that it is also the cause of pain; as though feeling were something numerically distinct from either pleasure or pain; as though feeling were the antecedent, and pleasure or pain the consequent. All pleasure, and all pain, cannot but be in the feelings. The feelings are themselves either pleasant or painful. If the feelings were the antecedents, and pleasure or pain the consequents, we separate pain and pleasure from the feelings. But this cannot be done even in thought. The cause of the pleasure, or the cause of the pain, is that which produces the feeling, and is, of course, distinct from the feeling itself.

Having thus far treated these two classes of our feelings, in connection with each other, I now propose to devote a separate section to each.

SECTION II.

PLEASURE.

Remarkable Fact—Pleasure modified by Age—Novelty—Association—Contrast—Harmony—Delay—Culture.

The greater the energy employed in producing pleasurable emotions, the higher the pleasure.

It is also a remarkable fact, in reference to this point, that our highest pleasures arise from the exercise of faculties that are developed, and developed with pain. The energies of our natural powers are spontaneously exerted, and in the development of these powers, but little conflict is necessary; and hence, this development is attended with little, if any pain. The energies of our intellectual and moral nature, are developed by the most careful, and often painful, culture; and we need not pause to show the immense distance between our physical pleasures, and those arising from the cultivation of the intellect and conscience.

Pleasure is modified by the following circumstances:

1. *By age.* Positive pleasure is the heritage of youth. Negative pleasure belongs to age. The chief enjoyment of old age, is freedom from pain; but the young are not satisfied with less than the positive putting forth of energies. The arm-chair of dozing age, is the symbol of the pleasures enjoyed by the aged, while the play-ground, the study-hall, the field, the shop, etc., are the symbols of the pleasures of youth.

2. *Novelty.* The tendency of novelty is to increase the pleasure. The novelty may be either subjective or objective. If subjective, the feeling itself is

new, and its intensity is increased by its novelty. If objective, the object exciting the feeling is new, and its influence is the greater on this account.

3. *Association.* A man resembling a friend, excites pleasure by association; one resembling an enemy, excites pain by the same principle. It is the associative principle that gives attraction to thousands of localities of sacred and historic interest. It is association that gives to national airs their great power in producing pleasure. So if the flag of one's country is associated with all that is great in statesmanship, that is lofty in patriotism, and that is noble in arts and arms, the very sight of it, as it floats in the breeze, affords intense pleasure.

4. *Contrast.* Positive pleasure becomes more intense to one just freed from overwhelming suffering. So powerful is this principle, that death has sometimes resulted from a sudden gush of joy, welling up at an unexpected moment, and when the person was almost in despair. History abounds with remarkable examples of the tenfold pleasure, which comes over a heart loaded with grief, when the cause of that grief is suddenly removed.

5. *Harmony.* The occurrence of an event in harmony with the occasion, gives great pleasure. Even a solemn funeral occasion affords pleasure, when every thing is in harmony with the sadness

of the hour. The feeling of pleasure produced by harmony, may be illustrated by observing its opposite. Let an occasion of ever so much interest and pleasure, be interrupted by conduct discordant, and the pleasure is at once displaced by the deepest pain.

6. *Delay.* Pleasure is increased by delay. How bright is the morning to the night-long watcher! How joyous is returning health to the care-worn invalid! How sweet is home, and how precious its joys, to one who for long years has been deprived of its light!

7 *Culture.* Pleasure is greatly modified by the degree of intellectual and moral culture. A Newton is capable of much higher pleasure, than an uncultivated peasant. As one looks at the bright canopy of heaven, and regards the stars as so many lights to guide him to his humble home, he may have gratitude and pleasure; but not such as fills the heart of the other, who gazes with admiration at suns and worlds, and filled with the most sublime and exalted feeling, exclaims, "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork."

SECTION III.

PAIN.

Of what is Pain the Result—Final Cause of Pain: Protective—
Remedial—Retributive—Disciplinary.

As pain is the result of the impeding, or misdirection, or over-action, of an energy, it is clear that the greatest pain must result from the violation of the greatest energy. The pain always corresponds with the intensity of the power, whose energy is impeded or overstrained.

In discussing the feelings, it behooves the philosopher to inquire into the final cause of pain. What is the end, in view of which pain is inflicted?

1. Pain is inflicted as a protection to life. The lowest orders of animals are incapable of suffering, because they cannot escape danger. The capacity of suffering, is always in proportion to the power of escaping danger. So, then, pain is given as a warning against further exposure. The pains of hunger and thirst, prevent starvation. The pains of a burn, prevent our being consumed in the fire. But for the monitions of pain, the boy would as soon try the edge of his knife upon his fingers, as upon a piece of wood.

2. Pain is inflicted as a remedy for ills which are

already existing. The painful feeling which we term nausea, is doubtless designed as a remedy for the disease. The pain which the lower animals suffer in attempting to move a broken limb, serves, instead of splint and bandages, to keep the limb inactive, and thus allow the broken bones to reünite.

3. Pain is retributive. It is inflicted as a just penalty for the violation of law. If physical law is violated, physical pain is the consequence. If moral law is violated, that indescribable and deeply painful feeling which we call remorse, is the consequence. Indeed, all the penal consequences of crime, whether inflicted in this life, or reserved for the terrible future, are the just retributions of a righteous Governor. The rule here is, that the degree of pain should be determined by the magnitude of the crime.

4. Pain is a means of discipline. If there were no pain, we should have no idea of sin. It exhibits with great force the turpitude of transgression. It is a schoolmaster, to guide us from vice to virtue. The man suffering from the lashes of a guilty conscience, almost instinctively turns to virtue as his last, best hope of happiness. Pain also teaches us our dependence on God, and thus excites us to the exercise of prayer and faith. It increases our

sympathy for others in their afflictions, and urges to the exercise of Christian charity. Without it, we could not cultivate patience, for it is only under suffering that we can be patient. If, then, pain is intended to show us the folly of sin and the wisdom of virtue, to teach us to look to God and trust in him, and to excite us to the exercise of the virtues of patience and benevolence, it must be designed as one of the great moral means of making man wiser and better.

CHAPTER II.

SPECIFIC CLASSIFICATION



SECTION I

ANIMAL FEELINGS.

Classification of Feelings into animal, rational, æsthetic, and moral—
Animal Feelings—External—Internal.

It has been said that all the feelings are either pleasant or painful, and consequently may be divided into two great classes. Sometimes the feelings may be mixed—partly pleasant and partly painful—but as this does not present a state of feeling numerically distinct from the two classes described, no additional discussion is required, for a mixed feeling embraces both classes.

We now come to a difficult task—the accurate classification of the feelings, according to their different species. After the most mature deliberation we have been able to give the subject, we propose the following classification: 1. Corporeal, or animal. 2. Rational. 3. Æsthetic. 4. Moral.

The corporeal, or animal feelings, are of two kinds. The first class are external in their origin. Such

are all our sensations—heat and cold, softness and hardness, smoothness and roughness, sweetness and bitterness, and sensations of sounds and colors. There are also the feelings of health and vigor, lassitude and weariness, etc., which are attributed by many to what is termed the vital sense.

The second class of animal feelings are of internal origin. To this class belong the appetites, such as hunger and thirst, the appetite for sleep, and that which arises from the peculiar constitution of the sexes. The characteristics of these feelings are: 1. They take their rise in the body, and are common to man and the lower animals. 2. They are attended with pain until gratified, when, from satiety, they disappear. 3. They are periodical in their return. 4. They are greatly affected by habit. 5. They can be brought, to a great extent, under the control of the will; and hence we conclude that in so far as their action is involuntary, man cannot be held responsible for them; but in so far as their action is voluntary, man is responsible for them. 6. These appetites are greatly increased by indulgence; and, on this account, they should be most rigidly controlled. 7 They are in themselves innocent, and are designed for our happiness, and the perpetuity of the race. A sound philosophy teaches us that our appetites have been

given us for the most benevolent purposes; that they are not to be eradicated, on the one hand, nor excessively indulged, on the other; and that they should ever be subjected to the control of higher principles.

SECTION II

RATIONAL FEELINGS.

Affections—Benevolent Feelings: Parental Love—Filial—Examples—Love of Kindred—When displayed—Friendship—Defined—Example—Diffusive—Gratitude—Defined—Mingles with all benevolent Affections—Love of the Human Race—Philosophical Error—Examples of this Affection—Love of God—Man primeval—Man redeemed.

We now come to a class of feelings much higher in their nature—these we term rational, because they are intimately connected with the action of the intellect. It is true that some of them may be possessed by the lower animals, but are as different in them, as instinct is different from reason.

We first notice the affections. These imply a peculiar susceptibility in reference to others. If this susceptibility is accompanied with the desire of good to others, the affection is termed benevolent; if the susceptibility is attended with the desire of evil to others, the affection is called

malevolent. All affections are therefore divided into benevolent and malevolent.

Benevolent affections are pleasant, and are intended for the good of the race.

1. *Parental love.* This is common to man with the lower animals; but in the former it is rational, while in the latter it is instinctive. In human beings, it continues during the life of the parents. It does not cease when the children are grown up, as in animals, but continues, often with increasing fervor, until the vital spark is extinguished. It is a principle that flourishes even in spite of the prodigality, the selfishness, the ingratitude, and the cruelty of those upon whom it is bestowed.

Such is parental love; and when pure and unselfish, it is one of the noblest principles of our nature; and amid the general depravity which has laid our common humanity in ruins, it rises up in beauty and loveliness, to show us the divinity of our origin, and the original glory of our nature.

2. *Filial affection.* By this is meant the love of children to their parents. It usually increases with age. It is not so strong as parental love.

History abounds with most beautiful and striking examples of filial affection; from which we select the following:

A mother was condemned to die by a cruel death

—starvation. Confined in a miserable dungeon, she was allowed the privilege of receiving her daughter as a visitor. Time wore on, and still the unfortunate victim lived. Suspicions were aroused that food was clandestinely conveyed to her by her daughter. Search was made, but no food could be found on her person. At last, a watch was set, and it was found that the mother was receiving nourishment from the breast of her daughter. Thus, filial affection gave back life to the mother, from a source like that from which the daughter in infancy had imbibed it.

One of the most touching descriptions in Virgil, is that in which Æneas is represented as bearing his old father from the walls of burning Troy. And surely, nothing is more grateful to the feelings of the refined and elevated, than unselfish displays of filial piety. On the other hand, nothing is more revolting, than the exhibition of filial ingratitude.

3. *Love of kindred.* There is a peculiar affection which rises up toward those of the same blood. This feeling is displayed in the scenes of childhood, and among all classes of society. The ties of near relationship are seldom forgotten, even amid conflicting interests. To eradicate fraternal love, requires an amount of real or supposed injury, and a hardening of the feelings almost incredible. I

have seen it cooled and apparently destroyed, and again I have seen it manifest itself under the most deeply affecting and painful circumstances. I have seen those who had been long alienated, and whose love seemed to have been changed to hate, suddenly drawn together by some common misfortune, and the feeling of love burned with a purer flame than ever—even in days of youth and innocence. It is this principle which enables us to look with so much charity upon the foibles, and even the crimes, of those nearly related to us. A murder committed by a stranger, is looked upon with abhorrence, and as utterly without excuse or palliation; while a similar crime, committed by one of our own blood, admits of a thousand palliations.

4. *Friendship.* This is the feeling which arises in view of some real or supposed *excellence*, in the person for whom we entertain the feeling. It is often a noble and unselfish feeling, and exhibits itself by acts of real sublimity. Such was the friendship between Damon and Pythias, and such, too, was that between David and Jonathan. Constant companionship tends greatly to increase the power of this principle. It may become so strong as to make one forget self, in the sublime devotion which he feels for another. No calamity can mar it; no disaster can destroy it. It flourishes in the

midst of adversity, and grows green and vigorous amid scenes of sadness and sorrow. It extends itself to the wife and children, and to all that are dear to him, whom we claim as our friend. It may even extend to the lower animals, and to inanimate objects. A feeling of attachment is experienced to the cane which supported us, and to the home which has sheltered us. The hunter looks upon his trusty rifle as a friend, and is fond of his dog. A friendship grows up between the rider and his horse, and is often most touchingly exhibited.

5. *Gratitude.* This benevolent affection arises in view of favors received. Sometimes the favor may have been only intended, and then the feeling arises in view of the intention. It is generally strong in proportion to the good done, or intended. Ingratitude is universally regarded with abhorrence, and the ungrateful man is stigmatized as a monster. It may mingle with any or all of the benevolent affections. It may serve to make more intense the affection between parents and children, between kindred and friends. How intensely strong must have been the maternal affection of her, who imbibed from the bosom of her daughter, the juices of life!

6. *Love of the human race.* Some philosophers have taught, that the natural condition of society

is one of hate; that man naturally hates his brother man. We do not so teach. Man naturally feels a deep and abiding interest in man. It is this feeling for humanity that imparts interest to history and biography, and lends a charm to the grand epic, the terrible tragedy, and the brilliant novel. But for this love of humanity, we would care no more for the terrible strife of men, than we do for the struggles of wild beasts. The fearful steps of the pestilence, and the gaunt and hungry form of famine, as they sweep their thousands into the grave, would attract no more attention, than the moans of a beast, or the death throes of a vulture. This principle urges us, with the force of an instinct, into scenes of suffering, to staunch the wounds, and mitigate the sorrows of the unfortunate. When refined and exalted by Christianity, it serves to lessen the horrors of war; it erects hospitals for the sick, asylums for the dumb and blind, institutions for the orphans; and bestows its blessings wherever needed by sighing sorrow or helpless want.

7. *Love of God.* In man's primeval condition, this noble affection rose above every other. It was the great central and controlling affection of man's nature. Around this, all the other affections clustered, and to it, they were all subservient. It has been greatly affected by the fall. Its power is

greatly diminished, and it no longer exerts supreme control over man. When man regains his lost purity, then this principle of love to God will again control every passion of his nature. Love of parents and children, of kindred and friends, and love of our race, will then be subordinate to this love to the Divine Being. Thus, a true psychology underlies and illustrates a pure Christianity, and Philosophy becomes the handmaid of Religion.

SECTION III

RATIONAL FEELINGS—CONTINUED.

Malevolent Feelings: Resentment—Resentment designed for our Good—Perverted—Revenge—Envy—Jealousy—Pride.

All the malevolent affections are modifications of resentment. Resentment itself is an innocent principle, and is designed for wise and just purposes. Without it, we would defend ourselves against no attack, however unjust. It was originally implanted for self-defence, and may now be exhibited in its unperverted nature, just as God designed, that it should be. The different vicious modifications of this affection, are generally classed as malevolent feelings.

1. *Revenge.* This is an affection aroused by some real or supposed injury; it is hatred to the object

intending the injury, accompanied by a desire to return the injury, if possible, in an aggravated form. It is the principle which seeks an "eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." It is the foundation of the law of retaliation, and is to be condemned as a perversion of a principle designed for our good. As it is a fruitful source of strife between individuals, and of war among nations, all the energies of the philosopher, the Christian, and the statesman, should be exerted to repress it.

2. *Envy*. This evil affection is aroused toward another because he has been successful. Envy is hatred to a rival; not because of any injury done or intended, but because of his good fortune. It is a malignant principle, and is as despicable as it is malignant. Revenge may be palliated; but envy is utterly inexcusable, contemptible, and mean. A peculiarity of this feeling is, that it usually arises between those belonging to the same class in society. The peasant does not envy the noble, but indulges this feeling to some more fortunate peasant. So rivals for the first honor of a class, and opposing candidates for some office of honor or profit, are those who indulge in this feeling.

3. *Jealousy*. This is the feeling of hate which arises toward a beloved object, because that object is supposed to love another. The stronger the

love, the more intense is the hate. In the feeling of jealousy, there appears almost to be a mingling of two antagonistic affections—love and hate. The mind at least vibrates from one to the other. Sometimes love appears to be in the ascendant, and then hate. It is an affection of terrible power. In its presence, domestic peace is not known, and all the social affections are blighted. It is fierce, vindictive, cruel, and knows no mercy.

4. *Pride*. By pride, is meant that evil affection which arises in view of some supposed superiority to another. A proud man hates another because he is his inferior. Pride in the rich, is hatred of the poor. And thus it always disposes its possessor to evil, against those who are regarded his inferiors, and simply because they are inferiors. Such is pride—a principle without one redeeming trait—an unmitigated evil—and worthy of universal condemnation.

SECTION IV

RATIONAL FEELINGS—CONTINUED.

Rational Propensities—Definition of Propensity—Self-love—Love of Life—Love of Property—Of Power—Of Esteem—Of Knowledge—Love of Imitation—Sometimes involuntary—Epidemic—Love of Society—Hope defined—Contrast between Hope and Fear.

By propensity is meant the peculiar feeling which *longs*, or *craves*, after some real or supposed good.

It implies, 1. A knowledge of an object; 2. Of supposed good in that object; and, 3. A going out of the feelings after that object. A mere emotion remains within, while a desire "elongates itself" toward the object. Thus, I perceive an object; a pleasant feeling is excited: this is emotion; then I desire to possess the object.

Professor Haven supposes that desire implies previous enjoyment. This may be sometimes true, but it certainly is not always so; for this would preclude the desire of any thing entirely new—of any thing not previously enjoyed. Nor am I sure that the desired object is necessarily absent. We may desire the continuation of enjoyment already present. The opposite of desire is aversion; and desire for any special object, always implies aversion to its opposite. The propensities, or desires, may be classified as follows:

1. *Self-love*. This is an innocent and essential part of our nature. It is altogether different from selfishness. Self-love is compatible with the highest benevolence, and with the exercise of the most heroic devotion to the good of our race. Selfishness is altogether incompatible with any noble or heroic conduct. Self-love prompts to the securing of our own happiness; selfishness, to the destruction of the happiness of others. It is universal,

and, in my opinion, it is ineradicable. Nor is it right to desire its eradication, or to ignore it in our appeals for virtue. Philosophers have erred greatly in reference to this principle, the true theory of which is this: (1.) It is innocent. (2.) It is designed as an incentive to virtue. (3.) Hence, as man is universally designed for virtue, this principle is universally implanted. (4.) It is compatible with self-denial. (5.) It is designed to control passion and appetite. (6.) It is to be subordinate to the moral principle, or conscience. (7.) If, then, self-love comes in conflict with appetite, appetite must yield; if with conscience, self-love must yield.

2. *Love of life.* The desire of life is also a universal principle. Sad indeed must be the condition, when love of life is destroyed. It clings to man amid the greatest evils and privations to which our nature is liable. It is said to be stronger in age than in youth; but we doubt the truth of the proposition. Youth may be reckless, and age may be cautious; but still youth clings to life with more tenacity than age. Providence, in connecting with age its many infirmities, has wisely designed to prepare us for death. But at the same time, the love of life projects itself into the future, and we seek a life untouched by age or infirmity.

3. *Love of property.* Desire of owning is universal. It exhibits itself as early as any propensity of our nature. The value of an article is increased when it becomes one's own. It is an innocent part of our nature, but when perverted, it becomes vicious. Avarice and covetousness are both perversions of this principle, and are both vicious. They harden the heart, dry up the streams of benevolence, and lead to fraud, theft, and robbery. Avarice and covetousness are inordinate actions of the desire of owning, and are always accompanied by a disregard of the rights of others. A singular perversion of this principle, is the desire of money for its own sake. Man first desires gold, because with it he can purchase what he wants. As it affords him the means of securing what he wants, he desires gold. But, by an improper exercise of this desire, a secondary principle is formed, which seeks and hoards up money for its own sake. Pinching poverty will be endured, while its victim is surrounded by bags of gold. The poor wretch who has suffered this perversion of his nature, has been aptly termed the *miser*. He lives in squalid poverty, while surrounded by wealth, and dies in the midst of ill-gotten gains, refusing, for the love of money, to call to his aid the skill of the physician, or the attentions of a nurse, lest, in prolong-

ing his miserable life, they might shorten his purse.

4. *Desire of power.* There are three kinds of power—physical, intellectual, and moral.

In the earlier periods of society, we behold this propensity manifested in the seeking after physical power. There were “giants in those days.” Such men as Nimrod, as Samson, and as Hercules, became famous. Brute force was desired, and boxing and wrestling were the sports of the day. He that could exhibit the most power in the destruction of human life, became a hero. We see the same principle still manifested in children, and in the uncultivated.

As society advances, the desire for the exercise of intellectual power exhibits itself. Knowledge becomes power. He that can solve the greatest difficulties, and that can master subjects requiring the greatest mental energy, now becomes renowned. Such men as Solomon and Plato, as Aristotle and Newton, wield a mighty influence, and the pen is declared to be more powerful than the sword.

And still a higher power is desired—this we call moral. It is the power to control the passions, move the hearts, and direct the manners of men—the power to elevate man from the dust, to

breathe into him the breath of life, and bid him walk forth a son of God, a model of moral excellence, with Heaven's own seal upon his brow, and with the fire of immortality glowing in his bosom. Such power was exerted by Paul, and Wesley, and Luther, and Chalmers. Man is indeed a wonderful being, and God has made him to have dominion over the beast of the field, the fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea. Under the impulse of this desire, he has produced the most wonderful results. He has felled the forest, tunnelled the mountain, bridged the ocean, commanded the lightning, controlled the tempest, and made the sun yield to his behests. He has brought light out of darkness, knowledge out of ignorance, beauty out of deformity, and order out of chaos. He has made earth, air, and water contribute to his wishes. He has annihilated time, and destroyed space.

By inordinate development, this principle becomes vicious. It is unbridled ambition, that would break the world to its sway. It erects its throne amid blood and carnage, and sways an iron sceptre over prostrate humanity. When properly controlled by reason and conscience, it is not only an innocent, but a noble principle, and should ever be honored and encouraged. Man should not be willing to die, until he has given this strayed planet

an impulse into its proper orbit. Let some monument, besides our tombstone, show that we have lived.

“Lives of great men all remind us,
We can make our lives sublime,
And departing, leave behind us
Footprints in the sands of time—
Footprints, that perhaps another,
Sailing o’er life’s solemn main,
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother,
Seeing, shall take heart again.”

5. *Desire of esteem.* Mr. Hume holds that we desire the esteem of others, because it confirms our good opinion of ourselves. This is not true. The principle is developed before the mind can go through any such logical process. It is an original and universal principle, and is designed to promote virtue. Those whose self-esteem is very great, are not prone to care a very great deal for the opinion of others; nor do they need that good opinion, in order to confirm their good opinion of themselves. We instinctively shrink from the man who is utterly regardless of public opinion. A refined and elevated public sentiment, holds the vicious in check, and offers a high encouragement to the virtuous. A low and degraded public opinion, encourages vice and blights virtue. It requires a hero to go forward in the face of public opinion, and dare to oppose the wrong and to uphold the

right. While, then, a proper respect for the opinions of mankind is praiseworthy, this should never be carried so far as, in the least, to interfere with a bold and faithful discharge of duty.

A modification of this principle, is a desire of posthumous fame. Man naturally desires to leave a good name behind him. No matter how humble he may be, still he wishes to be esteemed after he has ceased to live on earth.

6. *Desire of knowledge.* This is termed by some philosophers, curiosity. It is manifested at a very early period in the inquisitiveness of children. It is designed to promote the acquisition of knowledge. Its importance is seen in that it prompts to inventions and discoveries. The desire of knowledge, accompanied with the power to acquire, has done much to advance civilization, to improve the arts and sciences, and to elevate, in every respect, the condition of our race. It ever seeks the cultivation of new fields, the exploration of new seas, the revelation of new truths, and the development of new sciences.

7. *Desire of imitation.* The propensity to imitate is both original and universal. It is not confined to the human race, but is found to exist in some of the lower animals. The ape and mocking-bird are remarkable examples. It is found at a very early

period in children. It is developed in that peculiar species of literature known as the drama. It is the source of the power of example. In view of this last fact, it assumes a fearful importance, and it should serve to caution us against the performance of any act unworthy of imitation.

It is sometimes involuntary. Mr. Upham gives a remarkable example of this: a number of children affected with St. Vitus's dance, simply from the influence of involuntary imitation. It is upon the same principle that we account for peculiar bodily movements, which have taken place at different times during great religious excitement. They are familiarly known as the "jerks," and were confined to no class or condition. They seized alike upon young and old, upon the intelligent and ignorant, upon those concerned on the subject of religion, and upon the careless. The body was thrown into numerous and violent contortions, in spite of all efforts to restrain or prevent.

8. *Desire of society.* Hume and Hobbes admit that man desires society, but maintain that the desire originates in necessity. This is not true; the desire for society is manifest before there is any knowledge of the benefits of society. Children desire society before they know that it is necessary. They manifest it in all the sports of childhood.

The child that seeks not the society of its play-mates, is regarded as an anomaly. Solitude has no charms, except to the stoic or cynic. The writer was well acquainted with a highly educated German, who had escaped from a monastery. He said that the monks universally became so disgusted with their solitude, that they would attach themselves to cats and mice as companions. So great, indeed, is the love of society, that no punishment is more terrible than solitary confinement for life. The mind itself reels, gives way, and is prostrated by such punishment. This principle collects men in families, and villages, and cities, and states.

9. *Hope*. Hope implies something more than desire; but as it is so intimately connected with desire, and is partly constituted of it, we shall treat of it in this connection. Hope implies, (1.) The apprehension of a desirable object. (2.) The possibility or probability of its attainment. (3.) A strong desire, accompanied by a joyous expectation of its attainment. The object of hope must be future, it must be considered good, and it must be attainable. Hope is an original and a universal principle. It is to man universally a rich source of consolation. Amid the storms of life, it whispers, like an angel of mercy, words of comfort to the troubled heart. It throws its light along life's

pathway, and gilds the clouds of death with rosy splendors. It enters the cell of the prisoner, and the lazar-house of the pauper, and promises abundance to the one, and pardon to the other.

The entire deprivation of hope, is despair. It is only when we see the wretch seized upon by despair, that we can fully appreciate the value of a principle that is the heritage of the human race.

The opposite of hope is fear. It is probably the universal concomitant of hope. If we hope that an object may be attained, we fear that it may not be attained. Fear implies, (1.) The apprehension of a disagreeable object. (2.) The possibility of its realization. (3.) A dread of, or aversion to, its realization. Hence, we always hope for that which is good, and fear that which is evil. Both are designed for man's good—hope, to make him happy; fear, to make him cautious. But for hope, we would sink into despair; but for fear, we would become reckless.

SECTION V

ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS.

Taste—Definition—Complex Faculty—Objection answered—Taste universal—Can be cultivated—Refined Taste—Correct Taste—Technical Taste—Philosophical Taste—Scope of Taste—Beauty—Subjective—Objective—Emotion of Beauty defined—Common Definition of objective Beauty—Defective—Hume's Theory—Dr. Blair's Error—Cousin's Theory—Haven's Theory—Free Beauty—Associated Beauty—Simple Beauty—Complex Beauty—Physical Beauty—Intellectual Beauty—Moral Beauty.

Taste has been defined, "the power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature or art."

This definition by Dr. Blair, is generally regarded by psychologists as defective. Taste is regarded as a complex faculty, embracing both judgment and feeling. It is the faculty by which we judge, and exercise the emotion of the beautiful. The province of taste is both to judge concerning what is beautiful or sublime, and to experience the emotions of beauty and sublimity.

Whether this view be correct or not, it is certain that there is a most intimate connection between the judgment and feeling. A man who has an accurate judgment, is apt to have a high degree of susceptibility. On the other hand, a man who has a poor judgment of the beautiful, is usually pos-

sessed of but little emotion in the presence of beauty.

It would probably be better to say that the word taste is an arbitrary term, and conveys the idea of a complex operation of the mind; and that this complex operation embraces both the action of the intellect, in judging concerning the beautiful, and the action of the sensibilities, in feeling the emotions of the beautiful. This ought to satisfy all parties, and free us from the criticism of those who maintain that all our faculties are simple, and that it is consequently absurd to speak of a faculty uniting intellect and sensibility.

Taste is universal, and hence it is an original faculty of the mind. It exists in different degrees. Some men possess it to an extraordinary degree, while others are almost deprived of it. This difference arises from difference of temperaments, difference of education, difference of associations, and difference in the original mental organization.

It is capable of a high degree of cultivation. This cultivation is effected by a close observation of the beauties of nature, and by careful attention to the fine arts; by a high cultivation of the intellect, and by a rigid moral culture; by attention to polite literature, and a careful study of the classics; and, indeed, by whatever will improve and polish

the mind, including especially the intellect and sensibilities.

1. A refined taste is one whose decisions are in accordance with the highest intellectual and moral culture. It is opposed to a rude, uncultivated taste, and necessarily implies great advancement in civilization and learning. It is also opposed to a low and vulgar taste, and consequently implies a pure morality.

2. A correct taste is one whose decisions agree with some common standard. The standard of taste is the concurring voice of all cultivated persons, who are capable of appreciating the beautiful, grand, and sublime.

3. A technical taste is that which is governed in its decisions by the rules of the art, in reference to which it is exercised. It comes with square and compass, and measures according to the most rigid rules, and then gives its decisions. If exercised on poetry, for instance, it passes over the grand creations of a lofty imagination, and comes down to the rhythm, melody, etc. If exercised on architecture, and required to decide as to some magnificent building, it applies the most rigid rules of the art.

4. A philosophical taste is exactly the opposite of a technical taste. It is guided in its decisions by reason and nature; and it rejects nothing that is

really beautiful because it does not conform to certain technical rules.

The whole scope of taste is the beautiful and sublime. The useful and the good do not come within its range.

The beautiful may be considered either as subjective or objective. By subjective beauty, we mean, the emotion of beauty existing in the living and intelligent subject. By objective beauty, we mean, such quality in an object as is capable of exciting the emotion of beauty.

The emotion of beauty may be defined as, that placid and agreeable feeling which arises in the mind in the presence of a beautiful object.

A beautiful object is commonly defined as, one possessing uniformity in the midst of variety. This definition is defective. It does not define simple beauty, but only complex beauty. Take, for example, color—it is beautiful, but it possesses no variety.

According to Hume, beauty consists in utility. This is evidently incorrect, as there are many useful objects which have no beauty. No one regards the unsightly camel as beautiful, yet its utility is almost incalculable. So it is with hundreds of useful objects.

Dr. Blair regards novelty as one of the main

sources of the beautiful. This view is also maintained by others. This theory would give beauty to the most deformed and unsightly object in nature, provided it has novelty. The tendency of novelty is to increase whatever effect an object is naturally calculated to produce. If the object is deformed, its novelty enhances the impression of deformity; and if the object is beautiful, its novelty increases its effect.

Cousin regards beauty, not as an original and independent quality of any peculiar forms or colors, but as the sign, or expression, of some mental quality, or attribute. It lies in the mind, and not in matter. It is subjective, and not objective. This is also the theory of Alison, Reid, and others.

Haven takes a view entirely opposite to this theory. According to him, beauty is objective, and not subjective. He says, "It would seem strange that any one should deliberately and intelligently take the position, that beauty and sublimity are mere emotions of the mind, and not qualities of objects. When we hear men speaking in this way, we are half inclined to suspect that we misunderstand them, or that they misunderstand themselves. I look upon a gorgeous sunset, and call it beautiful. What is it that is beautiful? That sky, that cloud,

that coloring, those tints that fade into each other, and change even as I behold them, those lines of fire that lie in brilliant relief upon the dark background, as if some radiant angel had thrown aside his robe of light as he flew, or had left his smile upon the cloud as he passed through the golden gates of Hesperus, these, these are beautiful—there lies the beauty, and surely not in me, the beholder. An emotion is in my mind, but that emotion is not beauty.” Again he says, “There is no such emotion as beauty.”

The various kinds of beauty may be classified as follows :

1. *Free beauty.* Free beauty is found in objects that please us directly and of themselves. Thus, color may be said to please us directly, and not because of a connection with any thing else. So, melody and harmony of sound, impart the emotion of beauty directly, and without reference to any principle of association.

2. *Associated beauty.* By this is meant relative beauty, or that which pleases us indirectly, and because of connection with something else. Thus, the home of our childhood, the log school-house, the play-ground of our early years, may excite the emotion of beauty in us, by virtue of their connection with the exhibitions of parental love, with

our childish sports, with our early attachments, rivalries, etc.

3. *Simple beauty.* When one object is of itself capable of exciting the emotion of beauty, it is called simple. Any one of the prismatic colors may excite this emotion. So, it may be excited by any single form.

4. *Complex beauty.* When a variety of objects can easily be united into one by the understanding, they produce the emotion of complex beauty. Hence, some have defined beauty as uniformity in the midst of variety. The understanding binds up the multifarious into one. When it effects this with ease, the object is beautiful; if with difficulty, the object is wanting in the element of beauty. But, as the understanding of one person is more capable of effecting this union than that of another, there must ever be differences in regard to the estimation of the beautiful. A complicated structure excites the emotion of beauty in one of high cultivation, and fails to do so in a less cultivated person. This difference is owing to the difference in the capabilities of the two. One readily perceives uniformity in the midst of variety; the other fails to do so, and consequently fails to enjoy the emotion of the beautiful.

5. *Physical beauty.* When any material object

excites this emotion, it is called physical beauty. The rosy clouds, the variegated landscape, the bow arching the cloud, the human countenance, the spiral column, the gallery of paintings—are all examples of physical beauty. Form, color, sound, and motion, may all furnish examples of physical beauty.

6. *Intellectual beauty.* When the object which excites the emotion of beauty is an intellectual one, the beauty is called intellectual. Thus, a well-constructed argument, an apt illustration, a striking comparison, a refined taste, and a delicate fancy, all excite the emotion of intellectual beauty.

7 *Moral beauty.* This emotion is excited by gentle moral qualities. Disinterested friendship, sympathy with the suffering, gratitude for favors, generosity to a foe, maternal love, filial affection, and all the mild graces that adorn humanity, excite the emotion of moral beauty.

SECTION VI

ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS—CONTINUED.

Circumstances modifying Beauty—Health—Education—Moral Condition—Number of Senses involved—Novelty: Three Degrees of Novelty—Utility.

Beauty is modified by a great variety of circumstances, a few of which it may be important to enumerate.

1. *Health.* The health of the subject greatly modifies the emotion of beauty. Objects which afford the highest emotions of beauty when the subject is in good health, produce but little impression when the health is bad. The sweetest notes make no impression upon one prostrated by disease. So, flowers of most delicate hue, forms of faultless symmetry, pictures of exquisite finish, and landscapes of every variety, fail to arouse the emotion in the most susceptible when wasted by disease.

2. *Education.* That the beautiful is greatly modified by education, may be illustrated by supposing two men to be reading the same poem, or listening to the same strains of music, or beholding the same scenes of nature, or wandering in the same gallery of paintings. The educated man is carried away with beauties, which fail to secure the attention, or touch the feelings, of the uneducated.

3. *Moral condition.* I have stated above that the taste is greatly influenced by the moral condition. A man of depraved morals is sure to have a vitiated taste. What he would regard as beautiful, would disgust one whose morals are pure. The creations of a salacious imagination are eminently attractive to the former, and repulsive to the latter. Again, a man tortured by remorse is incapable of appreciating beauty of the highest degree, whether

found in nature or in art. Remorse, for the time being, represses every other emotion. To the poor, guilty wretch, heaven and earth, art and nature, all display their beauties in vain.

4. *Number of senses involved.* Beauty becomes more impressive, the greater the number of senses through which the impression is communicated. For example, here is an instrument of most beautiful form, but it utters no sound. Still the emotion excited is decidedly one of pleasure. Then let sounds of melody and harmony be called up from the beautiful instrument, and the emotion is greatly increased. So, a bird of gaudy plumage excites the emotion of beauty; but when its sweetest carols are united to this graceful appearance, the emotion of beauty becomes more intense.

5. *Novelty.* Novelty may exist in three degrees. (1.) An object may be seen a second time after a long interval. (2.) An object may be seen after various and vivid descriptions have been heard. (3.) An object may be seen for the first time, and without any intimation of its character, or even of its existence. This last is the highest degree of novelty. Now, novelty in any degree deepens the impression of beauty; but it is only when it exists in the highest degree, that it breaks upon the mind in its full force.

6. *Utility.* When to the beauty of an object added the idea that it is useful, the object becomes more beautiful, or the emotion of beauty is increased. Thus, a machine of exquisite finish is beautiful, but the beauty is greatly enhanced by the consideration that it serves a most valuable purpose, in the production of some article of great value—that it has literally fed the hungry and clothed the naked.

It is probable that there are other circumstances modifying the emotion of beauty, but these are regarded as the most important, and as sufficient for the illustration of the subject.

SECTION VII

ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS—CONTINUED.

Emotion of Sublimity—Subjective—Objective—Sublimity of Presentation—Extension—Intension—All united—Intellectual—Sublimity modified—Novelty—Mystery—Darkness—Terror.

Sublimity, like beauty, may be regarded as subjective or as objective. By subjective sublimity is meant the emotion of the sublime; and by objective, that which produces the emotion.

The emotion of sublimity is distinguished from the emotion of beauty, in its being much stronger. Beauty is tranquil; sublimity is violent. Beauty

is the little rill; sublimity is the dashing river
Beauty is the lake, whose crystal waters are slumbering in quiet repose; sublimity is the ocean whose turbulent waves are rocked by the tempest
Beauty is the murmuring cascade, whose laughing waters fall as softly almost as dew-drops on the mown grass; sublimity is the thundering cataract pouring its terrible tide of waters with fearful velocity and terrific power.

As an emotion, beauty is much more lasting than sublimity. The latter is too powerful to be lasting. Such agitation cannot continue; the mind would be overpowered by an excitement so overwhelming.

The emotion of sublimity may be defined as that intense feeling which is aroused in the presence of exhibitions of vast power or wonderful extent.

Objective sublimity is divided into the sublime of protension, the sublime of extension, and the sublime of intension.

By the sublime of protension, we mean the sublime of duration. Eternity is sublime. As the mind goes back, century after century, to the period when Deity alone inhabited the vast solitudes of space, and then goes through countless cycles, and on and on into the great, boundless eternity of the future, the emotion cannot but b

sublime. Infinite duration, whether past or to come, always excites the emotion of sublimity.

By sublimity of extension is meant the sublimity of magnitude. The huge mountain and the immense ocean, are objects of sublimity. Still more sublime is the solar system, the vast stellar universe, and infinite space.

By the sublime of intension is meant the sublime of power. The storm, sweeping over land and ocean, prostrating forests and stranding navies, affords an example of the sublime of power. The volcano, whose throes make the earth quake, and from whose crater volumes of smoke and rivers of fire are sent forth, is also sublime. Two great armies, struggling in deadly conflict, present a sublime sight. It is probable that the idea of power conveyed by the immortal words, "*Let there be light, and light was,*" caused Longinus to pronounce them the most sublime utterances ever made.

It is only when power, magnitude, and duration are united, that sublimity reaches its height. It is, therefore, in the conception of God that the height of sublime emotion is reached. Here the mind conceives a Being whose power has stretched the north over the empty space, and hung the world upon nothing, who weighs the hills in scales, and the mountains in a balance—of a Being who is

from everlasting to everlasting, and who fills immensity with his presence; who

“Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent.”

The intellectual sublime, as an emotion, is the result of great intellectual power. Striking original thoughts, discoveries of great truths, the establishment of truth by a course of powerful argument all tend to excite the emotion of sublimity. Acts of great heroism, of unfaltering courage, and of unselfish patriotism, arouse the emotion called the moral sublime.

Some philosophers make a distinction between sublimity and grandeur. They make beauty rise first to grandeur, and then to sublimity, and therefore make the emotion of grandeur a grade higher than beauty, and lower than sublimity. It is less tranquil than beauty, and less violent than sublimity. According to this, a rivulet would be beautiful, mighty torrent would be grand, the ocean would be sublime.

Sublimity is modified by the following circumstances:

1. *Novelty*. Novelty produces the same effect upon the sublime, that it does upon the beautiful. It renders the emotion more intense.

2. *Mystery.* A huge ox might be sublime to one who did not know his docile disposition. As long as mystery invested the powerful animal with some unknown attributes, he was capable of exciting to a good degree the emotion of sublimity. Mystery connected with the providence of God, gives sublimity to it. So the mystery investing the character of the Deity, imparts to it a higher degree of sublimity.

3. *Darkness.* A storm in the darkness of night, the conflict of battle covered by darkness, the tolling of a bell at midnight, the roar of cannon and the reverberations of thunder, during the gloom of night, are all felt to be more sublime than during the day.

4. *Terror.* The sublime is greatly increased by terror. Thus, when we see armies engaged in a mock fight, the feeling of sublimity is but slight; but when the conflict becomes earnest, and the groans of the dying are mingled with the fierce battle cry, the clash of arms, and the shouts of victors, then the scene becomes one of terrible sublimity. A city illuminated is sublime; but a city on fire is rendered far more sublime by its terror.

SECTION VIII.

ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS—CONTINUED.

Emotions of the ludicrous—Definitions of Wit—Johnson's—Dryden's—Locke's—Campbell's—Sydney Smith's—Author's Definition—Specimens of Wit—Definition of Humor—Difference between Wit and Humor—Humor illustrated.

The emotions of the ludicrous are usually attended with that peculiar outward manifestation known as laughter. They are generally aroused by wit and humor.

Wit has been variously defined by different authors, and in order that the student may arrive at a clear idea of it, we propose to discuss a few of these definitions.

1. Johnson's definition is, "Wit may be more rigorously and philosophically considered as a kind of *concordia discors*—a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things." This definition is found to be too general, and will apply as well to the resemblance between hasheesh and opium, or between charcoal and the diamond, as between any images which may be the result of wit. The discovery of an unexpected resemblance, is not necessarily the offspring of wit. Resemblances are often discovered after long

scientific investigation, and the emotion excited by the discovery is far from being ludicrous.

2. Dryden defines wit as, "A propriety of thoughts and words, or thoughts and words elegantly adapted to the subject." Now, this definition will apply just as well to the beautiful descriptions of Campbell, as to the witty effusions of Hudibras. It is, in fact, a far better definition of the beautiful in composition, than it is of wit. I suppose the orations of Daniel Webster, or of John C. Calhoun, abound in "thoughts and words elegantly adapted to the subject," yet no one pronounces them witty. The same may be said of the best authors in every language.

Locke's definition is, "Wit consists mostly in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, whereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy." According to this definition, any figure of rhetoric, which presents a pleasant picture, is the very essence of wit. The parables of our Saviour, bringing up, as they do, so great a number and variety of pleasant pictures, are, according to Locke, the finest specimens of wit. It is strange, too, that our author should make the wit depend upon the quickness with which the "ideas are put together."

It is true, that wit, to be very effective, should not appear to be studied. But, certainly, no one would reject a thought as witty, which had all the elements of wit, but which had really been the result of some effort.

Campbell says, "Wit is that which excites agreeable surprise in the mind, by the strange assemblage of related images presented to it." This is, doubtless, the best definition that has been given, and Mr. Campbell has probably written, with greater accuracy than all other authors on this subject. Still, this definition fails to convey a perfectly correct idea of wit.

Sydney Smith says, "The first limit to be affixed to that observation of relations, which produces the feeling of wit, is, that they must be relations which excite surprise. Surprise is so essential an ingredient of wit, that no wit will bear repetition." Although this definition is given by the greatest wit of his time, I doubt whether it conveys a sufficiently accurate idea of the subject. The surprise occasioned by wit, must be of a peculiar character, which is omitted in the definition. I may be surprised at the observation of many relations, which may excite the most melancholy emotions. It must be remembered that the tendency of wit, is always to excite the emotion of

the ludicrous; hence, the surprise occasioned by wit, must be of a peculiar character. We, therefore, offer the following as the best definition that we can give of wit:

Wit is the power of observing, in the midst of general incongruity, some unexpected resemblance, which occasions an agreeable surprise, and arouses the emotion of the ludicrous, or tends to provoke mirth. It discovers similarity in objects which seemed contradictory, and the more incongruous, the greater the wit in discovering the unexpected resemblance.

Wit, as distinguished from poetry, is the imagination so inverted, as to make the little look less, the mean more light and worthless, or to divert our admiration from that which is lofty and impressive.

The favorite employment of wit is to add littleness to littleness, or it affects to aggrandize, in order to deride. We give a few specimens. Butler, in his *Hudibras*, compares the change from night into day, to a boiled lobster:

“ The sun had long since, in the lap
Of Thetis, taken out his nap;
And, like a lobster boiled, the morn,
From black to red began to turn.”

The wit in this passage, consists in finding congruity in the midst of general incongruity. We

are surprised that one should find any analogy between a boiled lobster and the rising morn. The association is so grotesque, so incongruous, and yet so congruous, that it excites the emotion of the ludicrous.

Again, the same author compares the Bear turning round the pole-star, to a bear tied to a stake :

“ But now a sport more formidable,
Had raked together village rabble ;
'Twas an old way of recreating,
Which learnèd butchers called bear-baiting ;
A bold, adventurous exercise,
With ancient heroes in high prize ;
For authors do affirm it came
From Isthmian or Nemean game ;
Others derive it from the Bear
That's fixed in northern hemisphere,
And round about his pole does make
A circle like a bear at stake ;
That at the chain's end wheels about
And overturns the rabble-rout.”

The celebrated Porson, hearing some one observe, “ Certain modern poets would be read when Homer and Virgil were forgotten,” replied, “ And not till then.” This answer was both witty and sarcastic.

A celebrated politician defined the gratitude of office-seekers, as “ A lively sense of *future* favors.” This definition is the very essence of wit.

The eccentric Sydney Smith closed his charge to a young missionary, about to leave Europe for

Africa, by the remark, "I hope you will agree with the stomach of the man that eats you." It was very incongruous to the time and occasion, to use such a remark, yet there was peculiar congruity in it, as his mission was among cannibals.

Butler, speaking of hypocrites, says that they

"Compound for sins they are inclined to,
By damning those they have no mind to."

The wit here consists in exposing the incongruity between their lenity to their own vices, and their severity to those of others.

The following lines from Pope, are said to be remarkable for their wit. He speaks thus of the Lord Mayor's show :

"Now night descending, the proud scene is o'er;
But lives in Little's numbers one day more."

• The wit consists in inverting the poetical idea of immortality. It is said to fix the maximum of insignificance.

"Do you see any thing ridiculous in this wig?" said a brother judge to Curran. The reply was, "Nothing but the head."

Humor is the faculty by which we seize upon some eccentricity, absurdity, or accident, connected with human character, and present it in such manner as to excite laughter.

There is something in the slight misfortunes of our best friends, that excites emotions of the ludicrous. We laugh at people when they make blunders, commit errors, or even when they try to deceive us by wonderful lies. It is difficult to prevent children from laughing at a stammerer, or at a drunken man. We laugh at fools, at fops, and at those who pretend to be wise. We laugh at the awkward rustic, and the affected city belle. We often laugh at that in others, which may be a serious matter with ourselves.

Humor is not confined to observing the ludicrous connected with human character. We laugh at monkeys, and are amused by many tricks of the lower animals. The more incongruous, the greater the laughter. Let any thing ludicrous occur in a church, and it is with the greatest difficulty that the laughter is restrained. I once knew a minister and a congregation filled with laughter, by the leader of the choir, who, through mistake, sang the text. In a word, we laugh at incongruity; we laugh at absurdity; we laugh at deformity; we laugh at a bottle-nose in a caricature; at a stuffed figure of an alderman in a pantomime; we laugh at a dwarf seated upon a large horse, or at a giant upon a pony; at the dress of foreigners, and they laugh at ours; at one dressed entirely out of the fashion

we laugh at a man distressed because he has been discarded by his mistress.

A humorous man has power to seize upon whatever trait of character, in man or animals, that will excite the emotion of the ludicrous and produce laughter. Wit is rarer than humor, and possesses greater power of origination.

SECTION IX

MORAL EMOTIONS.

Conscience—Analogy to Taste—Both Complex—Mind a Unit—Faculty a Term of Convenience—Conscience defined—Position sustained—Good Conscience—Bad Conscience—Seared Conscience—No Palliation for Crime—Feeling of Moral Obligation—Confusion among Philosophers—Nothing above Duty—Duty the highest Reason—Subject relieved of Difficulty—Impulse to Duty—Soul agitated by conflicting Impulses—Self-approbation—Self-condemnation—Approval of Right—Disapproval of Wrong—Dignity of moral Emotions.

The conscience sustains the same relation to the moral emotions, that taste sustains to the æsthetic. Both taste and conscience are regarded as complex faculties, embracing both judgment and feeling.

When it is admitted that the mind itself is complex, I can see no impropriety in admitting the complex nature of its faculties. According, however, to the theory maintained in this treatise, the mind is a unit, and all our terms denoting faculties,

are simply adopted for convenience, and are by no means designed to convey the idea that the mind has separate faculties, as has the body. Some of the operations of the mind are simple, and others are complex. To denote these simple operations, we have such terms as perception, etc.; while to denote complex operations, we have such terms as conscience and taste.

Now, with this explanation, we are prepared to define conscience as, the moral faculty whose functions are to *judge* and *feel* concerning right and wrong.

That the mind has the power to discern right and wrong, and to exercise emotions in reference to right and wrong, is a fact, for the truth of which we have only to appeal to every man's consciousness. This is really the highest principle of man's nature. But for this principle, no idea of duty could be formed, and man would be entirely incapable of virtue. The fact that man can universally be taught moral obligation, and that notions of right and wrong are as universal as the race, as much proves the existence of this principle, as the recollection of events, or the accumulation of knowledge, proves the existence of memory. Whatever may be the peculiar notions, in reference to simple or complex faculties, or in reference to faculties at

all, no philosopher can deny that the mind is capable of discussing right and wrong, and that its feelings in reference to moral obligation, are as intense and as clearly manifested, as any feelings of our nature. This is all we claim, when we assert that there is a separate and distinct faculty of the conscience, and that it embraces both intellect and susceptibility.

It may be unfortunate for the science of psychology, that, even for convenience, any words, denoting separate faculties, have been applied to the mind. It possibly would have been better for the science, had it been said, the mind perceives, reasons, feels, wills, etc., instead of speaking of the faculties of perception, will, etc. This might have disencumbered the science of a terminology, which has probably obscured it. But as these terms are now universally in use, and as they are fully understood by all intelligent students of psychology, we think it almost impossible and unnecessary now to give them up.

With this explanation, the student will be fully prepared to understand the different kinds of conscience.

1. *A good conscience.* By a good conscience is meant, one that is quick to discern right and wrong, and quick to feel moral obligation. It is a highly

cultivated conscience. It has been illuminated by all the lights which God has given his creature man. It has been diligently cultivated, by rendering implicit obedience to all the claims of duty. A good conscience is one "void of offence toward God and toward man." It is a self-approving conscience. It rigidly exacts obedience to the moral law, and rewards the obedience with a peace which passeth understanding. It is a conscience which has been purified; so that, without regard to ease or pleasure, its only inquiry is, "What is duty?" and its only aim is, faithfully and earnestly to perform it, when ascertained.

2. *A bad conscience.* By a bad conscience is meant, one that disapproves of the conduct of its possessor, and, consequently, inflicts remorse upon him. It is the conscience of one who knows his duty, but performs it not. It is the conscience of the guilty. No degree of prosperity can give peace to the man of bad conscience. It makes cowards of the bravest, and blanches the cheeks of the most courageous. It extorts confession, or it drives to suicide. Its voice of rebuke is next in terror to the voice of an angry God, and its fires assimilate those which ever feed upon the spirits of the lost.

3. *A scared conscience.* By a scared conscience, we mean one that is slow to perceive duty, and still

slower to induce its performance. Its judgment of right and wrong is not reliable, and its sense of moral obligation is exceedingly feeble. It has failed so long to inquire what is duty, that the term is almost incomprehensible. Its voice for right and duty has been hushed amid the storms of passion, or the clamors of selfishness. With such a conscience, a man may commit sins of the greatest magnitude, and suffer no remorse. As it seldom gives an impulse to duty, it seldom inflicts remorse for neglecting the claims of the moral law. It is, however, proper to remark, that a conscience thus blunted to all the claims of right, and thus failing to impart a single pang for the commission of crime, is no palliation for sin, and, consequently, it does not, in the least, lessen the guilt of the transgressor. And, although its voice may be, for a time, hushed, it will, after a while, make itself heard in tones so harsh and angry, as to fill the soul with anguish. Such a conscience is not dead, but asleep. It may not be aroused until the voice of the Eternal shall break upon the dull ear, and the lightnings of his wrath shall pierce the sleeping eye, and the rod of his anger shall make every fibre of the moral nature quiver with anguish. But, then, as though having acquired strength by its protracted slumber, and, as if all its powers were

blended and concentrated into one—that of inflaming remorse—with more than a giant's power, it sweeps away the last vestige of happiness and of hope, and leaves the polluted transgressor a miserable wreck amid universal ruin.

In the light of these explanations of the conscience, we are prepared fully to discuss the moral emotions.

1. *The feeling of moral obligation.* In all human beings, there is a deep and abiding feeling of responsibility. Every man feels that he is *obligated* to do certain things, and to omit other things, and that consequently he is held responsible to the law of duty. This feeling of moral obligation is the highest possible reason that can be given for the performance of any act. That we should do what we feel under obligation to do, is the all-sufficient reason, and the great culminating idea of our humanity. This feeling never arises, except in reference to law; nor can it arise in reference to a law which cannot be obeyed. The intelligence must perceive, or apprehend law, and that the law apprehended can and must be obeyed, and then arises the emotion of moral obligation to keep the law.

In regard to this question of moral obligation, there is much confusion among philosophers.

They all admit the idea and the feeling, but forget that they are ultimate. Hence, the inquiry for the ground of moral obligation. By the ground of obligation, is meant the reason that is to be assigned for the performance of duty. By inquiring why it is my duty to do my duty, they have mystified a very simple and exceedingly plain subject. There is nothing beyond duty which can be given as a reason for its performance. Duty is above expediency, above happiness, indeed, above every other consideration. The fact that a course is one of duty, is an *all-sufficient*, an *omnipotent reason* for the performance of any act. Knowing and feeling that it is my duty to do any one thing, I press my inquiry no further, for I have reached my ultimate. Let the student ask just one question, and he must feel satisfied of the correctness of this view: Can any reason for the performance of duty be given, other or higher than is found in duty itself? But one answer can be given to this question. Every sane mind answers, No. Neither expediency, nor utility, nor even the will of God, can be above duty. If, then, duty is the highest reason that can be given for the performance of any act, the whole question is solved, and the subject is relieved of all its difficulties. If, now, I am asked why we should tell the truth, or honor our parents, or keep the

Sabbath, or obey God, my answer is, It is our duty. If the mind is convinced that such is duty, the inquiry at once stops, simply because the mind has reached its ultimate, and is satisfied. If, then, I can show that it is man's duty to obey the will of God, no other reason can be sought, as this is the *ultimate*, the *last* reason.

It may be proper for me to remark, in conclusion on this point, that there never can be any conflict between the will of God and duty, for it is impossible for God to do wrong, or to require wrong of his creatures. The Infinite Reason always perceives the right with infallible certainty, and requires particular acts because they are right.

2. *Impulse to duty.* After the feeling of moral obligation, comes the impulse to fulfil it. This is the highest impulse of our nature, but is far from being irresistible. The impulse is right, and if "it had might as it has right, it would rule the world." It is when this most authoritative impulse comes in conflict with other impulses of man's nature, that the soul is agitated to its depths. Let cupidity, or ambition, or appetite, impel man in one direction and duty impel in an opposite direction, while his soul vibrates between these opposing impulses, once while retreating, and then advancing; now sinking to the animal, then rising to the man; now the

victim of passion, then for a moment rising in sublime majesty, victorious over passion; there is an agitation deep as man's emotional nature, and stirring that nature to its utmost capacity, which is only calmed when the impulse to virtue is lost amid the clamors of passion, or passion itself is made to bow in meek submission to the demands of virtue. It is only when man conquers the tempter, and rises superior to passion, that he really appears as God designed him, fulfilling a noble destiny. He then appears as a conqueror, because he has conquered himself. Obeying the impulse to duty, man becomes free, because he is his own master.

3. *Emotion of self-approbation.* This emotion arises in view of obedience to moral law. It is a feeling of innocence. It is the emotion of a good man after he has performed a good action. It is the reward which the moral nature bestows for the performance of duty. The emotion is not violent, but is the tranquil feeling of purity. The emotion of self-approval is only experienced in perfection after such a conflict, and such a triumph of right over wrong, as we have described. It is then as the calm after the storm, or as a bright and beautiful morning, after a night of darkness and tempest. It comes after the terrible conflict, like

peace to the soldier, worn with the strife of battle. An emotion so grateful, is well worth the labor of a lifetime. It is next to the approving voice of God, in imparting a calm serenity to the evening of a life, whose morning and noon may have been disturbed by clouds and storms.

4. *Emotion of self-condemnation.* This is a feeling of mingled guilt, and shame, and regret. It arises in view of a violated moral law. At one time it suffuses the cheek with shame, and then blanches it with fear. It is well called remorse, for it bites like a serpent, and stings like an adder. It is accompanied by the most dreadful apprehensions of the future. Unlike the subdued sorrow which arises from losses or bereavements, it wrings the heart with anguish, which is not diminished by time, but will be made more poignant through eternity.

5. *Emotion of approval of the right.* This emotion arises whenever right is perceived. It makes no difference by whom the right is performed, the universal conscience approves it. The child, the savage, the almost idiot, will approve the right. The right may inflict pain—may bring punishment. but still it is approved. The guilty culprit, condemned by the law, cannot but approve the sentence, although it seals his doom. This feeling

arises in the cell of the criminal, it comes up under the gallows, and even in the agonies of a violent and ignominious death, it pays its homage to the supremacy of moral law, to stern and inflexible justice.

6. *Emotion of disapproval of the wrong.* Not only does our conscience condemn ourselves, but others. We feel the pains of remorse, when we have done wrong, and we have a painful emotion of disapprobation toward others, who may be guilty of wrongdoing. All persons, even those apparently benefitted by the conduct of a bad man, in their hearts despise the criminal, and condemn his crime. No perjurer receives the homage of the conscience. No traitor escapes the universal detestation of mankind. The patriot may die amid the clamors of a mob, that, in their hearts, find no fault in him; while the unprincipled betrayer of his country, is elevated to place and power by the very men that look upon him with loathing and contempt.

Such is man, and in nothing does he exhibit the divinity of his origin, and the sublimity of his destiny, more than in the moral emotions. These show that he was made for virtue. And as virtue is superior to knowledge, and shines with a fairer lustre than genius, so do the moral emotions rise, in dignity and importance, above all exhibitions of

intelligence, all displays of imagination, and all the complicated functions of the reasoning faculty.

We must now pass from this interesting department of our noble science. Here we have seen the secret springs of human actions—springs which render the stream of human life clear as crystal, or dark as the fabled waters of Erebus. In this department, we have discovered the motives which give character to human conduct—motives which elevate man to angelic purity, or degrade him to brutal depravity.

PART III.

THE CONATIVE POWER.

CHAPTER I.

THE WILL

SECTION I

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

Locke's Definition—Edwards's—Thompson's—Hamilton's—Difference between Will and Desire—Freedom of the Will—Hobbes's View—Edwards's—Author's View.

Mr. Locke, in defining the will, says, "The will signifies nothing but a power or ability to choose."

President Edwards says it is, "That by which the soul chooses, for in every act of will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another."

Dr. Abercrombie defines it as, "That in the mind which immediately precedes outward action."

Thompson, in his excellent work on "Christian Theism," says, "The will is the power of originating action."

Sir William Hamilton says, "By will is meant a free and deliberate tendency to act."

The will is the power of choice, and always implies an alternative. There can really be no choice, where there is no alternative. In every act of the will, we are conscious of both choosing and refusing. If we choose the right, we reject the wrong; so, the choice of any course, implies the rejection of its opposite. This fact is especially implied in the definition of President Edwards, when he says, "In every act of the will, the mind chooses one thing rather than another." When there is no alternative, the will is not consulted, and the action is involuntary, that is, necessary.

The great psychological, as well as theological, question, concerning the will, is this: Is the will free? Three answers have been given to this question.

1. Hobbes, and his school, maintain that the will is bound, and all its actions are necessary.

2. Edwards, Hamilton, and all the Calvinistic school of psychologists, hold the will to be free, but, at the same time, assert that the will is governed by motives, and that, if governed by motives, "its acts cannot escape necessitation." Thus, Edwards says, "Every act of the will has some cause." "Every act of the will is excited by a

motive—that motive is the cause of the act of the will.” “The existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of this motive.” “Acts of the will are none of them contingent in such sense as to be without all necessity, or so as not to be necessary with a necessity of consequence and connection.” “Every act of the will is as the greatest apparent good.” “Every act of the will has a cause, and must be necessary.”

3. It is maintained that the will is free, and that it can, and does control the motives of action. To this proposition we assent, and propose, in the following pages, to establish it, and, if possible, to remove all objections that can be urged against it.

SECTION II

FREEDOM OF THE WILL—CONTINUED.

Error of Edwards—Arguments to prove the Freedom of the Will—Difference between Freedom and Power—A Strong Will—Feeble Will.

Edwards defines freedom as, “The power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases.” This definition is essentially defective, in that it refers entirely to the outward conduct. It is strange that so astute a metaphysician, should have ignored the internal freedom of the mind, and con-

fined it to external action. The will, according to Edwards, is free, when the external conduct is not under the influence of coöction, or necessity. Now every one can see that the ground of the discussion is changed from the act of choice to the external act. The question is, not whether the external act is constrained or necessitated, but whether the acts of the will are free, or whether they are determined by necessity. The question is, not whether a man can do as he pleases, but whether he can choose to do differently from his present determination—whether he can change his purposes without restraint.

Not only does President Edwards evade the question at issue, but he places freedom where it is not to be found. I am prepared to prove that no external act is free. When a man does as he pleases, his freedom does not consist in the doing but in pleasing (willing) to do. Every external act is either controlled by the will, or by some other governing power. If the act is necessitated, it cannot be free. The will necessitates every voluntary act. At the command of my will, my hand moves, my feet walk, my eyes open or close, etc. It is the will that directs the blow of the assassin, that opens the lips of the seducer with honeyed words, that moves the tongue of the slanderer; and it is the

will that sends the votary of religion to the church and to the closet, that opens the hands and bestows the blessings of charity. If, then, all external acts are either governed by the will, or by some physical necessity, we must look elsewhere for freedom than in the external act. We shall, therefore, attempt to prove that the will is free.

1. If the will is not free, there can be no choice. For choice implies freedom. No one says that the stream possesses freedom, when it is confined by banks, and, having no power of choice, is *forced* downward by the law of gravity. Then, as choice necessarily implies freedom, and as all men have the power of choice, it follows, infallibly, that the will is free. No reasoning can convince man that he is destitute of the power to choose, for he is conscious of choosing every day. Every voluntary act of his life is demonstration, strong as proof of holy writ, that he possesses a will in liberty. By necessity is meant the absence of power to choose; and until it can be shown that man has no power to choose, the doctrine of the freedom of the will must remain untouched.

2. If the will is not free, there can be no such thing as human responsibility. Deprive human beings of the power of choice, and they are no more responsible than the descending drops of

rain, or the passing cloud. Man is then no longer a proper subject of moral law or moral government. Neither human nor Divine laws, hold man responsible for actions which are beyond his control. There is nothing clearer, than that when men lose the mastery of their actions, their responsibility ceases. Even the child knows this fact; and when he accidentally hurts his playmate, the utterance of the words, "I did not go to do it," is the apology which he offers, and, if believed, it fully exculpates him. So, then, the universal mind attests the truth of this proposition, that if there is no freedom of will, there can be no responsibility for actions. But the universal mind does hold man responsible for his actions; hence, the universal convictions of the human race, attest the truth of the doctrine that the will is free.

3. If the will is not free, there is and can be no distinction between right and wrong, virtue and vice. Man can no more be a virtuous being without the power of choice, than can the mill which grinds his corn, or the loom which weaves his cloth. All necessary actions are destitute of the elements of either virtue or vice. If, then, all actions are necessary, no action is either virtuous or vicious. Deprive man, then, of freedom of will, and his actions are all alike, and you can neither

attach to him praise or blame. The theory of necessity blots out all moral distinctions, and leaves man as utterly destitute of virtue as the horse he rides, or the pen with which he writes. But there is nothing more universally admitted, than the existence of virtue and vice. The admission of moral distinctions, is proof positive of the universal conviction that the will is free.

4. If the will is not free, then all psychology is false. By reference to our consciousness, we attest the truths of psychology. So, by reference to the universal consciousness, we establish the freedom of the will. We go, then, upon the principle, "*Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,*" and assert, that if consciousness be a false witness in reference to the freedom of the will, it must be made to stand aside as a false witness in other things; and all of its testimony must be rejected. If, then, we reject the freedom of the will, we must reject all the truths of psychological science, however palpable, and however universally admitted.

5. If the will is not free, all laws, both human and Divine, are evidently unjust. To punish man for what he cannot avoid, is evidently unjust. Yet if the will is not free, men are daily punished for unavoidable actions. This doctrine, then, of necessity charges God with injustice, and reflects

upon all jurisprudence. Surely a system which strikes at the foundation of society itself, and which dethrones Deity, by its absurd consequences, must be false, and the will must be free.

6. If the will is not free, remorse for wicked conduct could not exist. There never is, nor can be, remorse for unavoidable actions. A man may regret the performance of an action which was the result of some physical necessity, but he cannot feel guilt, or suffer remorse. The very constitution of the human mind, forbids that remorse can inflict its pains, where there was no possibility of pursuing the opposite—no power of choice.

7 The will must be free, or God is the sole author of all evil. He makes man sin, and then inflicts punishment upon him for being driven by his own irresistible power to the commission of what is forbidden. Surely a doctrine must be false that makes God forbid what he causes, and condemn what he requires.

8. But, in order to establish still more clearly the position here assumed, let us contrast the two doctrines of freedom and necessity. Truth never appears more clearly than when contrasted with error, and the contrast of two opposing theories will bring to light the true, and expose the erroneous.

(1.) The doctrine of necessity degrades human nature. It makes man nothing more than matter. He is essentially and wholly under physical law, and, like a piece of inert matter, drifts at the mercy of circumstances. On the other hand, the doctrine of free-will exalts our humanity. It invests it with immaterial principles; it assimilates it to God; it makes it breathe the pure air of freedom; it makes man the arbiter of his own destiny, and subjects him to moral law.

(2.) The doctrine of necessity makes consciousness a false witness; the doctrine of free-will admits the veracity of consciousness.

(3.) The doctrine of necessity makes a wrong application of the axiom, "Every effect must have a cause." It makes this axiom mean, that no being can act without being acted on—that no being can originate action. If the will acts, some cause must have preceded its action. The doctrine of free-will makes a right application of the axiom, which is, that no event can originate itself—hence, every event must be caused. The existence of the will precedes its action; its existence being admitted, it has the power to originate action.

(4.) The doctrine of necessity annihilates moral distinctions, so far as man is concerned. The doctrine of free-will admits moral distinctions, in all

their validity. The doctrine of necessity being true, there is no praise or blame to be attached to human conduct. The doctrine of free-will being true, man is worthy of praise for good actions, and of blame for vicious actions.

(5.) The doctrine of necessity makes our moral nature a lie; the doctrine of free-will admits man's moral nature to be his crowning attribute, and to afford the highest evidence that he was designed for virtue, as the great end of his being.

(6.) The doctrine of necessity is subversive of all religion, and destructive even to morality. It is in the highest degree licentious in its tendency and teaches man to live as he lists. The doctrine of free-will is promotive of religion, and, by teaching man his responsibility, presses upon him the lofty claims of the moral law.

(7.) The doctrine of necessity dethrones God and leads directly to Atheism. It binds everything "fast in fate." It makes every thing dependent upon an eternal succession of cause and effect. Its language is, "There is no God." The doctrine of free-will acknowledges the existence of God, denies the eternity of matter, rejects the endless succession of cause and effect, and proclaims "God is, and he holds man responsible for all his actions."

Such is the difference between these two systems: it is the difference between truth and error, between light and darkness, between the handwriting of God and the inventions of man, between a sound philosophy and one that is unsound to the core.

Before closing this section, I desire to correct an error into which many have fallen. The error is this: Because the power of the will is limited, it is concluded that limitations must be placed upon its freedom. Now, the will may be perfectly free in all its actions, and yet not omnipotent. The limitation upon its power, does not necessarily involve limitation upon its freedom. Whenever an object and its alternative are presented to the will, the choice is perfectly free. When there is no alternative, there can be no choice, and the will is not able to act. That the will cannot control the perceptions, is no evidence of want of freedom, but simply of want of power. All a man's external actions may be voluntary, and hence his choice in regard to them free, and still there may be thousands of actions beyond his reach, and of course he can have no choice in regard to them. This inability to choose, is the result of want of power, and not of want of freedom. We say that a man is perfectly free when his actions are voluntary;

but we do not claim for him a power to choose when really there is no alternative presented.

The will has full power in reference to all moral acts; it can choose virtue or vice, right or wrong, obedience to moral law or disobedience. It has power to direct the intellect in its investigations, to hold the attention, to restrain the imagination, and arouse its energies to loftier creations. But it has no power to control the perceptions; it cannot make one "hair white or black;" it cannot choose to see an object to be different from what it is; it cannot determine the perception of a grove to be that of an open field, or a house to be a river. It cannot remove pain, or bring back lost health, or regulate the actions of the heart and lungs; but it can curb impatience, and strengthen fortitude. It has no power over necessary, physical law; but it can obey moral law.

The will may lose its power, but I doubt whether it can ever lose its freedom. The will may become corrupt, and be powerless for good, and all-powerful for evil, and still no restrictions be placed upon its freedom. Such enthrallment is rather a diminution of its strength, than of its freedom. In a word, a man may have so corrupted his will, as to be unable to choose right, although free to make such choice. "When he would do good, evil is

present with him." The "sin that dwelleth in him" has, for the time, paralyzed his powers. The remedial dispensation comes here to his rescue, and imparts new strength to his corrupted will, and if he *will* avail himself of its blessings, his *will* will be as strong for the right, as it had been for the wrong.

A strong, or powerful will chooses boldly, and adheres tenaciously to its choice; a weak, or feeble will chooses timidly, and yields its choice without a struggle. A man of strong will meets danger without fear, treads unappalled upon the burning edge of a volcano, and bears the severest pain without complaint; a man of feeble will flees from danger, is frightened at the appearance of an enemy, and utters wild and impatient complaints under the infliction of pain. A man of strong will would die a martyr rather than yield his principles; a man of feeble will would falter, hesitate, and succumb, at the first sight of danger. The strong will utters "*no*" with so much force as to make the tempter flee; the feeble will sinks at once into the arms of the "siren." The man of strong will is capable of the loftiest deeds of heroism—he can be a Napoleon, or a Washington, or a Wesley; the man of feeble will is incapable of being a hero, and cannot rule large masses of men. Yet, whether

the will be strong or weak, it is free. Its freedom depends not upon whether it chooses boldly or timidly; or whether it adheres firmly or yields readily; but upon whether it chooses when it is conscious of being free to refuse, or upon whether it refuses when it is equally conscious of being free to choose. The weak will is as free as the powerful, but it cannot accomplish such results.

CHAPTER II

MOTIVES.



SECTION I

DOCTRINE OF MOTIVES STATED.

Theory of Edwards—Objections to it—True Theory.

I HAVE already quoted from President Edwards, who says, "Every act of the will is excited by a motive; that motive is the *cause* of the act of the will." Every act of the will has a cause, and *must be necessary*. This is a fair statement of the theory of motives, as it is maintained by that school of which Mr. Edwards was probably the greatest ornament.

This theory appears to degrade both God and man, and to be liable to all the objections which have already been urged against the doctrine of necessity. It places the immaterial mind under physical law, and utterly deprives it of the power to originate action. As the wheel in complicated machinery, cannot move until water, the great

motive power, falls upon it and puts it in action, so the will cannot move until some motive acts upon it.

Because matter is inert, it does not follow that the mind is also inert. The will is the power by which action is originated. It is not subject to physical law, neither, indeed, can be.

The true theory of motives is this: The motives are universally admitted to determine the character of the external action. Certainly, the universal convictions of the human race justify or condemn an action, according as the motive is perceived to be right or wrong. An action, to be right or wrong, must be voluntary; this, also, is universally admitted. It follows, then, that the motives are voluntary, and, of course, do not govern the will. Every man that holds that we are responsible for our motives, and that we are responsible for nothing that is involuntary, must admit the truth of this theory.

It may be asked, Do not motives exercise any influence over the will? I answer, None, except by the consent of the will. If the will chooses, it can resist or reject the most powerful motives, or it may elect the weakest motives. This is often the case in actual life. We often see men reject the strongest motives, and choose those which are by

far weaker. The choice is not always as the greatest apparent good.

It is unnecessary, however, to argue a point which is so clear, and which all must admit, or deny that man is responsible for his motives. All must admit that the motives are under the control of the will, or deny that they have any moral character.

All must admit that the motives do not control the will, but, on the other hand, are controlled by it; or they are driven to the conclusion, that all jurisprudence is wrong in inquiring as to the motive of the action, before determining its character.

Finally, all must admit the truth of the theory here presented, or place the soul in bonds, and accept all the absurdities of necessity.

SECTION II

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

That we deny the Uniformity of Causation—That every Event must have a Cause—Absolute Commencement inconceivable—Makes all Means powerless—Inconsistent with the Sovereignty of God—And with the Foreknowledge of God.

To the theory of motives which we advocate, certain objections may be urged, which we now propose to answer.

1. It may be said that we deny the uniformity of causation. If the will is free, and not governed by motives, then, says the objector, there is no uniformity in causation, and consequently there can be no uniformity in human character.

To this we reply: The will is not controlled by the motives presented, but controls them; and hence, there is not a great deal of uniformity in human character. No man can determine, with any certainty, how men will act under given circumstances. The same circumstances may surround different individuals, and yet their course of conduct will be in all respects unlike. Children in the same family, and subjected to the same influences; pupils in the same school, and operated upon by the same motives; members of the same community, and, so far as seen, surrounded by the same circumstances, are found to possess every variety of character. We do deny that the will like a machine, is under the influence of causation; if it were, character would be as uniform as would be the action of two watches made on the same pattern. One man is covetous, and another generous; one is bold, and another timid; one is pious, and another wicked, in spite of the uniformity of causation contended for by our objectors.

2. It is objected that we deny the axiom, "That every event must have a cause."

To this we reply, Every action must have an originator; but we need not go beyond the existence of the originator, to search for the cause of the action. The mistake of our opponents is this: They suppose not only that every event must have a cause, but that every cause must have some other cause preceding it. According to them, an action not only supposes a performer, but something going before, as a cause moving the performer; this cause being in motion, involves the necessity of another prior existing cause, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Here, then, is an endless succession of cause and effect, and thus the doctrine runs necessarily into Atheism. It is true that every event must have a cause; but it is not true that every existence must have a cause. God is an existence that has no cause. The will, as an entity, or existence, has a cause, but it originates its own actions, and they are uncaused by any thing apart from itself. A wheel or machine is not self-acting, and hence we must go beyond the wheel or machine, to find the cause of its action. But the will is self-active; it has a self-determining power; and hence we do not go beyond the will, to find a cause for its action. Its power of action is inherent and original. For

example: my hand moves; you ask me the cause; I answer, My will is the cause of its motion. You ask me, What caused the will to act? My answer is, The will is self-active—it originates action. And there the inquiry ceases, and the mind is satisfied, because we have reached the conclusion.

3. It is objected, in the third place, that the theory here enunciated, involves the idea of an absolute commencement, which is inconceivable.

There can be no absolute beginning; this is admitted. All beginning must be relative. A beginning supposes a beginner, and, hence, relates to that beginner. Now, we deny that our theory involves an absolute commencement of an action. The will must exist before it can act. Hence, all action of the will is relative to the will, and cannot be absolute. We do not maintain that the action of the will is before the existence of the will; and, hence, our theory is not liable to the objection urged. If, however, by absolute commencement, be meant the beginning of an action, for whose cause we are to look back of the will, then we receive the doctrine with the objection, and think we have established that, in the modified sense above stated, the will can absolutely begin or

originate an action. But, as to absolute beginning, in the sense in which we think such terms should be understood, the reality of such a thing is inconceivable, and, hence, is not maintained by us.

4. It is urged, in the fourth place, that all means are powerless, if the motives do not control the will.

Our reply is, we present motives, knowing that they may be resisted, but hoping that the consent of the will may be obtained, to their exercising a proper influence. Without the consent of the will, we all know that the most powerful means exert no influence. Motives are presented in the strongest light, in order that the will may elect them, and that its action may be in accordance with them. If motives *control, determine, necessitate*, the action of the will, why do they so often fail? It is a fact, well known, that the strongest presentation of hopes and fears, of rewards and punishments, of right and wrong, of interest and duty, of time and eternity, fails to influence man to change from sin to holiness, from a course of profligacy to one of virtue. All means are powerless, until those, for whose good they are employed, consent, or choose to be influenced by them. Men do resist the most eloquent appeals of the pulpit, and the most fearful

declaration of God himself, and continue, in spite of all the efforts of the pious, to pursue a course of vice.

5. It is objected to this view, that it is inconsistent with the sovereignty of God.

We reply, that this objection is based upon a wrong view of God's sovereignty. He is the ruler of man, only by man's consent. So far as man is concerned, his rule is a moral one. He does not force man to obey, but claims a *willing* obedience. His government over man is the government of free will, as opposed to the absolute control of inert matter by physical law. His moral government offers the highest incentives to virtue, and utters the most fearful denunciations against vice, but leaves us free to make our own choice, and pursue our own course.

6. It is objected, finally, that this doctrine of the freedom of the will, is in conflict with the foreknowledge of God.

Jouffroy says, in reference to this objection, "That if the alternative were presented, between the rejection of the freedom of the will, or the foreknowledge of God, he would reject the latter; for he knows the will is free." It is unfair to change the controversy from the will of man to the foreknowledge of God; but we do not hesitate to

answer the objection. It proceeds upon the false assumption, that knowledge is causative. God knows, of course, all physical events, but his knowledge does not produce the events. He foreknows every change that takes place in the universe, but his knowledge does not produce a single change. So, then, let the doctrine of his foreknowledge be fully admitted, and it cannot interfere with the theory here advocated. God may foreknow every act of my life, and yet every act be perfectly under the control of my will.

Moreover, some events are contingent, and others are necessary. The foreknowledge of God comprehends events as they are. He foreknows contingent events as such, and necessary events as such. His knowledge does not, in the least, interfere with the character of the events. It does not change a contingent event to a necessary one. Hence, the foreknowledge of God leaves man with his will untrammelled, and foresees all its actions as free, and not necessary.

We come, then, to the conclusion, heretofore reached, that if there is any truth in God's word, any consistency in God's government, any truth in psychology, any veracity in consciousness, any harmony between consciousness and reason, any reality in man's moral nature, any distinction

between vice and virtue, any difference between a good man and a bad one, any justice in punishment, the will is free, and the doctrine of motives, as taught by Edwards, is false.

We must here close the discussion of this important subject.

PART IV
MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

CHAPTER I.

THE MIND IN ITS ABNORMAL CONDITION

SECTION I

CRETINISM AND IDIOCY

Description of Cretins—Three Classes—Causes of Cretinism—Remedies—Idiocy defined—Causes of Idiocy—Remedies.

A traveller in the valleys of the Alps, is startled by seeing human beings, with large and misshapen heads, figures squat and bloated, blear, hollow, and heavy eyes, flat noses, faces of leaden hue, mouths open and full of slaver, limbs small, short, deformed, and stiff, skin flabby and covered with tetter, and the breathing difficult. The head drops listlessly upon the breast; they speak not, but utter a wild, hoarse, inarticulate sound. These are cretins. They are found in great numbers in these damp and

gloomy wastes, and, strange as it may appear, are regarded as blessings in the families to which they belong.

The cretins are divided into three classes.

1. The first class cannot be taught any thing. They are not above the lowest animal in their mental manifestations. They lie, for the most part, flat on their backs, and swallow what food or water may be placed in their mouths.
2. Those of the second class can utter a few words very inarticulately, and can receive a little instruction.
3. Those of the third class rise a little in intelligence; they can, with great labor, be taught to speak with some coherence, to read a very little, and to count.

The causes of cretinism are said to be various.

1. The climate in these deep valleys, is exceedingly unhealthy; it is very humid, and abounds with miasma. This is one cause.

2. The intermarriage of near relatives, is a prolific source of cretinism.

3. Food of the most unwholesome character, is a third cause.

4. The immorality, and especially the drunkenness of parents, may be safely regarded as a fourth cause of cretinism.

The means which have been, to some degree, successful in the removal of cretinism, are

a bracing climate, proper food, comfortable clothing, frequent ablutions with cold water, and the application of galvanism. These remedies will greatly affect the health, and quicken and invigorate the nervous system. After some decided improvement is seen in the bodily health, efforts may be made to develop the mind. In effecting this object, the cretin is to be regarded as an infant, and you are to commence by attracting his attention to colors, forms, various pictures, words, ideas. Patience, great labor, much painstaking, will be required of the philanthropist, who seeks the improvement of these imbeciles.

Idiocy, in general, may be regarded as the arrest of mental development—as a kind of prolonged infancy; in which the infantile grace and intelligence, having passed away, the feeble muscular development and mental weakness remain.

Like cretinism, idiocy is caused by intemperance, and intermarriage of relatives. It is also caused by blows on the head, by epileptic fits, scrofulous taint, sudden fright, etc. Sometimes idiocy is the effect of intemperance in the subject. The wretched victim prostrates his mental powers, and reduces himself to helpless and hopeless idiocy.

The remedies for idiocy proper, are the same as

those which have been successful in cretinism. The idiot must be regarded as an infant, and his mind must be gradually developed, as we develop the mind of the infant. Schools on this continent and in Europe, have been established specially for imbeciles. The statistics of such schools exhibit the cheering fact, that many who had been regarded as hopeless idiots, have been gradually developed, until they have become useful members of society. It is not proper, however, to prolong this discussion, in an elementary treatise on the human mind.

SECTION II.

ILLUSIONS

Definition of Illusions—Illusions dispelled by Science—Causes of Illusions—Examples.

On the point now to be considered, we must be brief, and yet no department of psychology is more interesting.

The lowest evidence of the departure of the mind from its normal condition, is found in what are usually termed illusions.

In illusions, there is always an objective reality, but the perception does not correspond with the object. A man declares that you are

cat, or Napoleon, or a well-known orator; he sees fighting armies in the clouds, and angels who blow the trumpet; or he thinks you are an ox, or a horned devil. Now, in all these cases, there are objects which are mistaken for other objects, and in this consists the illusion.

Some illusions have been dispelled by the progress of science. Of such is the giant of the Brocken. At certain times, a giant was seen on the summit of the Brocken, (one of the Hartz mountains,) to the great astonishment of the inhabitants and travellers. For many years, this prodigy had given occasion to many wonderful tales. A gentleman, while gazing upon the giant, suddenly had his hat carried away by a gust of wind; he quickly raised his hand, and the giant raised his; he bowed, and the giant bowed also. It was then found to be nothing but the effect of light, produced by an object highly illuminated, and surrounded by light clouds, which object, being reflected at a greater or less distance, was extended, by an optical illusion, to the height of five or six hundred feet.

Ignorance, fear, darkness, and remorse, are the usual causes of illusions. Hence, ghosts are usually seen at night, and by persons either ignorant, cowardly, or criminal. In such condition, the most familiar objects may be readily transformed into

phantoms. The following anecdote illustrates this point.

During a voyage, the cook of the vessel died. Some days after his death, the second mate ran to the captain, and informed him that the cook was walking ahead of the vessel, and all the crew were standing on deck to look at him. The captain directed his gaze to the object, and distinctly beheld the form of his old friend, habited in his familiar dress, and walking in his usual gait. The crew were so alarmed, that the captain was compelled to work the vessel himself. Amid the general panic, he discovered that the object which had been transformed into the ghost of the cook, was nothing more than a fragment from the top of some mast, which floated before the vessel. In this case, both ignorance and fright served to produce the illusion.

The following historical facts illustrate the power of remorse, in producing illusions.

King Theodoric, blinded by jealousy, put to death the senator Symmachus, a most virtuous man. Scarcely had he performed this cruel deed, when he was overwhelmed with remorse. One day, a new kind of fish was brought to his table, when suddenly he uttered a cry of horror, for he saw in the head of the fish, that of the unfortunate victim

of his jealousy. It is added, that the vision threw him into a profound melancholy, from which he never recovered.

Bessus, surrounded with guests, and deeply absorbed in the pleasures of the banquet, suddenly turns away from his flatterers. Transported with rage, he springs up, seizes a sword, and rushes upon a nest of swallows, all of which are killed. "Think," says he, "of the insolence of these birds, who dare reproach me with the murder of my father." Soon afterwards, it was discovered that he was really guilty of the crime of which the poor birds accused him. Remorse of conscience had converted innocent birds into accusing demons.

Sometimes these illusions assume an epidemic character, as the following facts will show.

Pliny says that, during the war of the Romans and Cambrians, they were alarmed by the clash of arms and the sound of trumpets, which appeared to come from the sky.

According to Plutarch, in the fight against Tarquin, Castor and Pollux were seen on white horses, fighting valiantly in front of the battle.

Josephus states that many prodigies, such as chariots in the air, full of armed men, were seen during the siege of Jerusalem.

In the reign of Charles the Sixth of France, bat-

gles appeared to be waged at different times in the clouds.

The period of the Crusades is said to have been remarkable for these apparitions. At the battle of Antioch, in the thickest of the fight, the Crusaders saw St. Demetrius, St. George, and St. Theodosius come to their aid.

Such epidemic illusions only occur during times of great popular excitement. Then the people become morbidly susceptible, and readily transform the most familiar objects into the most marvellous.

SECTION III

HALLUCINATIONS.

Difference between Illusions and Hallucinations—Two Classes—Examples of both Classes—Causes—Remedies.

The difference between illusions and hallucinations, is this: in hallucinations, there is no objective reality, as in illusions. In hallucinations a man is not transformed into a cat, nor are clouds into armies; but the object seen is the entire creation of the mind.

Hallucinations may be divided into two classes:
1. Such as are known to be hallucinations by the victim, and are therefore supposed to be consistent

with reason. 2. Such as are not consistent with reason.

In the former, the subject knows that he is laboring under hallucination, and understands perfectly that there is no objective reality corresponding with his perceptions.

In the latter, the subject believes the hallucination to be a reality. He cannot be convinced that there is no objective reality, and that he perceives what really has no objective existence. Consequently, his hallucinations cannot be corrected by any appeal to reason, for reason is dethroned.

It is proper to illustrate both of these classes by examples.

Dr. Boismont relates the following: "A lady about sixty years of age, of extremely nervous susceptibility, was from time to time affected with singular visions. Suddenly she would see a robber enter her chamber, and conceal himself under her bed; she was instantly seized with violent palpitations of the heart, and universal trembling. She was, nevertheless, perfectly aware of the falsity of these things, and her reason made great efforts to dissipate the fears which they awoke in her mind. Satisfied that no person could have entered the room, the lady resisted the impulse which led her to open the windows and call for assistance; after

a struggle of some minutes, reason finally triumphed, and she was restored to calmness."

The following is one of the most interesting examples that have ever been offered in the history of hallucination. A physician, of great intelligence, was called to see a judge, who was laboring under the deepest melancholy. The judge was a man remarkable for his great firmness, his good sense, and his unwavering integrity. For a time, he persistently refused to give any reason for his sadness, although urged to do so by his physician. At length, however, after earnest expostulation on the part of the physician, he made the following singular confession :

"I assure you," said the judge, "my case is not unique, for there is a similar example in the celebrated romance of *Le Sage*. Without doubt, you remember the disease of which the Duke of Olivares died. He was overcome by the idea that he was followed by an apparition, in whose existence he did not believe, and he died because the apparition conquered his spirit, and broke his heart. Well, my dear Doctor, mine is a similar case, and the vision before me is so painful and so frightful, that my reason is quite inadequate to combat the effects of a frenzied imagination, and I feel that I shall die the victim of an imaginary malady."

Upon further inquiry, the physician learned that the phantom was first a cat, which at the end of a few months disappeared, and was succeeded by a phantom of higher grade. This was no other than a gentleman usher, dressed as though he were in the service of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, or of some other great functionary. "This character," proceeded the judge, "in a court dress, with big wig, a sword by his side, a vest worked in tambor, and a chapeau, has glided by my side, like the shade of Beau Nash." This apparition accompanied the judge, whether in solitude or society, for several months, when the gentleman usher disappeared, and was replaced by a horrible phantom—horrible to the sight and distressing to the mind—a skeleton.

"Alone, or in society," added the unfortunate man, "this apparition never leaves me. It is in vain that I repeat to myself that it has no reality—that it is but an illusion, caused by the derangement of my sight, or a disordered imagination. Of what use are such reflections, when the presage and the emblem of death is constantly before my eyes?—when I see myself, although only in imagination, for ever the companion of a phantom representing the gloomy inhabitant of the tomb, whilst I am still upon earth? Neither science, philosophy,

nor even religion, has a remedy for such a disease; and I too freely feel that I shall die this cruel death, although I have no faith in the reality of the spectre that is always present."

The physician was pained to see how deeply this vision was rooted in the mind of the invalid, who was then in bed. He adroitly pressed him with questions as to the apparition; knowing him to be a sensible man, he hoped to make him fall into contradictions, which would put his judgment, to all appearances clear, in a state fitted to combat successfully the disordered imagination, which was producing such fatal effects. "It would appear, then," said he, "that this skeleton is ever before you?" "It is my hapless destiny to see it always," replied the sick man. "In this case," continued the doctor, "you see it now." "Yes." "In what part of the room does it appear to you?" "At the foot of my bed; when the curtains are a little open, it places itself between them, and fills the opening." "You say that you understand it to be only an illusion? In dreams, we are frequently aware that the apparition which freezes us with fear is false; but we cannot, nevertheless, overcome the terror that oppresses us. Have you firmness enough to be positively convinced? Can you rise and take the place which the spectre appears to

occupy, in order to assure yourself that it is a real illusion?" The poor man sighed, and shook his head. "Well, then," said the doctor, "we will try another plan." He quitted the chair on which he had been seated at the head of the bed, and, placing himself between the open curtains, in the spot pointed out as being occupied by the apparition, he inquired if the skeleton was yet visible. "Much less, because you are between it and me; but I see the skull over your shoulder."

The physician employed every means known to the profession, or suggested by the occasion, to remove the malady, but without success. In the deepest depression, the patient died, the victim of an imaginary disease.

Ben Jonson is said to have experienced these hallucinations. He told Drummond that he had passed a whole night in watching his great arm-chair, around which he saw Tartars, Turks, and Roman Catholics, rise up and fight; but he added that he knew these images to be the result of a heated imagination.

Abercrombie gives an account of a man who was all his life beset with apparitions, to such an extent that when he met a friend in the street, he was uncertain whether he was a real person or a phan-

tom. He usually corrected the visual appearance by the touch.

This man was in the prime of life, in perfect health, of clear intellect, and was perfectly aware of the illusions.

A gentleman, well known to the author, is a victim of these hallucinations. He is a man of intelligence and cultivation, and takes great pleasure in narrating the beautiful scenes that present themselves to his sight. He sees most beautiful pictures, in the absence of any real object, and, at the time, is fully aware that the vision has no objective reality.

Thus, we might multiply examples, showing that persons of sound minds, with reason unimpaired, may be the subjects of the strangest hallucinations.

2. The second class of hallucinations cannot exist, except during mental aberration, and, of course, are not corrected by reason.

The difference between the first and second class of hallucinations, is this: in the first class, the subject of the hallucination knows full well that he is laboring under hallucination; in the second class, the subject believes the hallucination to be a reality, and cannot be convinced that he is laboring under hallucination. The history of mind

abounds with examples of this class, a few of which we give, for the purpose of illustration.

“Madame C.,” says Dr. Boismont, “was always lively and impressible. Educated amidst the most superstitious practices, and very ignorant, according to the usage of her country, she was subject, during six years, to an intermittent melancholy, which, after several attacks, presented a novel form. This lady, who, for some time, had given up all religious exercises, became filled with scruples, and thought herself damned. She would say to her physician, ‘I am in hell, damned, while you are in Paradise.’ Then she would complain of seeing devils, and would howl like a wild beast, beat her head against the walls, tear her hair and clothes, while terror and despair were depicted on her countenance. Her eyes became fixed and sunken, her skin yellow and cadaverous, and her voice hoarse with crying that she was lost, damned, and that the devil possessed her, tortured her, and prevented her from closing her eyes, by his constant and terrible presence. She soon refused all nourishment, and, after fifteen days of starvation, died a most terrible death—the victim of most fearful hallucinations.”

“Madame M. labored under the hallucination, that her husband, who had been dead for six years, was constantly present with her, but he is not

above a foot high, and he appears to her as a soul. He wanders on the walls, on the roof, on the street; he calls to her, and complains of cold and hunger. She replies with sighs, and shrieks, and howls."

A man laboring under *delirium tremens*, sees the walls of the room hung with skeletons, phantoms, and devils, while the floor is covered with hissing serpents, that crawl up his legs, and throw their poisonous folds around his body, and fasten their deadly coils around his neck.

A man, laboring under this malady, in the town of F——, imagined himself in a cabriolet, drawn by two splendid horses. The horses became frightened, he rose up in bed, seized the reins, and, with terror, called for help. "The horses are approaching a precipice—stop them! stop them!" exclaimed the infuriated man. Still pulling the reins with all his strength, he exclaimed, "There—they are over!"—fell back and expired.

We might easily multiply examples. One man labors under the hallucination that he is a plant, and needs to be watered; another is possessed with the belief that he is a glass pitcher, and would be easily broken; a third imagines himself a goose, and prepares his nest, and expects to hatch goslings.

A woman labors under the hallucination that she is the Virgin Mary, or Queen Victoria; or, oppressed with melancholy, she has a frog or snake in her stomach.

A man of wealth, well known in the State of Alabama, was laboring under the hallucination that he was God.

It is a peculiarity in all these cases, that the victim frequently changes the character of the hallucination. He passes from one scene to another, and from one set of images to another, with wonderful facility. In all these imaginary characters and scenes, he conforms his conduct to the peculiar hallucination under which he labors.

If he is God, he assumes great dignity; if a goose, he collects pieces of stone, sits, and hisses; if a glass pitcher, he is very careful, lest he be broken to pieces; if he sees serpents, he is in alarm; and if friends and angels surround him, he is happy.

It belongs rather to a medical work, than to a text-book for schools and colleges, to point to the remedies for such abnormal, or disordered action of the mind. It may not, however, be improper, in closing this discussion, to offer a few suggestions, on the causes and cures of alienated mental action.

The following may be enumerated as the principal causes of hallucinations :

1. Malformation of the brain.
2. Inflammation of the brain.
3. Exposure to the burning rays of the sun.
4. Immoderate use of ardent spirits, opium, hasheesh, or any powerful narcotic.
5. Immoderate indulgence of any of the appetites, and especially solitary vices.
6. Immoderate exercise of the imagination ; hence, poets, painters, and orators, are peculiarly liable to hallucinations.
- 7 Long watching, and great mental anxiety.
8. Immoderate indulgence of any of the passions, as love, joy, grief, anger, terror, etc.
9. Mistaken views of religion.
10. Disappointment in business, or in affairs of love, or in ambitious aspirations.

Volumes might be written, illustrating, by appropriate examples, the power of these causes to produce the mental phenomena presented in this chapter. But I leave to the instructor, the business of illustrating, by such examples as may be familiar to him.

The means of cure will be briefly adverted to, as follows :

1. Careful attention to the bodily health.

2. Suitable occupation, both for the body and mind.

3. Removal from the familiar scenes which are calculated to increase the hallucination.

4. A patient inquiry into the cause of the malady, accompanied by an earnest effort to remove it.

CHAPTER II.

HUMAN DESTINY.



SECTION I

IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND.

Arguments to prove the Immateriality of the Mind—Phenomena immaterial—Mental Achievements—Not according to physical Development—The Mind does not always sympathize with the Body—Pure Reason—Dreaming—The Holy Scriptures.

HAVING discussed at some length the intellect, sensibilities, and will, we are prepared to enter into the investigation of the substance and duration of the soul, or mind. We take the position that the soul is immaterial, and that it is immortal. We shall notice in this section its immateriality.

1. All the phenomena are immaterial. Take the phenomena of the intellect—perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, etc.—and we find them all immaterial; and, hence, our conclusion is that the substance which gives forth the phenomena, is immaterial. It will be recollected, as a first truth of reason, that as are the phenomena, so is the

substance. Material phenomena indicate material substance, and, of course, immaterial phenomena indicate immaterial substance. Not only are the phenomena of the intellect immaterial, but those of the sensibilities—pain and pleasure—and those of the will—choice, refusal, determination, are equally immaterial; the conclusion, then, appears to me irresistible, that the mind giving forth these complicated, yet immaterial phenomena, must itself be immaterial. No man pretends to ascribe material attributes to the mind. No one says the mind is round, or square, or triangular. The most violent materialist cannot apply such terms to the mind. Whenever material epithets are applied to the mind, it is done figuratively, and not with any design that they be accepted in their literal signification.

2. The achievements of mind indicate its immaterial nature. Neither the chair nor table, the pen nor ink, can think. They are but the instruments used in expressing the thoughts of my mind. It is actually a degradation of the human intellect, to suppose that its wonderful achievements are of material origin. Achievements which have brought the material universe under contribution to man, which have made the winds and the seas subservient to his interests, which have made the rays of the

sun give immortality to his features, and have constrained the lightnings to carry his thoughts and obey his behests, cannot be of material origin. The thoughts which startle, the wonderful combinations which astound, the brilliant creations which impart beauty to poetry, and are the glory of the fine arts, and the loud wail of passion, which meets its response in every bosom, all teach us that the mind is not matter, and that the doctrines of materialism are founded upon a false psychology.

3. The fact that the developments of mind are not determined by physical developments, establishes the immateriality of the mind. A dwarfish body may be connected with a mind of highest powers, while a gigantic body may be tenanted by a mind exceedingly feeble in its developments. The size and development of the body, constitute no criteria of the powers of the mind.

4. The mind does not always sympathize with the body. Decaying age is not always accompanied by mental senility. The mind rises up in its strength, and exhibits a clearness of thought, a breadth of reasoning, when the body is wasted by sickness and by age. Now, if the mind were the result of material organization, it would always sympathize with the body in disease, and weakness,

and age. The fact that the intellect often shines out with supernatural brilliancy, even amid the darkness of death itself, is convincing proof of the immateriality of mind.

5. The ability of the mind to arrive at knowledge otherwise than through the material organism, establishes its immateriality. Hence, all those ideas termed rational, in opposition to empirical, prove the truth of our proposition. If the mind were the result of material organization, it could act only through that organization. It could have no idea of anything, a knowledge of which did not come through the senses. Hence, our ideas of space, time, etc., which cannot be attained through the senses, afford convincing proof, not only that the mind is not material, but that it can even act independently of matter. All intuitive ideas, therefore, prove that the mind is not material.

6. The phenomena of dreaming establish that the mind acts independently of the body. In dreaming, it must be remembered, the senses, the great gateways of knowledge, are effectually closed, and yet visions are distinctly presented to the mind—lessons are learned, problems are solved, thoughts are recalled, arguments are pursued, briefs are written, and causes gained. The mind is conscious, as has been shown, while the body is asleep.

It is extremely doubtful whether the mind ever sleeps. It can keep watch while the body slumbers, and arouse it at the appointed time.

7. Finally, the Scripture account of the origin of the soul, coincides with the views here expressed. The body of man was made of the dust of the ground; but the soul was not thus made. After the formation of the body, so comely in its proportions, so complex in its machinery, and so perfect in its organization, then God breathed into man, into this lifeless piece of sculpture, the breath of life, and man became a living soul. This account shows that God stamped the soul with a dignity which does not belong to matter. Without the invisible tenant, the most perfect bodily form would be as lifeless marble, and the most delicately chiselled countenance would beam with no life, sparkle with no intelligence, and be marked with no noble purpose or high resolve.

SECTION II.

IMMORTALITY OF THE MIND.

Arguments to prove the Immortality of the Mind—It is immaterial—
The Mind survives the Body—Desire of Life—Justice of God—
Wisdom of God—Moral Responsibility—Universal Consciousness—
The Holy Scriptures—Closing Observations.

We may, to a considerable extent, determine the destiny of any object by the nature of its powers.

The examination of the qualities of a vegetable or a mineral, will enable us to determine its destiny. In the same manner, we determine the destiny of the human soul. It is immortal. In proof of the immortality of the soul, we offer the following arguments:

1. The immateriality of the soul having been proved, its immortality follows as a natural consequence. Matter itself is supposed to be indestructible by any of the ordinary operations of nature; much more, then, is the spirit indestructible.

2. We argue the immortality of the soul from the fact, that in all adult persons, the soul has already survived the decay of the body. It is a settled principle in physiology, that every few years the body undergoes an entire change. No man has the same body that he had seven years ago. During every seven years, the old body passes away, and another body is formed from new materials. If, then, the soul survives these various transmutations, these different passings-away of the body, why not admit that it is immortal? The body decays some five or six times during the life of an aged person, while the soul remains unharmed. The conclusion is certainly a very just one, that when the body passes into the grave and

into dust, the soul shall survive immortal as its Divine Author.

3. The universal desire of life affords strong proof of the immortality of the soul. Dr. Chalmers objects to this argument, on the ground that it is rather a proof that life has its charms, and consequently is desirable, than that the soul is immortal. We do not see the force of this objection. The desire is universal: it is an original, a natural desire: it is not the result of the enjoyment of the blessings of life; and, hence, the objection loses all force. Now, we argue that it is a direct reflection upon the goodness of God, to suppose that he would create a desire so original and universal without any design that it should be gratified. Man naturally and universally shrinks from death, as an unmitigated evil. No man can rationally regard death itself as any other than a sad and terrible misfortune. Its only palliation or mitigation is, that it is a mere temporary suspension of the powers of life. And as death approaches, and the grave claims the body, the mind rises in lofty aspirations for the pure and joyous scenes of immortality. Surely, if God is good, this inborn desire is proof positive that the soul can never die.

4. It is a direct reflection upon the justice of God, to deny the immortality of the soul. The

inequality of rewards and punishments in this life, is proof that there is a great future, in which God's justice shall be vindicated. The suffering of innocence, the sobs that come up from oppressed orphanage and sorrowing widowhood, the prosperity of crime and injustice, the song and dance and mirth of profligacy, all require that these inequalities should be adjusted by Him whose justice is inflexible, and whose throne, although surrounded by clouds and darkness, has never yet been stained by any act of wrong or injustice.

5. It is equally a reflection upon the wisdom of God, to deny the immortality of the soul. To endow the soul with powers so vast, and to surround it by so many appliances to develop them, are evidences sufficient to establish its immortality. If God is wise, he would not create man, place him on this globe with all its magnificent furniture, give to him such noble aspirations, and invest him with such attributes, merely to live a few years, "*propagate, and rot.*"

6. The feeling of moral responsibility, as it is not confined to this life, but projects itself into the great future, and erects before us the terrible bar of justice and of judgment, affords convincing evidence of the immortality of the soul. The feeling of accountability is universal, and lights

the fires of the judgment, even to minds uninstructed in the word of God. The feeling of guilt and shame, the sense of moral approbation, the hopes and fears of man, all teach that he is immortal.

7 The testimony of universal consciousness, is in favor of the immortality of the soul. We are conscious of immortality. No argument against immortality is valid, as long as man has the witness in himself that he is immortal. I appeal to every one to test this important truth by this ever-truthful witness, the universal consciousness.

8. Finally, we argue the immortality of the soul from the sacred Scriptures. No truth is more clearly revealed in the book of God than this. The whole scheme of redemption, all the promises and precepts, all the threatenings of punishment, and all the offers of life—the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ—are all for naught, if man be not immortal. Nay, more: the Scriptures are a fable, if man be not immortal. Here, then, we rest the argument. Man, in his spiritual nature, is the heir of immortality. Though allied to worms, and destined to become a tenant of the tomb, he is equally allied to angels and to God.

Here, then, is seen the high destiny of man. Intelligent, sensitive, and free, he is destined for

immortal progress in knowledge, in happiness, and in virtue. If this destiny be not attained, man will be false to himself, to his own great nature, and to his God. The claims of immortality are as much above all earthly claims, as angels are above worms, or as heaven is higher than earth. That these claims may be met, and this high destiny reached, by all that study this volume, is the prayer of the author.

THE END.

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